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By the early 1970s, the detente, or relaxation of tensions, between the United States and the 
Soviet Union had reached its apex, heralded by the summits of 1972 and 1973. The shared 
impetus for detente was strong. Moscow’s achievement of nuclear parity during the 1960s 
effectively neutralized the American nuclear deterrent. Both countries agreed that the 
confrontational tactics of the earlier Cold W ar period could serve neither the interests of world 
peace, nor the objectives of either superpower in its drive for global supremacy. Additionally, 
the leaders of each country found great political value in detente, which explains why neither 
superpower held to a strict interpretation of the agreements each nation signed at the summits.
As the first major Cold W ar proxy conflict to follow the detente period, the Yom Kippur W ar 
of 1973, fought between Israel (supported by the United States) and Egypt and Syria (supported 
by the Soviet Union), put detente to “the test.” Israel’s crushing victory in the June W ar of 
1967, which resulted in the capture of surrounding Arab territories, polarized the Arab-Israeli 
conflict along Cold W ar lines. The Soviet Union attempted to consolidate its position as patron 
of its Arab clients through massive military support. American foreign policy moved to “freeze” 
Arab radicalization by guaranteeing Israeli hegemony until both sides would agree to negotiations 
under United States auspices. The Arabs’ success in the first days of the Yom Kippur W ar 
caused a revolution in Israel’s defense posture, and W ashington’s Middle East policy. W ith Israel 
badly battered, and Egypt planted in the Sinai and eager to shed its dependence on Moscow, the 
stage was thus set for Henry Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy, which resulted ultimately in a final 
peace between the two arch-enemies. This major American victory had detente to thank, as 
Kissinger took advantage of the wide diplomatic latitude created by relaxed superpower tensions. 
The nuclear crisis a t the end of the war demonstrated both the limits and the ultimate success 
of detente: neither superpower proved willing to abandon passively its Cold W ar policies, yet 
each shared a fundamental belief in the inadmissability of nuclear war.
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Chapter I 
Introduction
The Yom Kippur W ar occupies a special place in the bloody landscape of Cold W ar proxy 
conflicts. If the intensity of war could be measured as a ratio of firepower divided into the 
duration over which it was expended, then Israel’s two-front battle against Syria and Egypt in 
October of 1973 claims the dubious distinction as the most intense conflict of the Cold W ar 
system.
Unlike so many other sub-theater wars that invariably pitted American arms versus 
Soviet arms with guerilla-oriented tactics, the Yom Kippur W ar was fought in the European 
(even “old fashioned”) tradition of open confrontation between massive land armies. The tank 
war in the Sinai front alone rivaled the greatest battles between the Nazi and Soviet armies of 
World W ar II. But this Arab-Israeli confrontation came with some Cold W ar accouterments 
that were unknown to the Great Power rivalries in the European theater. The Yom Kippur W ar 
provided an environm ent where some of the most sophisticated weaponry in the world could be 
tested in battlefield conditions. Neither superpower was prepared to allow its rival to project a 
more impressive show of force. This explains, in part, why the fourth Arab-Israeli war saw the 
largest weapons airlift in the history of conflict.
But superpower “flexing” was only a symptom of the larger political ramifications of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. By 1973, the northern tier of the Middle East had become split along bi­
polar Cold W ar lines. Both the United States and the Soviet Union had vied for political 
dominance in the Middle East since the end of W orld W ar II. Its oil riches and geo-strategic 
centrality would be important in the global competition.
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Moscow had sought, since 1955, to increase its prestige in the area by presenting itself 
to the Arabs as a fellow socialist, anti-Zionist, big brother of sorts. If the Arabs wanted to 
challenge Israel -  or even threaten its existence -  they would need Soviet weapons to do so. 
The Arab-Soviet relationship, however, was a marriage of mutual convenience, nothing more. 
For all of the inter-Arab rivalries in the postwar era, the Arab world found unity in anti- 
Communism at least as much as in anti-Zionism. The Soviets, for their part, claimed to support 
the Arabs on anti-imperialist grounds, although the reality of their motives rested on simple 
power politics. In Egypt, Moscow saw both its greatest coup w ith the 1955 weapons deal to 
Gamal Nasser, and its ignominious fall after the Yom Kippur W ar, when Anwar Sadat extricated 
Egypt’s dependence on Soviet weapons by restoring diplomatic relations with the United States.
The United States never wanted to be the exclusive supporter of Israel that it had 
become by 1973. Like the Soviets, American Middle East policy courted Arab favor in the form 
of weapon transfers and economic support. Yet, in the black-and-white world of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, W ashington increasingly found itself backing Israel’s interests. This relationship, too, 
found its basis in amoral political expedience far more than any ideological impetus to support 
a fellow democratic nation. O ne of the most fascinating policy debates in W ashington during 
the Cold W ar focused on whether or not Israel facilitated or hindered America’s anti-Soviet 
interests. By the end of the Yom Kippur W ar, the debate found a satisfactory answer. Egypt 
chose American diplomacy over Soviet arms as a means to achieve its goals, once W ashington 
found that it could support Israel without necessarily alienating the Arab enemies surrounding 
it. A new problem tha t arose from the Yom Kippur W ar had more to do with economics than 
power politics. The Persian Gulf states saw in the war a convenient pretext to withhold oil from 
the industrialized nations, thus putting a pan-Arab face on a prudent business decision. The
ensuing energy shortages quickly replaced Soviet predominance as the most threatening security 
issue to come from the Arab world.
The stakes, then, were extremely high for both superpowers by October 1973, and as the 
historical record indicates, both the United States and the Soviet Union acted decisively to 
prevent the other from gaining unilateral advantage. Yet, the situation was not like Cuba or 
Berlin of the past decade. Strategic parity, achieved by Moscow as it caught up with the 
American nuclear arsenal over the course of the 1960s, and the excessively tense crises that had 
pushed the superpowers to the brink of nuclear war, called for a new framework to mitigate the 
superpower competition. The Soviet-American detente did not seek to end the Cold War; it 
merely rested on the shared assumption that the crises that would inevitably develop in Third 
World zones of competition ought never to deteriorate to the point of direct nuclear 
confrontation.
The Yom Kippur W ar -  the first major proxy conflict to erupt after the Soviet-American 
detente summits of 1972and 1973 -  thus underscored the competing, and sometimes mutually 
exclusive superpower impetuses of the Cold War. As a war which both Moscow and 
W ashington correctly perceived as crucial in the ongoing global competition, the fourth Arab- 
Israeli confrontation brought a fundamental Cold W ar question to a head: how far could the 
superpowers go in furthering their own interests without risking nuclear war?
This thesis seeks to answer that question in as comprehensive a manner as possible. To 
do so requires an examination of four unique international relationships, each of which serves 
as the major topic of each chapter. The author is most interested in how nations balance force 
and diplomacy as a means to further their security interests. This interplay serves as a guide for 
understanding both Cold W ar rivalry at the global level, and client-patron relations at the
regional level.
Chapter 1 broadly introduces the Soviet-American detente. It traces the shared goal of 
relaxed tensions from the birth of the Soviet Union through the Yom Kippur War. This chapter 
seeks to create a framework for how “to think” about superpower behavior in the events leading 
up to the Yom Kippur W ar. The seeming contradiction between the proclamations of the 
Soviet-American detente, and the actions each took in its quest for Middle East predominance, 
has led the author to examine detente beyond a superficial reading of the major summit 
documents of 1972 and 1973. Detente, or the relaxation of tensions, and its Russian equivalent, 
razyradka, was larger and richer than the ambivalent, and somewhat politically-driven 
interpretations of it in the early 1970s. If the Yom Kippur W ar put detente to “the test,” as the 
title of this thesis suggests, then detente must be understood in its proper, and full, historical 
context. In this first chapter the author has attempted to combine his training in both political 
science and historical methodology, out of the belief that the two fields intersect at the sub­
discipline of international relations. Chapter 1 combines analysis with historical narrative to 
define detente both as a creator and product of superpower relations in the middle six decades 
of the 20th century.
Chapters 2 and 3 (Soviet-Egyptian and American-Israeli relations, respectively)focus on 
the client-patron relationships of the four actors, both of which began in the early Cold W ar 
period, and culminated in the diplomatic revolutions wrought during and after the Yom Kippur 
War. These are “sister” chapters in more than one sense -  they are organized in the same style, 
but the content of each chapter, examining the particularities of the two client-patron 
relationships, yields fascinating similarities in national behavior. Strategic self-interest emerges 
as the dominant consideration of each of the four nations’ security policies. Likewise, each
international relationship is characterized far more by conflict than  harmony.
Chapter 4 examines American policy in the immediate postwar period. In this final 
chapter, the Soviet Union receives only passing reference for the simple fact that its Middle East 
standing was severely downgraded as a result of the Yom Kippur W ar. Henry Kissinger’s shuttle 
diplomacy serves to combine basic truisms of client-patron relations and the superpower detente; 
in a way, Kissinger’s performance shatters the myths discussed throughout the first three 
chapters. The evolution of Soviet-Egyptian and American-Israeli relations were neither 
inevitable nor unbreakable. Claims made to the contrary were generally ideological in nature, 
and designed to obscure each nation’s actual motives. In short, the United States did not “have 
to” become Israel’s guarantor to the exclusion of the Arabs -  events leading up to that situation 
were created either by chance or lack of choice.
Kissinger’s bold shuttle diplomacy emphasizes the basic meaning of the Soviet-American 
detente. Contrary to the warm personal relations between the leaders of the two superpowers 
and the high-minded agreements made between them, detente remained what it always had 
been: an attem pt to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war so that the political nature of the global 
Cold W ar competition could continue. This fact was realized dramatically when the Soviet 
Union could only watch passively as its major client in the Middle East effectively neutralized 
Moscow’s influence of the previous twenty years.
Finally, a word of caution. This thesis avoids any grand conclusions on the larger 
implications of the Yom Kippur W ar on detente. W hile the war did indeed test the efficacy of 
detente, it did not necessarily produce a conclusive outcome by which to determine if detente 
“failed” or “succeeded.” This is true for two reasons. First, while the Middle East was a major 
theater of Cold W ar competition, it alone would not, and could not, serve as the basis of the
globally oriented Soviet-American relationship. Second, the ambivalent nature of both detente 
and the client-state relationships resists simple cause and effect analyses. There is no single and 
authoritative definition of detente which can serve as a barometer of superpower behavior, and 
the Arabs and Israelis only concerned themselves with detente when it was in their direct 
interest to do so. N either side preferred to be agents of their superpower interests, and their 
actions -  largely taken without the consent of their patrons -  do not fit into the already 
imprecise nature of a detente framework.
The task of this thesis, then, is not to find conclusive answers, but, rather, to elucidate 
the complexity of a global and regional international framework.
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Chapter II 
Detente: Global Peace, Local Conflict
Saki Dockrill, a political scientist, captured perfectly the essence of detente: it is “an elusive 
concept, and, as it evolved during the Cold War, it was not about achieving ‘peace,’ if ‘peace’ 
m eant resolving the conflict itself.”1 In one sentence, Dockrill identified the three major 
elements that constitute detente: its complexity; long history; and most important, its mitigating, 
as opposed to curative, approach to the Soviet-American Cold War.
In order to examine the interplay of detente and the state of Arab-Israeli relations 
surrounding the Yom Kippur W ar of 1973, it is necessary to frame the most intensive period of 
relaxed tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union in its proper historical context. 
Detente, as it existed in the Richard Nixon-Leonid Brezhnev period of 1969-1973, emerged as 
a moderate policy that strove to ensure that the ongoing superpower conflict would never 
devolve to the point of nuclear war. Rooted in profound ideological, political, and economic 
differences, the Cold W ar was a global competition that by nature could not end until the 
collapse of either the American or the Soviet system. Beyond the fundamental agreement that 
nuclear war was an inadmissable method of advancing the interests of either superpower, both 
nations devised their strategy as a waiting game by which an eventual erosion of power would 
be advanced by the accumulated global influence policies of one side over the other. Through 
the auspices of improved communications, summit meetings, technological exchange, and the 
like, detente merely codified the peaceful nature of this global waiting game.
!Saki Dockrill, “Introduction,” in Wilfried Loth, Overcoming the Cold War: A  History of 
Detente. 1950-1991 (New York: Palgrave, 2002), vii.
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Extreme interpretations of detente -  on one side, that Nixon and Brezhnev managed to 
“end” the Cold War; on the other, that detente was nothing more than a mirage cynically
f
designed to consolidate the domestic base of both leaders -  fail to explain the nature of
superpower action in  Third World conflicts, albeit between each other or involving their
respective clients in the region.
Contrary to some contemporary opinions, the Nixon-Brezhnev detente did not, then,
significantly alter the nature of the Cold War. The historian Ronald Steel, writing in 1972,
exemplifies the most inflated interpretation of detente:
T h e C old W ar is over because few serious people any longer believe that it exists. A t  a time 
w hen then  president o f  the U nited  States renders hom age to the C om m unist rulers o f  China by 
traveling to their court in Peking, and w hen W ash ington  seeks M oscow ’s help in the onerous, 
and increasingly tiresom e, burden o f developing the im poverished states o f  the Third W orld, it 
is obvious that the old  faith has eroded and that the old  vocabulary is ob solete.2
Steel based his argument on genuine geopolitical changes afoot in the early 1970s that would 
have been unthinkable in the years immediately following W orld W ar II. Indeed, N ixon’s visit 
to China in 1972 was historic, but Steel failed to couch the meaning of the trip as a method, in 
part, of exploiting the Soviet fear of a possible Sino-American entente. As for the supposedly 
collaborative nature of dealing with the “onerous” and “tiresome” burden of the Third World, 
Steel presumably referred (he did not elaborate) to the Soviets’ hand in two areas: mediating 
the Arab-Israeli conflict -  which succeeded only in arming the Arabs to force levels sufficient 
to launch a war against an intransigent Israel -  and Moscow’s highly tentative offer to help end 
the Vietnam W ar by putting pressure on its N orth Vietnamese clients, who were also sufficiently 
armed with Russian weapons to continue aggression. Such actions hardly constituted a
2Ronald Steel, “Introduction,” in Walter Lippmann, The Cold War (New  York: Harper &. Row, 
1974), vii.
meaningful relationship with the United States on the basis of managing a peaceful developing 
world. Steel had nothing to say of the Indo-Pakistani war of December 1971, and of course he 
may be forgiven for writing without the benefit of hindsight; whereas the Yom Kippur W ar of 
1973 and the war in  Angola of 1975-1976 challenged the viability of detente, the war in 
Afghanistan of 1979 collapsed the framework entirely. If the Cold W ar, as Steel claimed, was 
over before each of these brutal wars occurred, the question is begged: if this was not Cold War, 
what was?
In a similar vein, the scholars Charles Gati and Toby Trister Gati wrote, “compared to 
the explicit antagonisms and relative simplicity of the Cold W ar era, American-Soviet relations 
entered a somewhat relaxed and certainly more complex phase in the 1970s.”3 Like Steel, Gati 
and Gati viewed the 1970s detente as a distinct era succeeding (as opposed to being included 
in) the old Cold W ar system. One is reminded of the critic Robert Kagan’s argument against the 
nostalgia of alleged past simplicity. In a 1998 New Republic review of A  Tangled Web, written by 
former Kennedy official William Bundy, Kagan wrote, “The historical fallacy that most pervades 
discussion of American foreign policy these days is that it was all so m uch simpler during the 
Cold War....This, of course, is nonsense.”4 Although Gati and Gati were not romanticizing the 
supposedly bygone Cold W ar era, they were certainly guilty of the oversimplified demarcations 
Kagan warned against.
These “revolutionary” interpretations of detente were common among government 
officials as well. In congressional testimony, David E. Mark, a State Departm ent intelligence
3Charles Gati and Toby Trister Gati, The Debate Over D etente (New York: Foreign Policy 
Association Press, 1977), 3.
4Robert Kagan, “Disestablishment,” The N ew Republic, August 17-24, 1998. Although Kagan’s 
review is extremely negative, he did not specifically direct this argument against Bundy.
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officer, referred to “a new, if very imperfect, world order [that]...has laid the ground rules for 
peaceful, if no t always harmonious, intercourse between the Free W orld and the Soviet sphere.”5 
Mark’s characterization reflected an honest ambiguity inherent in the concept of detente itself. 
If, in 1971, detente was being hailed as a “new world order” (always a suspect phrase) this fact 
was more a product of a politically charged domestic atmosphere than  indicative of any geo­
political reality. Furthermore, the concept of a “very imperfect” new world order defies logic; a 
more cautious phrasing may have illustrated the strategy of detente more clearly.
O n the whole, contemporary characterizations that hailed detente as a comprehensive 
shift past the Cold W ar were exceptions rather than the norm. Marshall Shulman, a scholar of 
the Cold W ar, addressed what he called a “confusion” due to the
am biguities over the word detente. Som e had taken it to m ean a qualitative change from the 
kind o f  relationship w hich  existed  over the C old W ar— a rapprochem ent; a com m on approach  
to international problems based upon com m on values, interests, and objectives. M y view  is that 
this is too broad a use o f  the word, and that it does n o t bear any realistic resem blance to the 
relationship that exists. I believe a more restricted definition is required, and that it m ight make 
m atters clearer to use the term  ‘lim ited D eten te .’ T h e essential characteristic o f  the present 
S oviet policy, wether we call it ‘lim ited d eten te’ or ‘peaceful co ex isten ce ,’ is that it offers the 
possibility o f  a partial codification o f  the terms o f  com petition  b etw een  the two countries.6
If, somehow, the global superpower competition had indeed moved beyond the early Cold War, 
as Shulman argued, then the qualitative change in East-W est relations must be interpreted in 
the most limited of terms. In this sense, detente did not usher in an end to the basis of an 
ongoing Soviet-American conflict; it simply recognized that this conflict would continue without 
resorting to nuclear force.
5David E. Mark, as cited in United States, Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Hearings: The Cold War: Origins and Developments (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1971), 56-57.
6Marshall Shulman, as cited in United States, Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Hearings: Detente (W ashington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), 3.
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The emphasis on avoiding nuclear war during the Nixon-Brezhnev era owed its existence
to a long history of advocates warning against the ghastly nature of such a conflict. If the basis
of characterizing the Cold W ar as past history by the early 1970s rested on shared nuclear fears,
it is a blurry one indeed. The real transition lay in a growing urgency to establish nuclear-free
tensions as a result of the Soviet-American nuclear parity which did not exist in the years
immediately following W orld W ar II, and the balance remained extremely lopsided in America’s
favor until the late 1960s. In the W estern perspective, the Nixon-Brezhnev detente formed as
the realization of a Soviet nuclear capability transformed from a hypothetical possibility to reality.
This long-standing fear was most powerfully enunciated by W inston S. Churchill in his famous
“Iron Curtain” speech delivered in Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946. He declared,
It w ould nevertheless be wrong and im prudent to entrust the secret know ledge or experience o f  
the atom ic bomb, w hich the U nited  States, Great Britain, and Canada now  share, to the world 
organization, while it is still in its infancy. It w ould be crim inal m adness to cast it adrift in  this 
still agitated and un-un ited  world. N o  on e in any country has slept less w ell in  their beds 
because this know ledge and the m ethod and the raw m aterials to apply it are at present largely 
retained in A m erican  hands. I do n ot believe w e should all h ave slept so soundly had the 
positions reversed and som e C om m unist or neo-Fascist state m onopolized, for the time being, 
those dread agencies.7
If the intensity of the Nixon-Brezhnev detente, as measured by summitry and issuance of joint 
Soviet-American communiques and agreements, somehow indicated a clear transition from the 
earlier Cold W ar period, the backdrop of this entire framework must be measured in terms of the 
urgent need to normalize relations between two roughly equal nuclear powers. Detente, then, 
was the Nixon administration's pragmatic response to the traditional concerns as expressed by 
Churchill. The fact tha t Moscow became a major nuclear power did not diminish the real
7W inston Churchill, “The Iron Curtain Dropped by Russia.” Speech reprinted in Thomas G. 
Paterson, The Origins of the Cold W ar. 2d ed. (London: D.C. Heath and Company, 1974), 12-13.
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concerns of W estern leaders as compared to the imagined concerns of the first generation of 
Cold W ar warriors -  it simply necessitated a relaxation of tensions.
The detente period of the early 1970s made apparent the shared revulsion toward the 
prospect of nuclear war, but it could not lay claim to monopolizing an anti-war atmosphere. 
Even NSC-68, the classic American Cold W ar document, deemed a "preventative" war -  
irrespective of the likelihood of military victory -  as "morally corrosive," which "would [bring] 
us little if at all closer to victory in the fundamental ideological conflict."8 The Soviet American 
summits of 1972 and 1973 produced no more eloquent renunciation of war, nor did the leaders 
of either country lay any claim that the ideological basis of their differences had abated in any 
form. A nd of course, the very concept of desiring peace did not originate in the Nixon-Brezhnev 
detente. The historian John Lewis Gaddis concluded in  his classic study, The United States and 
the Origins of the Cold War, that both Soviet and American leaders genuinely desired a peace, 
but that proved to be incompatible with external situations "beyond the control of either power" 
and internal situations tha t created the hostile character of the burgeoning Cold W ar.9 The 
same case can be made for the Cold W ar as it existed by the early 1970s -  especially in the areas 
of arms control negotiations, the most significant area of detente.
Based on aspirations toward peace throughout the Cold W ar, both nations had to 
grapple, on one hand, with the external and uncontrollable reality of the opposing country's 
military; on the other, with the internal impetus to refuse conceding any meaningful offensive 
capability. To the extent that the 1970s detente leaders were charting new waters, they were
sNSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs o f National Security. 14 April 1950. 
< http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm>  (20 January 2004).
9John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins o f the Cold War. 1941-1947 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1972), 361.
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dogged by the same basic contradiction that defined the whole of Soviet-American relations in 
the post-war era. And, like the leaders of the late 1940s and early 1950s, eliminating the 
atmosphere of hostility between the two nations was neither possible, nor particularly desirable. 
The Soviet Union and the United States both operated on the premise of waiting out the other's 
eventual demise, bu t an imminent national collapse in the detente period struck neither side as 
likely. Beyond continuing measures to ensure the avoidance of nuclear war, the United States 
and the Soviet Union perceived detente as essentially a tool of self-interest; a framework to be 
exploited and challenged, and, a means ultimately to further the conflict until one side collapsed 
after the burden of the others' preponderance became too m uch to bear. W hat the Soviet 
Ambassador to the U nited States, Anatoly Dobrynin, concluded of the Nixon/Kissinger strategy 
was true of his own bosses as well: "Essentially, neither the president nor his closest aide proved 
able (or wanted) to break out of the orbit of the Cold W ar...."10
Detente. Peaceful Coexistence: American and Soviet Perceptions
A policy of relaxed tensions, dictated largely by self-interest, and a combination of both domestic 
and foreign objectives, was bound to result in highly divergent approaches among the 
superpowers. As the theorist G. W arren N utter observed, Kissinger's detente strategy aimed to 
create a "web of mutual involvement and vested interest," albeit in the economic or political 
sphere.11 Although Kissinger recognized the Soviet Union as the only nation capable of 
threatening America's global position, he regarded the leading Communist country as essentially
10Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: The Memoirs o f M oscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six 
Cold War Presidents (1962-1986) (New York: Random House, 1995), 195.
n G. Warren Nutter, Kissinger’s Grand Design (W ashington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute 
for Public Policy Research, 1975), 13.
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a pariah among the community of nations. His plan was to afford the Soviet Union more in the
way of economic and political integration (but never to the extent that might challenge the
United States) so that Moscow would have more to lose, and, in turn, become less likely to take
adventurous risks. Richard Nixon recalled his strategy at the 1972 Summit in Moscow:
T h e first stage o f  d eten te [was] to involve S oviet interests in ways that w ould increase their stake 
in  international stability and the status quo. There was no thought that such  com m ercial, 
technical, and scientific relationships could by them selves prevent confrontations or wars, but 
at least they w ould  h ave to be counted  in a balance sh eet o f  gains and losses w henever the 
Soviets were tem pted  to indulge in  international adventurism .12
In a conflict between ideological adversaries, Kissinger and Nixon sought victory over the Soviet
Union by making it more like the United States. John K enneth Galbraith, a prominent scholar,
identified this strategy as "convergence," a policy that assumed the inherent rightness of the
industrialized democratic system, which would eventually compel the Soviet Union to abandon
its ideological pretensions in favor of the more comfortable trappings of capitalism.13
If Soviet leaders were receptive to this strategy, they certainly hid it from public view.
A t the 24th Congress of the CPSU, of March 1971, General Secretary Brezhnev introduced his
summary report of the Soviet Union's foreign policy activity, with the following declaration:
Socialism , w hich  is firmly established in the states n ow  con stitu tin g  the world socialist system,
has proved its great viability in  the historical con test w ith  capitalism ....T he world socialist system
has b een  m aking a great contribution to the fulfillm ent o f  a task o f  such  v ita l im portance for all
the peoples as the prevention  o f  another world war. It is safe to say that m any o f  the imperialist
aggressors' plans were frustrated thanks to the ex isten ce o f  the world socialist system  and its firm 
Haction.
12Richard M. N ixon, RN: The Memoirs o f Richard N ixon . 2d ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1990), 618.
13Robert Conquest referring to John Kenneth Galbraith, as cited in U nited States, Congress, 
Senate Committee on Government Operations, Hearings: International Negotiation (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1970), 19.
i4Leonid I. Brezhnev, speech reprinted in Soviet Union, Docum ents of the 24 th Congress o f the 
Communist Party of the Soviet U nion  (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1971), 9.
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Brezhnev's statement, if taken at face value, offered little in the way of varying interpretations. 
Moscow's view of itself at the helm of a global, rising Communist movement left slight, if any, 
room for convergence of W estern interests, insofar as having the effect of dampening the Soviet 
ideological position.
In a clearly divergent view from the Americans, the Soviets interpreted the economic 
aspect of detente (and, for that matter, detente as a whole) as a gamble. As the political 
scientist Lawrence T. Caldwell characterized Moscow’s perspective, detente “implies that 
peaceful competition between socialism and pluralist democracies will be resolved in favor of the 
former.”15 Although the Brezhnev regime generally repudiated the bluster of the Khrushchev 
era in favor of more businesslike relations with the W est, there is little evidence to suggest that 
Moscow in the detente period lost sight of the fact that the Soviet Union was, as Seweryn Bialer, 
an academic specialist of Soviet domestic issues, observed, “Created to fulfill a mission...to be 
a refuge, a bastion, a base of revolution for the whole world.”16 This Soviet mission necessitated 
a dynamic interpretation of global events whereby change toward Marxism-Leninism was the 
norm. Such a framework stood starkly in contrast to the American status quo vision, in which 
nations were to be prevented from “falling” into the Communist orbit. The oppositional 
character of Soviet and American foreign policy conceptions was most profoundly exemplified 
in the area of arms limitation. The fact of nuclear parity left the Americans to  advocate 
“sufficiency,” or the maintenance of equal force levels sufficient to ensure mutually assured 
destruction, beyond which excess capabilities were considered pointless. The Soviets, in
15Lawrence T. Caldwell, Soviet-American Relations: One H alf Decade of D etente Problems and 
Issues (Paris: Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1976), 56.
Seweryn Bialer, “Soviet Foreign Policy: Sources, Perceptions, Trends,” in Seweryn Bialer, ed.,
The Domestic C ontext o f Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder: W estview Press, 1981), 418-19.
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contrast, exhibited little interest in a static nuclear relationship. As one group of experts argued, 
“Soviet leaders conceive of national power, including of course military power, mainly in terms 
of class struggle, i.e. in terms of the dialectics of political competition and conflict between 
social-political ideologies and systems which are fundamentally and irreconcilably opposed to 
each other.”17
The Soviet U nion’s self-perception as the leading custodian and exporter of Communist 
ideology was not limited to its relations with the non-aligned Third World. Vladimir Petrov, a 
political scientist, observed that whereas the United States maintained one detente with the 
Soviet Union, Moscow managed several detentes concurrently with America’s main allies, 
including Germany, Canada, Iran, and Japan. Petrov identified this as a dual strategy, to 
“accentuate the positive in bilateral relations and benefit from them  economically and politically, 
while taking full advantage of what they see as the existing and developing ‘contradictions in the 
imperialist camp.’”18 For a country tha t assumed an inevitable decay of Canadian-American 
relations, belief in the efficacy of convergence required a leap of faith, indeed. After the fanfare 
of the American-Soviet Summit of June 1973 had quieted, Pravda emphasized Moscow’s ongoing 
foreign policy: “Peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems by no means 
signifies a recognition of the immutability of capitalism.”19 In a study of Soviet propaganda 
techniques, scholars Richard H. Schultz and Roy Godson conclude tha t “negative and 
defamatory” characterizations of the United States were consistently disseminated, regardless
17Leon Goure, Foy D. Kohler, and Mose L. Harvey, The Role o f  Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet 
Strategy (Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1974), 40.
18Vladimir Petrov, U .S .-Soviet Detente: Past and Future (W ashington, D.C.: American 
Enterprise for Public Policy Research, 1975), 26-27.
,9Cited in United States, Congress, Detente. 1974, 85.
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I
of “whether the W estern allies have perceived East-West relations to be in  a period of Cold W ar 
or a period of ‘detente.’”20
In sum, there is little ground for the argument that the Nixon-Brezhnev detente “ended” 
the Cold W ar in a sense that a period of summitry and production of joint agreements resolved 
the basis of the conflict itself. To be sure, the cooperative framework of this era indicates a 
transition from the more confrontational atmosphere in earlier Cold W ar periods. A t most, this 
fact is rooted in an ongoing willingness between the superpowers to manage their differences 
without resorting to nuclear war -  the transition did not attem pt to solve the differences 
themselves. As a m atter of simple pragmatism, the basic opposition of a status quo verses 
revolutionary ideology was largely unresolvable. Each superpower’s detente strategy reinforced 
this fact.
Detente in Historical Perspective
Soviet and American leaders in the early 1970s did not invent detente; it had existed in one 
form or another since then birth of the Soviet state. A  brief review of the long East-West 
tradition of relaxed tensions emphasizes the importance of interpreting detente in limited terms 
-  it would be difficult to assess Soviet and American actions, and the Middle East conflict 
leading to the Yom Kippur W ar, on the assumption that detente was somehow a repudiation of 
past conflict in favor of a peaceful “new world order”. The historical record suggests a 
continuation of, rather than revolution from, the pattern of Soviet-W estern relations from the 
October Revolution through the early 1970s.
20Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy 
(Washington, D.C.: Pergamon Press, 1984), 188.
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A  State D epartm ent document, published in 1974, identified the current U.S. policy of
detente, aiming to reduce the risk of war with the Soviet Union, as a “a central foreign policy for
over twenty years," thus dating the movement to normalize Soviet-American tensions from the
death of Josef Stalin onward.21 But detente, in policy if not in name, must be traced back to V.I.
Lenin’s foreign policy, which served (or was at least claimed to have served) as the foundation
for all successive regimes.
Lenin treated the prospect of war with the bourgeois democracies -  what he called “a
series of frightful collisions” -  as a matter-of-fact historical inevitability. In a report to the
Seventh Congress of the Communist Party in March 1918, Lenin declared:
International imperialism, w ith  the entire m ight o f  its capital, w ith  its highly organized military 
techn iqu e...cou ld  n ot under any circum stances, or any con d ition , live side by side w ith  the 
Soviet R epublic...it could  n ot do so because o f  com m ercial con n ection s o f  in ternational financial 
relations. In this sphere a conflict is inevitable.22
But Lenin, like his successors, was a pragmatist as well as an ideologue. After the Bolshevik 
Revolution failed to spark similar proletarian revolutionary upheavals across Europe, Lenin 
clarified that an inevitable war was not necessarily an imminent one.23 According the Soviet 
writers Henry Trofimenko and Pavel Podlesny, Lenin, who understood English, was the first 
leader to use the word “coexistence” in a September 1919 interview with the Christian Science 
Monitor. The following year, the Kremlin declared,
21United States, Department of State, The Meaning of D eten te, Publication N o. 8766, 1974, 5.
V.I. Lenin, “Report on War and Peace.” Speech delivered to the Seventh Congress o f the 
Communist Party on 7 March, 1918. Reprinted in Robert C. Tucker, The Lenin Anthology (New York: 
W .W . Norton &  Company, 1975), 542.
23Graham D. Vernon, “Controlled Conflict: Soviet Perceptions o f  Peaceful Coexistence," in 
Graham D. V em on, ed., Soviet Perceptions of War and Peace (W ashington, D.C.: National Defense 
University Press, 1981), 114-
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Our slogan has b een  and remains the same: peaceful coex isten ce w ith  other governm ents, no  
m atter w hat they are. Reality itself has led us and other states to  find it necessary to establish  
lasting relations b etw een  the worker-and-peasant governm ent and capitalist governm ents.24
Stephen W hite, an historian, identified the Genoa Conference of 1922 as the first 
attempt to normalize W estern-Soviet relations. W estern opinion generally interpreted the 
Soviets’ New Economic Policy, launched in 1921, as a sign “that a more moderate and 
acceptable form of politics would gradually emerge in its place.”25 British Prime Minister David 
Lloyd George predicted that the Russians would follow the course of the French Revolution. 
Like the French, Lloyd George assumed that internal stability and a relaxation of tensions with 
other nations would eventually replace the revolutionary fervor of a five-year-old government. 
The United States, which would not establish diplomatic relations with Moscow until 1933, sent 
Ambassador to Rome R.W. Child only as an unofficial observer. Georgy Vassilievich Chicherin, 
the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, advocated industrial and agricultural cooperation 
between Russian and other Great Powers.26 Such cooperation was not a m atter of choice for the 
Soviets, but a necessity. By 1922, world wide socialist revolution was proving to be a more 
difficult process than the Bolsheviks had anticipated. Peaceful coexistence with the W est not 
only offset the “series of frightful collisions” that Lenin had predicted -  it was also used as an 
essential prop to the Communist government, which had to worry about its own survival before 
directing liberation movements elsewhere.
24V.I. Lenin, as cited in Henry Trofimenko and Pavel Podlesny, U SSR -U SA : Lessons o f Peaceful 
Coexistence: Fifty-Five Years of Soviet-American Diplomatic Relations (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency 
Publishing, 1988), 11.
25Stephen W hite, The Origins o f Detente: The Genoa Conference and Soviet-W estern Relations, 
1921-1922 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 97.
26Evgeny Chossudovsky, “Genoa Revisited: Russia and C oexistence,” Foreign Affairs 50, April 
1972, 557.
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Eugene V. Rostow, an Undersecretary of State in the Lyndon Johnson administration, 
characterized President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union as 
the first detente between the two nations,27 although the years preceding the outbreak of World 
W ar II failed to produce any significant normalization of relations which in fact became strained 
to the point of collapse after the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939. The American- 
Soviet alliance, a result of Hitler’s attack on Russia and his declaration of war on the United 
States following the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor, clearly spoke to the ability of a common 
enemy to bring adversaries together. The shared Nazi menace was responsible for what was 
arguably the warmest American-Soviet dialogue of the entire history of relations between the 
two countries.
W endell Willkie, special representative to President Roosevelt during W orld W ar II, 
issued a report on Soviet affairs, titled “Our Ally, Russia,” which he included in his wartime 
travelogue, One World. He wrote admiringly of both the Soviet war machine and the Russian 
character. He commented that all the authorities offered him full access to inspect schools, 
farms, and factories, and allowed private interviews with randomly selected citizens. Willkie 
empathized with the courageous plight of the Red Army, the survival instincts of the peasants, 
and the efficiency of the collective farms. Stalin, whom Wilkie met on two occasions, struck him 
as “a hard man, perhaps even a cruel man, but a very able one.” Willkie concluded of the Soviet 
leader, “There is no reason to be cautious. He is one of the significant men of this generation.” 
Willkie was genuinely moved by his experiences in Russia. Perhaps sensing a likely hostile 
relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union in the future, Willkie ended his
27 Eugene V. Rostow, as cited in American Bar Association, Detente: A  Law Professor Workshop 
(Washington, D.C.: American Bar Association Press, 1976), 3-4.
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report: “No, we do not need to fear Russia. We need to learn to work with her against our 
common enemy: Hitler. W e need to learn to work with her in the world after the war. For 
Russia is a dynamic country, a vital new society, a force that cannot be bypassed in any future 
world.”28
The National Council of American-Soviet Friendship echoed Willkie’s sentiments at the 
popular level. Two “friendship rallies,” held at a crowded Madison Square Garden in 1944 and 
1945, hosted many speakers who delivered “peace speeches,” including one titled “No Third 
World W ar” from Soviet Ambassador to the United States (and future Foreign Minister) Andrei 
Gromyko. Gromyko characterized wartime Soviet-American relations as only a starting point for 
future “durable bonds... in the interests of the preservation of general peace and prosperity of the 
peoples. ”29 Joseph E. Davies, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, warned that peace with 
Russia must be preserved, otherwise “civilization would be set back hundreds of years, if it 
survived at all. ”30 T hen Under-Secretary of State Dean Acheson called for increased 
understanding and communication between the two countries, whose differences must be 
mitigated by the “overwhelming desire for mutual understanding . ”31
O f course, a lasting momentum of Soviet-American friendship was contingent upon 
ongoing German and Japanese aggression, whose actions had temporarily eclipsed the pre­
existing animosity between the United States and the Soviet Union. As the presidential 
historian Robert Dallek pointed out, “The Soviet regime of 1939 tha t outraged us by signing the
28W endell L W illkie, O ne World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1943), 50-87.
29Andrei Gromyko, “N o Third World War.” Speech reprinted in U .S .A .-U .S .S .R .. Nations 
United for Victory. Peace and Prosperity (New York: National Council o f  American-Soviet Friendship, 
1945), 25.
30Joseph E. Davies, “Mutual Confidence for Security.” Speech reprinted in ibid., 22.
31Dean Acheson, “Problems of Security and Understanding.” Speech reprinted in ibid., 15.
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Nazi-Soviet pact was precisely the same as that in which we came to discern so many virtues 
during the war. ”32 John Lewis Gaddis observed, “Through a curious kind of illogic the Russians’ 
vigorously successful resistence to Hitler purified them  ideologically in the eyes of the 
Americans. ”33
Yet detente never suffered a total collapse. From 1947 until Stalin’s death in 1953 -  
what is generally considered the height of the Cold W ar -  detente was on hiatus just as the 
Soviet-American entente during World W ar II greatly shadowed the two nations’ mutual 
hostility. The historian William Taubman identified the period of January 1946 to April 1947 
(at least as far as Stalin was concerned) as a detente in transition. In early 1946, the United 
States and the Soviet Union remained allies, but growing tensions in this year and a half period 
were clearly intensifying toward Cold War. Taubm an referred to Soviet-American relations 
during this time as demonstrating the basic characteristics of detente: “A  moderate amount of 
tension plus a good deal of negotiation, all within the context of what the Soviets, at least, 
regarded as inevitable, ongoing competition .”34 Taubm an emphasized his description of this 
detente period by noting the intensity of its negotiations as compared to the later detente: 
“Richard Nixon would hail detente as a transition from confrontation to renegotiation. But the 
1970s had nothing on 1946 when it came to time spent at the negotiating table . ”35
By early 1947, U.S. foreign policy, as embodied in the Trum an Doctrine, enacted major 
increases in military and economic assistance to Greece and Turkey. As the Cold W ar scholar
32Robert Dallek, “How W e See the Soviets,” in Mark Garrison and Abbot Gleason, eds., Shared 
Destiny: Fifty Years o f  Soviet-Am erican Relations (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985), 85.
33Gaddis, The United States and the Origins o f the Cold W ar. 33.
34William Taubman, Stalin’s American Policy: From Entente to D etente to Cold War (New York: 
W .W . Norton &. Company, 1982), 128.
35Ibid„ 159.
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Thomas G. Paterson observed, “The doctrine assumed that eastern Europe was already lost to 
the Soviet Union,” and tha t the major countries on Russia’s southwest flank -  Iran, Greece and 
Turkey -  “were to be drawn into the United States’ sphere of influence . ”36 The strategy of 
Containment helped to move American-Soviet relations from a shaky period of postwar detente 
to one of Cold W ar. If Stalin’s February 9, 1946, election speech, in which he called on the 
Soviet Union to militarize in preparation for another global conflict, heralded the Cold War, the 
Trum an Doctrine made it operational.37 Soviet and American leaders made no significant efforts 
to return to detente until 1953, after Stalin’s death and the armistice in Korea.
In a speech delivered in 1969 to the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research, international relations expert William E. Griffith characterized the whole of East-West 
relations: “International detente has often been interrupted but has basically continued since 
1953.1,38 Once freed from the terror and cult of Stalin’s personality, the new Soviet leaders 
wasted little time in  making overtures to the United States. O n  M arch 9, 1953, four days after 
Stalin’s death, Soviet Prime Minister Georgii Malenkov called for the “possibility of a lasting 
coexistence and peaceful competition between the two different systems. ”39 Malenkov also 
advocated increased domestic production of consumer goods, and significantly muffled the 
Soviet Union’s traditional call for proletarian revolutions abroad. The Soviets’ successful test 
of a hydrogen bomb, announced on August 8 , 1953, undoubtedly supplied Malenkov, and First
36Thomas G. Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins 
of the Cold War (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 174.
37Walter LaFeber, America. Russia, and the Cold War. 1945-1966 (New York: John W iley and 
Sons, 1967), 30.
38William E. Griffith and W alt W . Rostow, East-West Relations: Is D etente Possible? 
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1969), 1.
39Loth, Overcoming the Cold W ar. 19.
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Party Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, with the confidence necessary to enact these significant 
reforms.40
The Geneva Conference of July, 1955, represented the first significant step toward 
detente for the United States, both at the popular and political level. Joseph McCarthy’s 
Communist witch-hunt had subsided by the end of 1954, and U.S. policy toward Moscow 
became more flexible as a result. Richard W. Stevenson, an historian, explained Eisenhower’s 
response: “While the frenzy of McCarthyism had blinded Americans to the changes tha t had 
been occurring since 1953, it was the excesses of McCartyhism tha t forced Americans to reassess 
their views in 1955. It was this reassessment that persuaded Eisenhower to explore alternatives 
to the stalemate in  the Cold W ar and helped him politically to do so .”41 A lthough the “spirit of 
Geneva,” as the conference came to be known, failed to produce any significant changes in the 
Cold W ar system, both the American and Soviet delegations concluded talks by affirming their 
commitment to peace. A  W hite House statem ent on the Geneva Conference declared, “The 
President expressed the belief that the outstanding feature of the meeting was apparently sincere 
desire expressed by the Soviet delegation to discuss world problems in  the future in an 
atmosphere of friendliness and a willingness to sit down together to work out differences. . . . ”42
By 1956, Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization program was well underway. The General 
Secretary believed that the potential of thermonuclear war necessitated a fundamental 
reorientation of Lenin’s foreign policy. W hereas early Soviet doctrine regarded war with the
40LaFeber, America. Russia, and the Cold War. 148-149.
41Richard W . Stevenson, The Rise and Fall o f Detente: Relaxations o f Tension in U .S .-Soviet 
Relations, 1953-1984 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1985), 37.
42Dwight D. Eisenhower, as cited in United States, President, Public Papers o f the Presidents of 
the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1956), 728.
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bourgeois industrial nations as inevitable ( if not necessarily imminent), the idea of global 
nuclear holocaust dictated tha t such a conflict was unacceptable. Yet the Marxism-Leninism 
ideological component -  always central to Soviet detente policies toward the United States -  
remained intact. As the scholar Fred W arner Neal theorized, the new Soviet policy held:
T h e therm onuclear nature o f  m odern was such  that no society  w ould  escape destruction; and
com m unism  cou ld  n ot possible be built on  the ruins o f  w hat, if  anything, w ould be left.
Therefore, avoidance o f  therm onuclear was n o t on ly  possible, but in order to  insure the final
triumph o f  com m unism , essential.43
A lthough anything approaching Soviet-American nuclear parity would not be achieved 
until the late 1960s, Khrushchev’s characteristic embellishment of Soviet capabilities held that 
W estern aggression had become deterable, and, as a result, the Soviet Union could continue its 
support of Socialist revolutions around the globe.44 Thus was created the Soviet policy of 
peaceful coexistence in its modern form.
The Cuban Missile Crisis, by far the most tense episode of the Cold W ar, actually proved 
to be a boon to the detente process. As the Kennedy Administration enjoyed its “victory” after 
the Soviets backed down from the naval blockade standoff, Moscow demonstrated, as far as the 
Americans were concerned, that it could act rationally during crisis situations. Additionally, 
Kennedy’s hardline strategy during the showdown furnished him with the domestic credentials 
necessary to pursue detente -  a policy at once urgently needed and seemingly attainable, due 
to the intensity of the crisis, and its peaceful conclusion, respectively .45
The Limited Test Ban Treaty, certified between the U nited States, Britain and the
43Fred Warner Neal, as cited in United States, Congress, The Cold War: Origins and 
Developm ents. 1971, 175.
44David Holloway, The Soviet U nion and the Arms Race (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1983), 84.
45Stevenson, The Rise and Fall o f D etente. 138-139.
25
Soviet Union on O ctober 10, 1963, represented the first significant step by the nuclear powers 
to avoid a repeat of anything like the Cuban crisis. Like the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
Treaty, signed in 1972, the earlier Test Ban Treaty aimed to reduce tensions through indirect 
means. In an April 12,1963, interview with the Saturday Review, Khrushchev reasoned, “After 
Cuba, there was a real chance for both the Soviet Union and then  United States to take 
measures together tha t would advance the peace by easing tensions. The one area on which I 
thought we were closest to agreement was nuclear testing . . . . ”46
Kennedy’s famous commencement address at American University on June 10 aimed 
to break the deadlock on the test ban negotiations. The President declared: “Today, should 
total war ever break out again -  no m atter how -  our two countries would become the primary 
targets. It is an ironical but accurate fact that the two strongest powers are the two in the most 
danger of devastation.” Kennedy agreed with Khrushchev -  a test ban on nuclear weapons was 
the one feasible area of arms control that would help relax tensions between the superpowers. 
“The conclusion of such a treaty,” Kennedy said, “so near and yet so far -  would check the 
spiraling arms race in one of its most dangerous areas. ”47 Kennedy’s speech, especially his 
mention of the grievous losses sustained by Russia during W orld W ar II, elicited a positive 
response from Khrushchev, who offered a limited ban on nuclear testing in outer space and 
under water in a speech delivered in East Berlin on July 2,1963.48 Intense negotiations, with W. 
Averell Harriman leading the American team, produced the docum ent titled “Treaty: Banning
46Glenn T. Seaborg, Kennedy. Khrushchev and the Test Ban (Berkeley: University o f California 
Press, 1981), 180.
47John F. Kennedy, as cited in United States, President, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the 
United States: Tohn F. Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964), 462.
48Harland B. M oulton, From Superiority to Parity: The United States and the Strategic Arms 
Race, 1961-1971 (London: Greenwood Press, 1973), 129.
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Nuclear W eapon Tests in Atmosphere, in O uter Space and Underwater” signed in Moscow on 
August 5, 1963. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreements of the following 
decade could not claim a loftier goal than that offered by the Test Ban Treaty. The second 
paragraph read,
Proclaim ing as their [U .S ., U .K ., and U .S .S .R . governm ents] principal aim the speediest possible 
ach ievem en t o f  an agreem ent on  general and com plete disarm am ent under strict international 
control in  accordance w ith  the objectives o f  the U n ited  N ation s w hich  w ould put an end to  the 
arm am ents race and elim inate the incentive to the production and testing o f  all kinds o f  
w eapons, including nuclear w eapons....49
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was able to convince a skeptical Senate tha t the treaty 
in no way represented a softening of U.S. nuclear strategy and superiority. McNamara declared, 
“W e are determined to m aintain that superiority. In order to achieve it, we maintain a total 
number of nuclear warheads, tactical as well as strategic, in the tens of thousands .”50 As 
McNamara’s testimony makes clear, the Test Ban Treaty would not actually impede global 
nuclear proliferation. Underground testing was not included in the agreement; France and 
China refused to sign the treaty; and, as the German historian Wilffied Loth observed, advances 
in nuclear technology would find increasingly novel methods of testing weapons.51
In 1964, the Soviets began development for an ABM shield around Moscow and Russia’s 
western border. McNamara immediately recognized that the missile shield would create another 
arms race -  largely what the Test Ban Treaty, if only in name, was designed to curtail. The only 
concrete success that came as a result of the treaty’s enforcement was environmental -  after
49The Test Ban Treaty is reprinted in United States, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
Third Annual Report to Congress, January 1, 1963-Decem ber 31, 1963, 33.
50Robert McNamara, as cited in United States, Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Hearings before the Committee on  Foreign Relations. 88th Cong., 1st 
sess., 1963, 97.
51Loth, Overcoming the Cold War. 77.
October, 1963, the level of radioactive pollutants in the atmosphere decreased. Nonetheless, 
the treaty was an important first step in the history of nuclear diplomacy, and in conjunction 
with the J une 20 memorandum establishing a direct communications link between Moscow and 
Washington, D.C., the summer before Kennedy’s assassination demonstrated a shared resolve 
of both superpowers to improve their crisis management capabilities. Both Kennedy and British 
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan considered the Test Ban Treaty a great achievement of their 
respective terms .52
Kennedy’s assassination effectively ended the tacit detente that had been building since 
the Cuban Missile Crisis. Kennedy’s successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, directed his efforts toward 
the Great Society reforms and the American military engagement in the Vietnam conflict, which 
was quickly transforming from “Containment in action” to fiasco. Stanley Hoffmann 
characterized Soviet-American relations between 1964-1968 as “years of rather muted 
Containm ent of Moscow and limited accommodation. O ne could perhaps speak of a de facto 
detente, a detente more improvised than thought through . ”53 This fact was best exemplified by 
the impromptu Glassboro, New Jersey summit of 1967, where Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin 
and Johnson met on cordial, if shallow, terms. Ambassador Dobrynin concluded of the summit, 
“The fact that the Glassboro Summit seemed to yield no concrete results can...be explained by 
its sudden genesis; having been arranged with so little preparation it could hardly be expected 
to make significant advances .”54 Johnson framed the goals of his presidency in domestic terms,
52Seaborg, Kennedy. Khrushchev and the Test Ban. 282.
53Stanley Hoffmann, “D etente,” in Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ed., The Making o f America’s Soviet Policy 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 234-235.
54Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: The Memoirs o f  M oscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six 
Cold War Presidents (1962-1986) (New York: Random House, 1995), 167.
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and he intended that he would continue the policies of his hero, Franklin D. Roosevelt, in the 
form of the Great Society. But that “bitch of a war,” Johnson’s telling nickname for the Vietnam 
conflict, sapped American resources and his domestic credibility alike .55 To the extent that 
Johnson’s administration kept a wary eye on Communist expansion, American officials looked 
to China and the rising tide of the Cultural Revolution. It was not until two years after Richard 
Nixon’s election that he and Henry Kissinger linked Moscow, Beijing, and Vietnam, thus shifting 
a linked Soviet-American detente to the forefront of international affairs.
New Leaders. New Detente
The fall of Nikita Khrushchev in October 1964, and subsequent accession to power by Leonid 
Brenzhnev and Alexsei Kosygin -  First Secretary of the Central Committee and Chairman of 
the Council of Ministers, respectively -  did not result in any significant foreign policy changes 
of the Soviet Union. While Khrushchev’s ouster resulted principally from his failed 
brinkmanship in Cuba, the new leaders in Moscow emphasized that the “palace coup” would not 
be accompanied by reinvigorated hardline policies. Ambassador Dobrynin was dispatched to the 
W hite House on October 16 to inform President Johnson of the planned continuation of 
Moscow’s policy toward the United States .56 In that early juncture, the Soviet Union was totally 
unprepared for change -  both Brezhnev and Kosygin were amateurs in the foreign policy realm, 
which remained in the hands of Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. In 1966, Gromyko issued 
a foreign policy report to the Politburo which reiterated the basic detente policy that had been
55Bruce J. Schulman, Lyndon B. lohnson and American Liberalism: A  Brief Biography with 
Documents (Boston: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 125-152. Schulman’s chapter on  Vietnam  offers a good 
explanation as to why Johnson was distracted from other concerns.
56Dobrynin, In Confidence. 128.
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in place since 1956. He called for a “m uch greater scope” in the “Soviet-American dialogue” 
and for socialism’s peaceful victory in the long run: “The concentration of our main efforts on 
the domestic purposes is fully in line with Lenin’s statem ent tha t the final victory of socialism 
over capitalism will be ensured by the creation of a new, m uch higher level of labor 
productivity .”57
As the Cold W ar expert Foy Kohler argued, Brezhnev’s conception of peaceful
coexistence, as influenced at the beginning of his tenure by Gromyko, was a continuation of
Lenin’s own proclamation of peaceful coexistence, with the noted emphasis on economic, rather
than military, measures to achieve Moscow’s final goal.58 Soviet President Nikolai Podgomy’s
toast to Nixon during the 1972 Moscow Summit exemplified this longstanding approach:
A s far back as in  the early years o f  the young S ov iet states, its founder V .I. Lenin substantiated  
the objective n eeded  for and possibility o f  peaceful coex isten ce o f  countries w ith different social 
systems. Today, as before, the Soviet U n ion  is prepared to d evelop  and deepen  relations o f  
business cooperation  and m utually beneficial ties w ith states o f  a different social system .59
In a more candid moment, Podgorny might have added, “in order to observe their eventual 
destruction.”
The State Departm ent under Nixon also emphasized America’s long history of detente, 
noting that any substantive changes in detente policy in the early 1970s were of an operational, 
as opposed to strategic or ideological, nature. A rthur A. H artm an, the Assistant Secretary of 
State for European Affairs, noted that from 1933 to 1974 the American and Soviet governments 
signed a total of 105 agreements, of which 58 took place since 1969, and of those, 41 since
57Andrei Gromyko, as cited in Loth, Overcoming the Cold War, 84.
58Foy Kohler, as cited in United States, Congress, D eten te. 1974, 70.
59Nikolai Podgorny, as cited in United States, President, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the 
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1 9 7 2  60 W alter Laqueur characterized this trend as the latest -  and clearly the most 
comprehensive -  period of detente, which nonetheless had yet to achieve a cohesive policy.61 
As the scholars Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George observed, the intensity of the early 
1970s detente must be understood in light of Nixon and Kissinger’s highly ambitious goal of 
developing a new international system. Nixon and Kissinger believed tha t the Soviet Union 
would remain the principal threat to the United States, but the growing rift between Moscow 
and Beijing could be exploited by pursuing detente with both  Comm unist nations over an 
extended period of time .62 The implications of the Nixon-Kissinger strategy -  especially in the 
context of understanding Soviet and American actions in the Yom Kippur W ar -  are twofold. 
First, the “new international system” assured an ongoing conflict with the Soviet Union; second, 
the benefits to be derived from the expanded conception of detente would be apparent only in 
the long term. In other words, the new international system was still in its infancy by October 
1973, and the peace the United States sought to achieve remained very much a hypothetical 
possibility up to that time.
In 1972, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird emphasized this point: Soviet and American 
differences, he said, “are rooted in a conflict of world interest and differing perceptions of how 
those interests should be protected and forwarded. W e cannot eliminate these differences 
overnight. W e probably cannot eliminate them  in your lifetime or mine . ”63 By 1977, detente
60Arthur A. Hartman, as cited in United States, Congress, D eten te. 1974, 48.
61 Walter Laqueur, as cited in United States, Congress, Senate, Comm ittee on Government 
Operations, Hearings: N egotiation and Statecraft (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), 
2 .
62Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our 
Time (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 132-133.
63Melvin R. Laird, The N ixon Doctrine (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for 
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had lost most of the luster attached to it during the Nixon administration, and an American Bar
Association pamphlet aptly reflected the prevailing mood: “Detente, stripped down to its
coexistence essence, is hardly a notch above an undertaking to  attem pt to adjust superpower
differences through negotiation .”64
A limited interpretation of detente is thus necessitated by the fact of an ambiguity
inherent to the Nixon-Kissinger strategy. W hatever their long term goals, Soviet-American
relations in the early 1970s remained steeped in a Cold W ar setting, what Fred W arner Neal
described as a mutual goal toward “negative coexistence,” or the process by which both  countries
could “reach an agreement about what not to do. This is the primary task of statesmanship for
the moment -  not to produce an ideal world but to insure as far as possible tha t there will be a
world.”65 In light of this most basic determinant, detente inhibited superpower competition in
the Third W orld only insofar as it threatened to create a crisis situation tha t could potentially
become nuclear. In less tense circumstances, detente actually encouraged the competition. As
Roger E. Kanet, a scholar, interpreted the Soviet objective, detente
provides an environm ent in w hich  the forces o f  reaction, b oth  in the W est and the Third W orld, 
will gradually w eaken. D eten te  is n ot view ed by the S ov iet leadership as a prelude to a period 
in  w hich  cooperation, rather than conflict, will characterize the basic relations b etw een  the two 
superpowers and their allies.66
In other words, the Soviets rejected the American detente strategy aimed at forcing Moscow 
to abandon its interests in the Third W orld in favor of de facto acceptance of the existing world 
order. As Raymond Garthoff, a formet arms control expert, noted, the Soviet counter-strategy
64American Bar Association, Detente: A  Law Professor W orkshop. 38.
65Fred Warner Neal, as cited in United States, Congress, The Cold W ar. 1971, 171.
66Roger E. Kanet, Soviet Foreign Policy and East-West Relations (New York: Pergamon Press, 
1982), 42.
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of detente was essentially the same as the Nixon-Kissinger model, only in “reverse mirror 
reflection,” whereby Moscow aimed to prod W ashington into acceptance of a new world no 
longer under American global predominance.
In the Soviet framework, the fact of strategic parity with the United States shattered the 
status quo, and by extension, furthered the legitimacy of Marxism-Leninism on a global scale.67 
Because the Soviet Union and United States based their detente strategies on these highly 
divergent assumptions, Helm ut Sonnenfeldt, a member of the National Security Council in the 
Nixon administration, argued for the word “detente” to be banished from the American political 
lexicon in favor of the phrase “management of the emergence of Soviet power.” For political 
purposes, the phrase was much clumsier than “detente,” but Sonnenfeldt believed that it would 
more accurately reflect the ongoing American-Soviet conflict, and emphasize the importance 
of crisis management when the Soviets decided to demonstrate their power.68
These interpretive differences of detente at the politico-strategic level in no way negated 
real gains in detente in other areas. As Marshall Shulman argued, detente was a “multi-level 
relationship, and the movements on the various planes on which the two nations now interact 
are not always in the same direction.” Along with the politico-strategic level, Shulman identified 
the plane of “functional cooperation” as a major component of detente .69 The Soviet writers 
Henry Trofimenko and Pavel Podlesny echoed Shulman’s point: “The discords stemming from 
the differences between the two countries’ interdependence is just as important, and so are the
67Raymond L. Garthoff, D etente and Confrontation: Am erican-Soviet Relations From N ixon to 
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factors tha t make it indispensable to promote contacts and cooperation between the two powers 
and the two peoples. ”70 The idea was that detente was not a monolith, and there was no 
necessary contradiction between important gains made in cooperation in non-strategic areas, and 
deadlock over arms limitation treaties and competition in the Third World.
The Nixon-Brezhnev detente secured concrete gains in several areas in the plane of 
functional cooperation. In the business realm, the Congressional removal of the “Most Favored 
N ation” ban on the Soviet Union was a necessary condition for several agreements, including 
settlement of the Lend-Lease debt, left over from W orld W ar II, increased trade between the 
two nations, and Soviet access to low-interest Export-Import bank credits .71 In July, 1969, 
Apollo 8  Commander Colonel Frank Borman took a nine-day tour of the Soviet Union and 
exchanged pleasantries with many Soviet officials. President Podgorny remarked that a "blip had 
appeared on the U.S.-Soviet friendship screen" -  clearly the American anxiety caused by the 
launching of Sputnik was a thing of the past. 72 A  report commissioned in 1989 by the United 
States Institute of Peace concluded that Soviet-American cooperation in areas including health 
research, technological exchange, space exploration, and environmental protection, all 
contributed to a very real detente that served as a moderating influence on the Cold W ar .73
Shulman's term of functional cooperation is especially apt; for the non-strategic aspect 
of detente, namely peaceful exchange, reflected the mutual desire for cooperation between two
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powerful nations irrespective of the ongoing Cold War. The shortcomings of both superpowers 
in their attempts to relax tensions in the areas of arms proliferation and global political influence, 
i.e. the real issues of the Cold W ar, do not contradict the success of detente in the functional 
realm -  these areas were not necessarily interdependent. Finally, even if the whole of detente 
can be judged as only partially successful, alternative policies were not necessarily viable. Henry 
Kissinger characterized the detente policies he and Nixon had established: "The quest for 
peaceful coexistence clearly had its perils, it did not follow that a crusading policy of 
confrontation would prove more successful."74 The former Secretary of State was answering the 
many critics of the United States policy of detente. His reasoning could have served the Soviet 
architects of coexistence as well.
D etente and Adventure
Henry Kissinger explained in his memoirs the necessity of his hardline policy against the Soviet 
Union: "If Moscow is prevented by a firm W estern policy from deflecting its internal tensions 
into international crises, it is likely to find only disillusionment in the boast that history is on its 
side."75 Moscow's hum an rights record serves as a useful gauge for measuring domestic tensions. 
In Kissinger's conception, fomenting crises abroad was a release valve for tha t tension, and the 
impetus to divert attention away from domestic problems was strong indeed. One of the major 
communiques issued in the detente era, the "Basic Principles of M utual Relations Between the 
United States of America and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," signed in Moscow on May 
29, 1972 (henceforth referred to as the BP A, which will be further examined later in this
74Henry A , Kissinger, W hite House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 1256.
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chapter), affirmed:
T h e U S A  and U S S R  h ave a special responsibility, as do o ther countries, w ith  the perm anent 
members o f  the U nited  N ations Security C ouncil, to  d o  everyth ing in their power so that 
conflicts or situations will n ot arise w hich w ould serve to increase international tensions. 
A ccordingly, they will seek  to  prom ote conditions in  w hich  all countries will live in peace and 
security and will n ot be subject to outside interference in  their internal affairs.76
The simple calculus of this statem ent holds that the superpowers had a mutual and overriding 
interest and responsibility in maintaining global stability, which itself was a crucial determinant 
in avoiding nuclear war. In other words, detente precluded whatever benefits either superpower 
stood to gain by aiding or creating regional instability. A  broad interpretation of this principle 
would effectively condemn arms proliferation in superpower-client relations and political 
meddling in sovereign states. Thus, the BPA, viewed in this light, expressed the mutual desire 
to eliminate the competitive nature of the Cold War.
The actual policies of the Soviet Union exposed the hollow meaning of the BPA for two 
reasons. First, a central tenet of Marxism-Leninism required destruction of the status-quo; 
indeed, there would have been little operational value of the ideology without its disruptive 
component. Second, as Kissinger argued, Moscow also exploited international crises for the 
decidedly non-ideological purpose of deflecting attention from its own internal problems. These 
factors explain how, contrary to a literal interpretation of the BPA, Moscow saw in detente an 
opportunity to pursue a very different policy. The fact of the Soviets' growing nuclear power 
since the time of Khrushchev created mutual deterrence, out of which grew detente. In the 
Soviet view, nuclear power was the master of detente -  not the other way around. As the 
scholar Albert Weeks observed,
76The BPA is reprinted in Richard P. Stebbins, and Elaine P. Adams, eds., American Foreign 
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D eterrence op en ed  up new  avenues for revolutionary agitation and for exporting revolution  to 
Third W orld 'nations’ bourgeoisies struggling against colonialism .' Precisely because o f  the fear 
o f  an outbreak o f  therm onuclear war, 'wars o f  national liberation' (local wars) have becom e  
feasible because the superpowers would be loath  to escalate such  wars in to  world con flicts.77
Adam Ulam, an historian, identified Soviet support for "wars of national liberation" as the 
theater in which Moscow attempted to gather global prestige and eventually emerge victorious 
in the Cold War:
A lthou gh  they are determ ined to prevent the outbreak o f  a major war, S ov iet leaders seem  as 
yet insufficiently aware o f  the n eed  to evolve techniques for preventing sm all crises from  
escalating into major ones. O n  the contrary, they see such  small crises as offering opportunities 
for the S ov iet U n ion  to improve its diplom atic power and p osition .78
As the political scientist W alter Laqueur noted, "wars of national liberation are not covered...by
the Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence, for they are considered progressive wars which ought
to be supported ."79 Professor Laqueur's statem ent raises two major implications: 1)Marxism-
Leninism and detente were in some ways incompatible, and 2) the Soviets cosigned a major
detente agreement tha t included principles which ran counter to Moscow's basic foreign policy.
Brezhnev himself outlined the paradox of detente and national self-interest in his Foreign Policy
Report of the 24th Party Congress:
W e declare that while consistently pursuing its policy o f  peace and friendship am ong nations, 
the S ov iet U n ion  will con tinu e to conduct a resolute struggle against imperialism, and firmly to  
rebuff the ev il designs and subversions o f  aggressors. A s in  the past, w e shall give undeviating  
support to the people's struggle for dem ocracy, national liberation and socialism .80
As Moscow's "undeviating support" was in fact checked before tensions reached a point that
77W eeks, The Other Side of Coexistence, 241.
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would risk an American response. As Stanley Hoffmann, a scholar of international relations, 
argued, the period of relaxed tensions allowed the Soviets increased latitude for provocation .81 
W ith the possible exception of Southeast Asia, no region in  the world received greater amounts 
of Soviet weaponry than  the N orthern Arab states. In public, Moscow couched this support in 
terms of fraternal socialism, but privately based its decisions in terms of enhanced self-interest. 
(This topic will be further discussed in chapter 3).
Fred Schulman, a nuclear scientist, asserted that detente “permitted the Soviet Union 
to incite the October W ar ."82 This was perhaps oversimplified, but nonetheless gets at the heart 
of the very different modes of detente principles and practices. To be sure, the United States did 
not sacrifice international interests for detente, either -  the events of 1973, in  Chile, speak to 
this fact. And, in the Middle East, the United States supported its client Israel no less 
enthusiastically than Moscow's influence policies attem pted to maintain sway over the Arabs. 
Nixon declared as much in his 1972 Foreign Policy report to Congress, "The Emerging Structure 
of Peace": "We stand at the head of a group of countries whose association we value and are not 
prepared to sacrifice to an improvement in Soviet-American relations ."83 In sum, Moscow's 
revolutionary policies exhibited more dramatically the divide between ideals and geopolitical 
reality, but this fact applied to both superpowers. D etente cannot be judged only in the vacuum 
of imprecise communique wording. The refusal of both the United States and the Soviet Union 
to adhere to the lofty principles set forth in detente proceedings underscores the ongoing Cold 
W ar conflict, which had at its roots continued avoidance of nuclear war. For the United States,
8!Hoffmann, “D eten te,” in Nye, ed., The Making of America’s Soviet Policy. 243.
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these preventative measures would be accomplished through the strategy of the Nixon Doctrine.
Detente and the Nixon Doctrine
The Nixon Doctrine provided an operational link between detente and the Yom Kippur War.
As part repudiation, and part continuation of the Trum an Doctrine, the basic foreign policy
strategy of the United States during the Nixon Administration reflected the need to manage an
evolving Cold W ar. T he United States would continue to support democracy and its allies
against Communist expansion, bu t the real catastrophe of V ietnam and the realistic possibility
of nuclear holocaust -  made all the more frightening toward the end of the 1960s as Soviet
nuclear stockpiles reached comparable levels with those of the United States -  necessitated
indirect support of its allies in the form of military and economic assistance. Nixon's Foreign
Policy Report to Congress of 1970, “A  New Strategy for Peace,” defined the Nixon Doctrine,
first the president announced by in 1969:
Its central thesis is that the U n ited  States will participate in  the defense and developm ent o f  
allies and friends, b ut that A m erica can n ot -  and will n o t -  con ce ive all the plans, design all the  
programs, execu te  all the decisions and undertake all the defense o f  the free nations o f  the world. 
W e will help  where it m akes a real difference and is considered  in our interest.84
In other words: no more Vietnams, and no more potential for direct confrontation of 
Soviet and American forces. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird categorized the four major 
components of the N ixon Doctrine, all of which relied on the longstanding American strategy 
of deterrence and containment. The first, "deterring strategic nuclear warfare," emphasized the 
continuation of American policy since W ashington was first confronted with Soviet nuclear
84Richard N ixon, as cited in United States, President, Report to Congress. “U.S. Foreign Policy for 
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capabilities in the years following World W ar II. The second, and third components, "deterring 
theater nuclear warfare," and "deterring theater conventional warfare," respectively, reflected 
the growing strength of American allies in Europe and their consequent responsibility in 
deterring localized nuclear war and/or conventional aggression by China or the Soviet Union. 
The Nixon Administration introduced the fourth component, "deterring subtheater or localized 
warfare," in the form of Vietnamization, which was expressed most fully with American support 
to Israel during the Yom Kippur W ar .85 The Departm ent of Defense referred to this fourth 
component as a "strategy of realistic deterrence,” which recognized the inadmissibility of massive 
retaliation as a means to deter Communist aggression in non-strategic regions; i.e., the Third 
World.
By the early 1970s, the United States had lost a clear nuclear advantage over the Soviets. 
As the American homeland became more or less equally vulnerable to Soviet attack, 
W ashington could no longer credibly threaten "massive retaliation" in defense of "subtheater" 
allies.86 N ixon defined the alternative, which was designed to take the potential of nuclear 
attack on American cities out of the equation: "In cases involving [subtheater] aggression we 
shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty 
commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary 
responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense .”87
As Nixon noted in his 1973 Foreign Policy Report to Congress, "Shaping a Durable
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Peace," the superpowers could not assume that their policies would be obeyed by client
countries, which had their own agendas. This fact intensified the need to keep U.S. and Soviet
forces out of situations that they could no longer control.88 The course of the Yom Kippur W ar
(to be fully discussed in chapters two and three) dramatically exemplified Nixon's concerns. As
Edward B. Atkenson, a military expert, noted,
T h e O ctober 1973 experience marked the first occasion  o f  the exercise o f  real power by member 
states o f  the Third W orld. N ever before have former colonial territories or non-aligned  countries 
b een  able to d ictate political and econom ic terms to industrialized nations on  such  a scale or 
w ith such  effectiveness.89
Thus, the Nixon Doctrine attempted to synthesize old and new policies in order to meet 
the challenges of a Cold W ar comprising old and new elements. The political scientists 
Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke aptly characterize the Nixon Doctrine as essentially 
"an odd mixture of Containm ent (thought not referred to as such) and hints of a successor to 
that policy.”90 Because the Nixon Doctrine emphasized above all else the necessity to avoid 
crisis situations and nuclear war, it must be viewed at the center of the overall U.S. detente 
policy. As a strategy, it illustrated an attempt to confront the Soviet Union both firmly and 
rationally. As Henry Kissinger argued, "To be sure, detente is dangerous if it does not include 
a strategy of Containment. But Containment is unsustainable unless coupled with a notion of
Kissinger's observation emphasized the moderate character of the Nixon Doctrine in
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particular and detente as a whole. Although both superpowers had augmented their strategic 
forces many times over since the beginning of the nuclear arms race, neither country enjoyed 
greater security as compared to the early 1950s. The fact of nuclear parity alone accounted for 
this state of affairs, but a number of factors also contributed to each superpower's compromised 
security, and consequently, their desire to maintain a detente.
By the early 1970s, the industrial nations of the world had recovered from the 
devastation ofW orld W ar II. W est Germany and Japan enjoyed robust trade surpluses while the 
United States suffered a trade deficit that had nearly tripled between 1971 and 1972. As 
Richard Thornton observed, the United States was "gradually losing its leading position and was 
experiencing a declining share of world economic product."92 Kissinger, of course, was not an 
economist, but he understood the close connection between geo-strategy and economics. Citing 
the shrinking percentage of the American contribution to the global Gross National Product (it 
had dropped from 52 to 30 percent between 1950 and 1970), Kissinger reasoned: "Still the 
strongest nation but no longer preeminent, we would have to take seriously the world balance 
of power, for if it tilted against us, it might prove irreversible. ”93
These economic concerns were not lost on the Soviets. Leonid Brezhnev declared at the 
24th Party Congress: "The ruling circles of the capitalist countries are afraid more than  they have 
ever been of the class struggle developing into a massive revolutionary movement...capitalism 
has not stabilized as a system. The general crisis of capitalism has continued to deepen ."94 The 
Soviet Union, however, had serious international economic woes of its own. The growing
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economic power of W estern Europe's Common Market underscored the irrelevancy of Moscow's 
opposition to it -  and consequently reduced Soviet political influence throughout Europe .95 And 
as Morris Bernstein noted, the beginning of the 1970s saw a decline in the value of Soviet 
petroleum exports -  what he called "the USSR's principal earner of convertible currency" -  thus 
inhibiting Moscow's access to technology and equipment exports from the industrial countries .96
The evolving Cold W ar thus found two superpowers with growing nuclear arsenals but 
diminishing political and economic global influence. Both the U nited States and the Soviet 
Union recognized each other’s vulnerabilities. Before the Cold W ar could end in an ultimate 
victory of one side over the other, detente would implicitly m aintain the military power of each 
nation for the time being.
Summit I: SALT
No event signaled the Soviet achievement of nuclear parity with the United States more 
dramatically than SALT. Negotiations began in November, 1969 at Helsinki, as the United 
States began to recognize Soviet nuclear capabilities that had been long in the making. In 1963, 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara testified before Congress tha t U.S. nuclear superiority 
would not guarantee victory in the event of a nuclear war -  at least not in the conventional 
sense. The United States would “win” insofar as its nuclear arsenal would destroy more of the 
Soviet Union than the Soviets would destroy the United States. McNamara reasoned, “I do not 
believe we can, not in the normal sense of the word, ‘win,’ because in my opinion there would
95Caldwell, Soviet-American Relations. 25.
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be so much severe damage done to this country that our way of life would change, and change 
in an undesirable direction . ”97 McNamara’s response, which would not have been out of place 
in the movie “Dr. Strangelove,” essentially heralded the age of nuclear parity of Soviet and 
American forces, realized by the early 1970s, and codified by SALT.
Serious diplomatic efforts to control the arms race dated back at least as far as the 
Kennedy Administration, but Nixon was the first American president to conduct arms 
negotiations from a position of parity. As the historian Harland B. M oulton summarized, Nixon’s 
objective in SALT was to produce “a verifiable agreement in which stable strategic equilibrium 
is achieved .”98 For the first time, U.S. policy was aimed not at staying ahead of the Soviets, but 
in maintaining rough parity.
Paul H. Nitze, an arms negotiator and scholar, identified crisis management as the other 
major component of SALT. He reasoned that the American SALT strategy attempted to 
formalize the essential equivalence of each superpower’s nuclear arsenal, so “tha t both sides 
would be willing to downgrade the nuclear arms relationship between them  as a factor in the 
world political balance . ”99 The ultimate goal of the superpowers’ de-emphasis on nuclear power 
would in turn help to m aintain nuclear-free crisis situations. As Laurence W. Martin, a political 
scientist, argued, the SALT agreements were “major landmarks by any standards. The mere 
achievement of agreement on such critical and complicated issues goes far beyond what many 
observers believed possible between major adversaries. ” 100 M artin was referring to the freeze on
97Robert McNamara, United States, Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Department 
of Defense Appropriations for 1964. Hearings before a subcommittee o f the com m ittee on Appropriations. 
88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963, 340.
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ABM shields at two for each side -  one each for the national capital and a missile launching 
area. Like the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the ABM Treaty, signed on May 26, 1972, at 
the Moscow summit, sought to curb the nuclear arms race by indirect means. Paragraph three 
of the treaty read, “Considering tha t effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems 
would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms . . . . ” 101 The rationale 
behind the ABM Treaty held that an unchecked proliferation of nuclear defensive shields 
(assuming that ABMs could indeed adequately defend regions from nuclear attack) would in 
turn spur a new arms race in intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The ABM Treaty 
sought to avoid arms proliferation that would invariably result from the fact of a new, and 
mutual, superpower vulnerability. Each superpower would have to increase its offensive 
capabilities so that its strategic deterrent effect would not be neutralized by the opposing 
superpower’s augmented defense structure.
This line of reasoning had its limits. By the early 1970s, ABM technology was still in its 
experimental stage, and older defense strategies had by no means lost their appeal. Secretary of 
Defense Laird noted in 1972: “W e continue to believe that an effective defense of our 
population against a major Soviet attack is not now feasible. Thus we must continue to rely on 
our strategic offensive forces to deter a Soviet nuclear attack on our cities . ” 102 In 1972, 
McNamara would no longer have been able to qualify the likelihood of U.S. “victory” in the 
event of a nuclear conflict. By this point, the Soviet Union had the capability to inflict 
approximately an equal magnitude of destruction as it would sustain. Admiral of the Navy and
101The ABM Treaty is reprinted in United States, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 12th 
Annual Report to Congress, lanuarv 1, 1972-Decem ber 31, 1972, 44.
102Melvin Laird, as cited in United States, Department o f Defense, Toward a National Security 
Strategy of Realistic Deterrence. 1971, 63.
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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Thomas H. Moorer testified in 1972 that a general nuclear 
war between Soviet and American forces would kill in the short term approximately 100 million 
citizens of each country . 103 The magnitude of such a conflict, which would have quickly claimed 
the lives of four times as many humans who died in all of W orld W ar II, defied comprehension. 
Jurii Pankov has observed that superpower parity created a “nuclear stalemate” which effectively 
negated the famous Clausewitzean principle, that war is a continuation of policy by other means, 
“because nuclear war cannot lead to the achievement of political goals...at this point there is no 
sensible alternative to peaceful coexistence and detente .” 104
The particularities of the complicated SALT process must be understood in the context 
of what Henry Kissinger recognized in the nuclear age as a fundamental change in the meaning 
of national power:
It w ould have b een  inconceivable even  a generation  ago that such power on ce gained  could n ot 
be translated directly into advantage over o n e’s op ponent. But now  b oth  we and the Soviet  
U n ion  have begun to find that each  increm ent o f  power does n ot necessarily represent an  
increm ent o f  usable political strength.105
Thus, like detente as a whole, SALT in the Nixon-Brezhnev years did not seek a fundamental 
change in the political relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union. N either country 
entertained the notion of substantially reducing their nuclear capabilities already in  existence, 
and each exploited SALT as a platform to emphasize the continued importance of military 
power. Nuclear parity may have negated the political utility of nuclear weapons as a means of
103Thomas H. Moorer, United States, Congress, Department o f  Defense Appropriations, 1972,
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gaining leverage over the other, but SALT never aimed to put a real halt on the arms race, due 
to the prestige that American and Soviet leaders continued to associate with nuclear 
preeminence. Richard Pipes has argued against the idea “tha t in the nuclear age numbers of 
weapons do not m atter once a certain quantity has been attained . ” 106 The record of SALT 
clearly supports his claim. During the Moscow Summit -  the high point of SALT in the three 
years after its inauguration -  Brezhnev informed Nixon tha t the Soviet Union intended to 
continue its nuclear arms buildup in any way not expressly prohibited by SALT. O ne group of 
experts observed that immediately after the Moscow summit, the Kremlin began “a public 
campaign for the further overall strengthening of Soviet armed forces on the stated ground that, 
despite the present effectiveness of Soviet deterrent capabilities, the danger of war will persist 
as long as imperialism survives. . . . ” 107
Detente had not changed Moscow’s basic equation of nuclear might and international 
prestige. This fact was clearly demonstrated by Brezhnev’s declaration at the 24th Party 
Congress: “Let no one, for his part, try to talk to us in terms of ultimatums and strength . ” 108 
Moscow had repeatedly rejected the American notion of sufficiency, which Secretary of Defense 
Laird defined as “an effort to avoid major war increases in strategic force expenditures ,” 109 for two 
reasons, one ideological, and the other a simple m atter of power politics. First, the static nature 
of strategic sufficiency was incompatible with the revolutionary, forward-momentum ethos of
106Pipes, U .S .-S ov iet Relations in the Era of D eten te. 160.
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Soviet foreign policy. 110 Second, Moscow saw little reason to inhibit future enhancem ent of the 
prestige it had already gained as a result of a rigorous arms buildup. As far as the Soviets were 
concerned, SALT evidenced America’s recognition of its own limits; Moscow did not see a mere 
coincidence in  the fact of the United States struggle in V ietnam and its willingness to begin the 
SALT process in 1969.111 In the Soviet view, as the world’s “correlation of forces” continued to 
tip in favor of Moscow, at the expense of America’s deteriorating global position, the impetus 
to augment socialist power at its epicenter was strong indeed.
The United States, for its part, was no more interested than  the Soviets in allowing 
SALT to compromise its nuclear strength. Secretary of Defense Laird emphasized in a speech 
delivered after the SALT I agreement that the United States would never abandon its nuclear 
deterrent, which depended on offensive nuclear weapons that remained unaffected by the first 
round of SALT: “Actual reductions in weapons can come later, after more patient negotiation 
from a position of adequate strength .” 112 A  1974 State Departm ent publication affirmed: “W e 
are not dealing with the Soviet Union out of a position of weakness. O n the contrary, the 
preservation of our military strength is a prerequisite for detente, and military strength inferior 
to none is the only national defense posture which can ever be acceptable to the United 
States .” 113 Unsurprisingly, Senator Henry Jackson denounced SALT as a framework that put 
more stringent limits on American strategic forces as compared to their Soviet counterparts, thus 
leaving the United States vulnerable to “inferior" strategic force levels in an ongoing arms race.
110A  good example o f the revolutionary aspect of Soviet foreign policy can be found in a speech 
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Jackson never elaborated on his interpretation of inferiority, but, as William Bundy observed, 
he needed a strategy to deflate Nixon’s post-summit prestige in the summer of 1972 -  arguably 
the high point of N ixon’s presidency.114
Gerard Smith’s memoir, Doubletalk, recounted the frustrations of the U.S. SALT 
negotiating team, which Smith headed in the Nixon Adm inistration as Director of the U.S. 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He argued that N ixon’s use of the “back channel” for 
nuclear diplomacy effectively surrendered expert control of the negotiations to politicians like 
Kissinger and Nixon -  to the detriment of both superpowers. The ABM Treaty earned Nixon 
an enormous amount of political capital, but Smith noted tha t the treaty compromised U.S. 
strategic interests particularly and that of both nations generally. First, the U.S. delegation 
originally pushed for a numerical advantage of ABM sites but consented to an equal number of
t
two for both sides in the final agreement. This loss, although major, was dwarfed by a larger 
blown opportunity for both superpowers. Smith bitterly noted: “There was a chance to outlaw 
ABMs entirely. W e pulled away when this prospect seemed to brighten.”115
The impressive, yet strictly limited, success of the ABM treaty serves as a microcosm for 
Nixon and Kissinger’s overselling of the entire detente policy. Gerard Smith characterized 
Nixon’s eagerness to complete the treaty as reflecting “the natural tendency of a politician 
approaching an election to magnify the significance of his accomplishments.”116 For Kissinger, 
the SALT agreements satisfied his enormous appetite for combining geo-strategic policy with 
personal prestige. As Kissinger’s biographer W alter Isaacson noted, the Moscow Summit
114Bundy, A  Tangled W eb. 354.
115Smith, Double talk. 456.
116Ibid., 453.
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“completed Kissinger’s transition into a global superstar, the first and thus far only celebrity 
diplomat of the media age.”117 It is illustrative of detente politics as a whole tha t the main SALT 
experts, Raymond Garthoff, Paul Nitze, and Gerard Smith -  all of whom possessed a technical 
command of nuclear diplomacy far beyond that of their politician bosses -  were largely excluded 
from the summit negotiations. Nuclear parity may have rendered meaningless marginal gains 
of one Great Power over another -  but its utility for gaining domestic political clout remained.
In addition to the overselling of detente, SALT also exemplified the ongoing fact of the 
Cold W ar arms race. SALT evolved out of four years of intense diplomacy and two summit 
meetings without any permanent reduction in either superpower’s strategic offensive capabilities. 
A n Interim Agreement, attached to the end of the ABM Treaty, placed a five-year freeze on 
ICBM launchers and submarine-based ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers. As if to underscore 
the title, “Interim Agreement,” Article VIII, paragraph three, read: “Each party shall, in 
exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Interim Agreement if 
it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject m atter of this Interim  Agreement have 
jeopardized its supreme interests.”118 Gerard Smith testified before the Senate Committee on 
Armed Services that the Interim Agreement “does not provide long term comprehensive 
limitation on strategic offensive weapons systems.”119 A nd Nixon could only offer at an ABM 
signing ceremony that limitations on defensive systems were im portant because they would set 
the stage toward arms limitations for the “vitally im portant” area of offensive nuclear weapons.120
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If the success of the ABM treaty is to be judged by its potential in limiting offensive weapons, 
it was indeed a muted success.
As Stanley Hoffmann observed, SALT I produced a “sausage effect,” which succeeded 
in “inciting both sides to produce whatever weapons had not been limited.”121 In the beginning 
of the 1970s, the U.S. Air Force had successfully tested and deployed its first generation of 
multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) Poseidon and M inuteman III missiles, 
allowing several warheads each aimed at a different target to be fired from a single launcher. 
The Americans justified the development of these enormously lethal weapons on the grounds 
that as of 1970, there existed no guarantee that Moscow would agree to limit their ABM 
program, which could have eroded the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
In May of 1972, Soviet MIRV technology was still in its testing stage. Understandably, 
Moscow refused to include MIRVs as part of SALT, for doing so would have put the Soviets in 
a permanently inferior nuclear position. In what Richard Smoke calls a “tragedy of timing” the 
omission of MIRVs from SALT m eant that “the number of separate nuclear warheads that each 
side could rain down on the other increased from between one and two thousand as SALT was 
getting underway to approximately ten thousand in the 1980s.”122
In Moscow’s view, the checkered success of SALT represented the contradictory 
impulses of maintaining -  or even surpassing -  Am erican nuclear capabilities. O n  the other 
hand, the Soviets wanted to avoid an intense arms race which threatened to rupture the entire 
detente framework.123 The Soviets perceived the benefits of detente in a more complicated light
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Richard Smoke, National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma: A n  Introduction to the 
American Experience in the Cold War. 3d ed . (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), 159.
123Goure, Kohler, and Harvey, The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet Strategy. 99.
51
than the United States. W hereas W ashington formulated one basic detente strategy vis-d-vis 
Moscow, the Soviet Union managed an independent detente with several U.S. allies. Moscow 
saw enemies in all directions (not to mention its arch-nemesis C hina), and therefore refused to 
concede any grounds during SALT that they interpreted as limiting their strategic forces.124 
Richard Pipes explained Moscow’s anti-equivalence nuclear strategy: “Essentially, the Soviet 
Union hopes to neutralize the damage to its interests implied in the balance-of-power principle 
by establishing its physical (military) presence in every major strategic area of the globe and 
demanding a senior voice in all regional politico-military arrangements.”125
Through a combination of political and strategic factors, SALT as it existed up to the 
Yom Kippur W ar did not curb the arms race. The second Soviet-American Summit held in the 
United States during June 1973, did not produce any significant breakthroughs in arms 
negotiations, and detente, as it related to the control of a nuclear buildup, had clearly 
demonstrated its limits. As the historian David Holloway concluded, “The Soviet leaders did 
not see a contradiction between growing military power and detente. O n the contrary, the one 
was seen to provide the basis for the other.”126 This contradiction was not unique to the Soviets. 
In a bizarre defense of detente, aimed at policy makers who charged that relaxed tensions with 
Moscow would translate into reduced U.S. security as a result of cutbacks in defense 
expenditures, Henry Kissinger noted that the Pentagon’s research and development efforts 
flourished only after the signature of SALT I -  as if the point of SALT was geared for the benefit 
of defense contractors.127
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In sum, SALT I succeeded mainly in formalizing the rough parity of Soviet and American 
nuclear force levels. The Soviet MIRV program did not become operational until 1975; 
therefore, the Interim Agreement left the number of American nuclear warheads at twice the 
Soviet level. In turn, Moscow enjoyed a three-to-two advantage of total missiles and three times 
more mega-tonnage than  tha t possessed by the United States.128 As Richard Thornton, a 
political scientist, observed, “SALT established a common basis for evaluating the complex 
power shift underway,” meaning the transition from U.S. superiority to parity with the Soviet 
Union.129 N either superpower demonstrated any inclination toward permanent, genuine nuclear 
disarmament, and in some ways, the Cold W ar arms race became reinvigorated as a result of 
detente. As Stanley Hoffmann remarked, “Nuclear weapons have not abolished war, they have 
displaced it.”130 His observation speaks directly to the fact that the looming threat of nuclear 
holocaust necessitated a superpower detente in which general war could never become “a 
continuation of politics by other means.” But superpower behavior throughout SALT I speaks 
to a “non-violent” nuclear war by other means as well.
Because of the absolute inadmissability of such a conflict, both the Soviet Union and the 
United States sought to enhance their nuclear power -  w ithout any particular desire to unleash 
it -  as a means of furthering the Cold W ar to its ultimate and peaceful conclusion. The nuclear 
theoretician Robert Jervis succinctly captured the contradictory nature of the political 
component to the nuclear arms race: “M uch of the history of nuclear strategy has been a series 
of attempts to find a way out of this predicament and return to the simpler, more comforting pre-
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nuclear world in which safety did not depend on the adversary’s restraint.”131 Direct Great 
Power conflict may have ended with the advent of nuclear weapons, bu t Great Power politics 
continued in the Cold W ar as vigorously as ever.
Summit I: The Basic Principles Agreement (BPA)
Along with the ABM Treaty, the other major document signed during the May 1972 summit in 
Moscow dealt with political relations between the superpowers. “The Basic Principles of Mutual 
Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” 
attempted to link the spirit of a responsible policy in arms control with responsible political 
exchanges as necessitated by the danger of nuclear conflict. Henry Kissinger framed the 
' American strategy as a component of linkage between SALT and the BP A: “The two elements 
reinforced each other; they symbolized our conviction that a relaxation of tensions could not be 
based exclusively on arms control; the ultimate test would be restrained international 
behavior.”132 Like the ABM Treaty, the BPA signaled an im portant first step toward normalized 
relations between the superpowers. Adam Ulam, a scholar who did not romanticize the 
potentials of detente, characterized the BPA in positive terms: “For the first time in a generation 
the two superpowers were able to survey the whole realm of international relations, and to do 
so without resorting to m utual vituperations and accusations.133
Moscow initiated the BPA, which, as Ambassador Dobrynin noted, received far more 
attention in the Soviet Union than in the United States.134 In hindsight, this disparity seems
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logical -  the fundamental theme of the BPA assumed th a t all political relations between the 
superpowers flow from the basis of equality, of which nuclear parity was a primary com ponent.135 
Thus, Moscow viewed the BPA as a victory for Soviet prestige on the world stage, and as such, 
it figured prominently in the Soviets’ self-image as leader of the world’s revolutionary socialist 
movements. O ne document released after the Moscow summit by the Council of Ministers of 
the USSR emphasized the great importance that Moscow attached to America’s recognition of 
Soviet legitimacy, as embodied by the BPA: “The results of the Soviet-American talks showed 
once again that in m odem  circumstances controversial international questions cannot be solved 
by methods of the policy from ‘a position of strength.’ They can and must be settled through 
negotiations based on observing the principal of parity and equal security of [both] sides....”136 
Richard Nixon, for his part, reinforced the spirit of equality during the opening toasts of 
the Moscow Summit. He declared at the state dinner of May 22: “Because we are both prepared 
to proceed on the basis of equality and mutual respect, we meet at a mom ent when we can make 
peaceful cooperation between our two countries a reality.”137 Nixon, always a shrewd politician, 
told the Soviets exactly what they wanted to hear. A  firm American declaration of equality, 
noted Dobrynin, “Created the impression among the Soviet population that its government at 
last had prevailed over the United States on this principle [of equality], which had long been 
reluctant to accept it even though we had presented it as a fundamental issue of war or peace.”138 
American officials did not ascribe nearly as much importance to the BPA as their Soviet
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counterparts. They generally found little reason to revel in the principle, or fact, of Soviet 
equality. Between Vietnam and impressive economic growth in W estern Europe and Japan, the 
condition of global U.S. preeminence was damaged enough -  adding to that list nuclear parity, 
and, by implication, de facto acceptance of Moscow’s political strength, did not strike American 
leaders as deserving of great publicity. Article I of the BPA addressed the issue of political 
equality most directly: “Differences in ideology and in the social system of the USA and USSR 
are not obstacles to the bilateral development of normal relations based on the principles of 
sovereignty, equality, non-interference in international affairs and mutual advantage.”139
W here the Soviets tended to see the BPA as a meaningful and overdue recognition of 
their country’s viability and seriousness, American leaders dismissed the docum ent as a function 
of diplomatic pleasantries. Among Kissinger’s objectives during his secret pre-summit trip to 
Moscow in April 1972 was to hammer out the details of the BPA so tha t it could be signed 
without incident at the upcoming summit. Kissinger was unmoved by Brezhnev’s promise of “the 
accolades of history” if he agreed to accept an essentially Soviet-constructed document, which 
Kissinger considered to be “flavored with Pravda-like rhetoric.” Kissinger dryly commented: “I 
did not believe that history would remember a set of principles so watered down as to be equally 
acceptable to the principal capitalist and strongest Communist state.”140 Kissinger biographer 
W alter Isaacson observed that Nixon and the State Departm ent “tended to dismiss [the BPA] 
as a boilerplate, with good reason: the document sought to enshrine a nebulous and unworkable 
code of conduct....”141 Indeed, the principal document of the Moscow Summit, as far as the
139The BPA, in Stebbins and Adams, eds., American Foreign Relations. 1972. 76.
140Kissinger, W hite House Years. 1150.
141Issacson, Kissinger, 427.
56
Americans were concerned, was the ABM Treaty; their concern for the BPA was remarkably 
more muted than tha t of the Soviets, who valued it more than other summit agreements.142
If American officials were skeptical of the viability of the BPA in the short term, their 
solution was to “free” the United States by interpreting the docum ent as a vague set of objectives 
to be met over a long period of time. Nixon’s foreign policy report to Congress of 1973, “Shaping 
a Durable Peace,” interpreted the BPA as such: “W hat we have agreed upon are principles that 
acknowledge differences, bu t express a code of conduct which, if observed, can only contribute 
to mold peace and to an international system based on mutual respect and self-restraint. These 
principles are a guide for future action.”143 This interpretation was consistent with N ixon’s 
statem ent before a joint session of Congress following his return from the Moscow Summit: “The 
principles to which we have agreed in Moscow are like a roadmap. Now that the map has been 
laid out, it is up to each country to follow it.”144
Soviet leaders, of course, did not publicly degrade the immediate significance of the BPA, 
although the evidence suggests that they were content with its emphasis on superpower equality. 
Beyond that, there is little reason to assume that Moscow attached any more operational weight 
to the document than the Americans, insofar as they intended to truly refrain from instigating 
crisis situations. As previously quoted, Article I of the BPA identified peaceful coexistence as 
the basis by which the two superpowers would conduct their relations. In the Soviet political 
lexicon, peaceful coexistence referred to a framework of superpower relations far different from
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the American conception of detente. During Kissinger’s pre-summit negotiations in Moscow, 
Foreign Minister Gromyko and General Secretary Brezhnev insisted on including the phrase 
“peaceful coexistence” in the document. William Bundy characterized the term as a “code 
phrase meaning tha t the relationship with the United States would still be intensely competitive. 
The USSR would not abandon any form of pressure, threats or covert action by intelligence 
agencies; it merely implied that it would not engage in the outright use of force against the 
United States.”145
Kissinger was entirely aware of the Soviet interpretation of peaceful coexistence; Article 
II of the BPA represented his attem pt to neutralize whatever “free pass” the Soviets believed 
they gained to pursue international adventurism. The key sentences in Article II essentially 
served as a rebuttal to Article I: both nations “will always exercise restraint in their mutual 
relations and will be prepared to negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means....Both sides 
recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or 
indirectly, are inconsistent with these objectives.”146 Because the Soviets interpreted peaceful 
coexistence in far more precise terms than the Americans framed their rebuttal against obtaining 
unilateral advantage, Moscow saw the BPA above all as a legitimization of their interpretation 
of peaceful coexistence. Alexander L. George concluded his brilliant analysis of the BPA by 
referring to the docum ent as a “pseudoagreement.” He noted: “It gave an erroneous impression 
that the United States and the Soviets were in substantial agreement on the rules of the game 
and the restraints to be observed in their competition of third areas.”147 As John Lewis Gaddis
145Bundy, A  Tangled W eb. 323.
146The BPA, in Stebbins and Adams, eds., American Foreign Relations. 1972. 76.
147Alexander L. George, “The Basic Principles Agreem ent o f 1972: Origins and Expectations,” in 
Alexander L. George, ed., Managing U .S .-Soviet Rivalry: Problems o f  Crisis Prevention (Boulder:
58
observed, not only did the Soviets have “no intention of giving up support for Third World 
‘national liberation’ movements,” but, as with any international agreement, the BPA was not 
self-enforcing, hence “there was no way for W ashington to monitor Moscow’s compliance.”148 
Senator Stephen J. Solarz of New York, in raising the fact that detente “did not prevent 
the outbreak of the [October] 1973 war,” rhetorically asked: “If nobody had ever thought of the 
word detente, that both sides, recognizing the real possibility that a continuation of the conflict 
would lead to a confrontation between our two countries, would have recognized the mutual 
interest in bringing it, at that particular point, to a halt.”149 Solarz’s counterfactual question is, 
of course, impossible to answer, but it raises an important point: if the BPA was intended to 
capture on paper the essence of relaxed tensions between the superpowers, but instead negated 
itself through its internal contradictions, then  the efficacy of detente as it related to preventing 
tensions in Third W orld conflicts is questionable. Helm ut Sonnenfeldt emphasized that the 
BPA “and subsequent agreements with the Soviets in 1973 regarding international political 
conduct never were intended to be self-enforcing.”150
Given these circumstances, it is fair to ask why the docum ent was created in the first 
place. The answer must reflect the detente framework as a whole. Two superpowers were 
competing in an ongoing Cold W ar and exploited detente in the interests of their own national 
power and political prestige within a system which aimed to minimize the potential of a nuclear
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149Stephen J. Solarz, as cited in United States, Congress, House, Committee on International 
Relations, Hearings: U .S .-U .S .S .R . Relations and Strategic Balance (W ashington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1976), 13.
150Helmut Sonnenfeldt, as cited in Confrontation in the US-U SSR  Relationship. 107.
59
war. N either side viewed detente, or the documents that gave it expression, as a hallowed set 
of laws to be meticulously followed. T hat is the meaning of Moscow’s insistence on including 
the phrase “peaceful coexistence” in the BPA, and the Americans’ subsequent dismissal of the 
document as a “roadmap.” Superpower actions surrounding the Yom Kippur W ar certainly 
“violated” detente principles in many forms (each of which will be discussed in detail in the 
following chapters): Moscow’s decision not to warn the United States of an imminent surprise 
Arab attack; the huge weapons airlift undertaken by each superpower during the war; and the 
caustic Soviet-American exchange that took place during the ceasefire violations.
But a larger question needs to be addressed before detente can be evaluated in a simple 
cause and effect analysis. If, indeed, detente was pushed and prodded in the Middle East in the 
interests of national power over mutual accommodation, it is clear tha t neither side assumed that 
the agreements which had defined detente were designed for strict adherence beyond the 
ongoing avoidance of nuclear war. This view does not condone the decisions that helped to 
produce one of the most destructive wars of the modern era -  it merely seeks to interpret detente 
in the terms understood by the Soviet Union and the United States. The second Soviet- 
American summit, held in the United States in June, 1973, three months before the outbreak 
of the Yom Kippur War, reinforced each superpower’s prevailing notion of a limited detente. 
A t the global level, peace would be maintained in the form of avoiding nuclear war, yet local 
conflict in the Middle East would erupt yet again.
Summit 11: The M idnight Harangue and the Nuclear Agreement
Two major situations affected the Soviet-American detente in the eleven months between the 
Moscow and W ashington/San Clemente summits. In the United States, the W atergate affair,
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sparked by a break-in of the offices of political opponents, was transforming from a domestic 
nuisance into a full-blown scandal that was threatening to erode N ixon’s ability to perform his 
presidential duties. Nixon had always thought that his greatest legacy would be in the foreign 
policy realm. Just as N ixon tied much of his reelection hopes in  1972 to a successful (if oversold) 
record of detente with the Soviets, the president became determined to demonstrate his 
ongoing command of U.S. foreign policy. The Soviets, unsurprisingly, could not quite 
understand how the leader of the United States allowed himself to get mixed up in the mounting 
W atergate crisis. But they did respond favorably to Nixon’s detente overtures, although with 
reservations about the president’s ability to retain the credibility necessary to make 
commitments. If the W atergate scandal never occurred, N ixon likely would have found 
Kissinger’s growing fame unbearable. But Kissinger was left unscathed by the Watergate 
shakeup, and as a result, saw his own powers increase dramatically. The trend culminated in 
Kissinger replacing William Rogers as Secretary of State (he remained National Security 
Adviser) in late August, 1973.
O n the Soviet end, by the spring of 1973, Moscow had armed its Arab clients in Egypt 
and Syria to levels sufficient to launch a war against Israel. The Soviets had put themselves in 
the curious position of neutralizing their authority in the region by transferring sufficient 
amounts of weapons so tha t the Arabs could effectively ignore Moscow’s wishes. (This client- 
patron relationship is discussed in Chapter 3.) For much of 1973, the Soviet Union tried to 
balance the impossible -  continuing influence in the Arab world w ithout damaging its relations 
with the United States.
As the war in V ietnam was coming to an end, and no major breakthroughs occurred in 
the area of SALT, the American Summit of 1973 began with fairly singular objectives for both
sides: Nixon wanted to push detente forward, and Brezhnev wanted to warn the Americans of 
the possibility of another war in the Middle East without being too explicit about it. The 
General Secretary first brought up the m atter of a looming crisis with Kissinger during the pre- 
summit negotiations. The Arab-Israeli conflict was still deadlocked under the unworkable 
United Nations Resolution 242 rubric, which called for full Israeli withdrawal from Arab 
territories occupied since the June 1967 War, in exchange for political normalization and Arab 
pledges of security. Brezhnev ominously hinted to Kissinger: “N othing in the world is eternal 
-  similarly the present military advantage enjoyed by Israel is not eternal either.”151 His warning 
fell on deaf ears; the Americans (and Israelis, for that matter) assumed that an Arab attack was 
unlikely because it would end in another catastrophic defeat similar to the outcome of the June 
W ar of 1967. Kissinger informed the Soviets that they were inflating W ashington’s ability to 
exert any meaningful influence over the Israelis. It was only with the beginning of the Yom 
Kippur W ar that Kissinger became interested in a comprehensive Arab-Israel settlement. Before 
the war, he considered all third-party efforts to impose a peace on the region futile, as evidenced 
by what he called a “meaningless” paragraph in the BPA affirming m utual superpower 
commitment to a territorial and political agreement as envisioned by United Nations Resolution 
242.152 The thorny Middle East issue was not raised at the June 1973 summit until the last day 
of Brezhnev’s trip.
A t a lavish dinner party hosted by the Soviets in their W ashington embassy, Nixon 
delivered a speech in which he emphasized that detente would not cure the fundamental 
differences that comprised the Cold War: “I would not for one mom ent suggest to this audience,
1S1Leonid Brezhnev, as cited in Kissinger, Years o f Upheaval. 296.
152Kissinger, W hite House Years. 1247.
62
or to those who may be listening on television or radio, tha t one meeting or two meetings at the 
summit brings instant peace, instant relaxation of tensions, and instant reduction or limitations 
of arms.”153 It is noteworthy tha t Nixon characterized detente in such cautious terms. Beginning 
with the Yom Kippur W ar, detente suffered a precipitous decline through the 1970s, and 
collapsed entirely at the end of the decade.
O n the following day, the superpowers signed the “Agreement for the Prevention of 
Nuclear W ar” (henceforth referred to as the PNW ). In its final draft, the docum ent was a rather 
bland reiteration of the superpowers’ mutual, if non-committal, desire for global peace. Moscow 
had originally pushed for an agreement to ban the use of nuclear weapons. N ixon and Kissinger 
steadfastly rejected the proposal on the grounds that such an agreement would deny W estern 
Europe a nuclear shield against Soviet attack -  an especially dark scenario given the 
overwhelming superiority of Soviet conventional forces -  and afford Moscow maximum latitude 
in a potential war with China. The United States refused to shelve its nuclear arsenal for the 
simple reason that doing so would increase the likelihood of war, thus illustrating continued U.S. 
emphasis on nuclear deterrence.154
The PNW  did not depart from the conditions of the BPA except in the area of crisis 
management. Article IV stated that if a situation arose tha t ran the risk of erupting into nuclear 
war as a result of direct tensions or third party conflict, the U nited States and Soviet Union 
“shall immediately enter into urgent consultations with each other and make every effort to
153Richard N ixon, as cited in U nited States, President, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the 
United States: Richard M. N ixon. 1973, 603-604.
154N ixon, RN: The Memoirs o f Richard N ixon . 881.
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avert this risk.”155 O n its own accord, the language of Article IV was unambiguous, but Article 
VI managed to negate m uch of the docum ent’s viability -  especially if the overall aim of the 
PNW  set out to codify a set of norms during crisis situations. It read: “N othing in this 
Agreement shall impair...the obligations undertaken in treaties, agreements, and other 
appropriate docum ents.”156
The nuclear imbroglio that would occur at the end of the Yom Kippur W ar became the 
first such crisis situation to test Soviet and American intentions. T he behavior of both countries 
(to be discussed in detail in Chapters 2 and 3) in that tense period reflected the ambiguity 
expressed in the PNW: N either side wanted nuclear war, but neither side dem onstrated a 
willingness to sacrifice its clients’ interest, either.
As if to demonstrate that the summit was an inappropriate forum to discuss unpleasant 
issues, the Middle East received no official m ention except one passing reference in a joint 
communique. This docum ent broadly covered all detente issues raised during the summit, from 
ongoing negotiations in arms control to cultural exchanges. Only the topic of transportation 
received fewer words than the Arab-Israeli conflict. The relevant passage read: “Both parties 
agreed to continue to exert their efforts to promote the quickest possible settlem ent in the 
Middle East.”157 The statem ent could not have been further removed from reality. The 
Americans were doing nothing to push the Israelis toward accepting the provisions set forth 
under United Nations Resolution 242 on the m istaken assumption tha t Israel’s military
l55The “Agreem ent for the Prevention of Nuclear War” is reprinted in Richard P. Stebbins and 
Elaine P. Adams, eds., American Foreign Relations. 1973: A  Documentary Record (New York: N ew  York 
University Press, 1976), 268.
156Ibid.
157Cited in United States, President, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the U nited States: Richard 
M. N ixon . 1973, 611.
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hegemony would indefinitely maintain regional stability. The Soviets, meanwhile, were in the 
process of arming their Egyptian and Syrian clients with enormous amounts of materiel, 
including advanced surface-to-air-missile technology.
Brezhnev clearly sensed that conditions were ripe for a major war in the Middle East. 
He decided that the summit could not end without a concerted attem pt to impose peace on the 
region -  on Arab terms. O n ju n e  23, at Nixon’s “Casa Pacifica” residence in San Clemente, the 
Soviet and American delegations had retired for the evening at 7:15 p.m., only to resume talks 
three hours later when Secret Service agents informed Kissinger tha t Brezhnev was demanding 
an immediate meeting with the president. It was a gross breach of diplomatic protocol, but 
Nixon consented, and at 10:45 p.m. the leaders of the world’s superpowers met, in their pajamas, 
in Nixon’s study accompanied by Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin. Brezhnev proceeded to 
launch into a rambling diatribe about the Middle East. He demanded Israeli withdrawal from 
all occupied territories, and intimated that if the United States failed to coerce Israel to do so, 
Moscow would be compelled to blame the Americans if and when a war should erupt.158
As Dobrynin observed -  and the events in early October clearly proved -  the Americans 
should not have discounted Brezhnev’s insinuations, no m atter how bizarrely he chose to present 
them .159 Given that Brezhnev himself was not sure of the Arabs’ intentions (Egyptian President 
Anwar Sadat refused to inform Moscow of his exact plans until the last possible moment), it is 
unlikely that the General Secretary could have been any more explicit. O n  the other hand, 
Brezhnev did not deliver another such warning in the weeks preceding the war. He would have 
enjoyed more credibility as American and Israeli intelligence reports were tracking large-scale
158Bundy, A  Tangled W eb. 412.
159Dobrynin, In Confidence. 282.
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Egyptian and Syrian deployments throughout September. Furthermore, Brezhnev’s harangue 
-  unconventional as it was -  did not depart from the UN Resolution 242 framework that had 
failed to break the six-year deadlock. Aside from Brezhnev’s insistence on giving himself a place 
to air out Moscow’s frustrations, it is unclear if he believed tha t Israel would throw away its 
entire defense posture based simply on the vehemence of the Soviet leader’s demand. In the 
twilight hours of the meeting, a bleary eyed and unimpressed Nixon did his best to reject politely 
Brezhnev’s plan, and the summit ended on one of the weirder notes in  the history of Soviet- 
American relations.
A  Limited Detente: Toward the Yom Kippur W ar
The Nixon-Brezhnev years were characterized by a basic paradox: the superpower detente 
blossomed while the Arab world coalesced as never before toward another war with Israel. It 
must be left to imagination regarding the path of Soviet-American relations had the Y om Kippur 
W ar never occurred. It cannot be known what the Cold W ar would have looked like, but it is 
clear that October, 1973, marked the beginning of a downward turn  in superpower relations. 
If one fact emerges from the ambiguous and sometimes inconsistent record of detente, it is that 
the inadmissability of nuclear war, and the moral imperative of effective crisis management, 
transcended the ideological nature of the Cold War. The Yom Kippur W ar was the first major 
third-party conflict to demonstrate that detente was fair game in furthering superpower self- 
interest, so long as the avoidance of direct engagement of Soviet and American forces remained 
at the fore of each nation’s policies.
Even though Nixon and Kissinger assumed that another Arab-Israeli war was unlikely 
in the short term, the Middle East had long been recognized by many Americans as the region
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which posed the greatest threat to a superpower confrontation. As such, the Arab-Israeli 
conflict provided a barometer for measuring the “push and pull” imperatives of detente and the 
Cold War. In 1969, W illiam E. Griffith commented on the potential for catastrophe in the 
Middle East, where neither superpower had demonstrated m uch success in controlling its clients, 
but had nonetheless supplied them each with the ability to  wage a massive war.160 George 
Mahon, Chairman of the House subcommittee on D epartm ent of Defense Appropriations, aptly 
summed up a major American foreign policy concern in 1972: “I think the feeling in this 
country, certainly my feeling, is that the greatest threat to W orld W ar III lies not in Vietnam or 
W estern Europe as such, but in the Middle East.”161 The Yom Kippur W ar would thus test the 
competing factors of superpower restraint and the desire for regional prestige.
A t the outbreak of the war, both the United States and the Soviet Union exonerated 
their own actions by accusing the other as the instigator of hostilities. Moscow blamed the 
United States for not heeding their warning of a looming war; while the United States countered 
that the warnings were too vague, and delivered too early, to be taken seriously. A t the Pacem 
in Terris conference on O ctober 8, two days after the beginning of the war, Kissinger warned: 
“W e will resist any attem pt to exploit a policy of detente to weaken our alliances, we will react 
if a relaxation of tensions is read as a cover to exacerbate conflicts in international trouble spots.” 
And most pointedly: “The Soviet Union cannot disregard these principles in any area of the 
world without imperiling its entire relationship with the U nited States.”162 For all of Kissinger’s 
dismissals of the BPA -  the docum ent that most directly prohibited superpower instigation -  the
160Griffith and Rostow, East-West Relations. 19.
161United States, Congress, Department o f Defense Appropriations for 1972. 725.
162Henry Kissinger, as cited in United States, Department of State, Bulletin N o. 1792 (1973), 528.
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Secretary of State and other American officials were clearly surprised that Moscow had chosen
not to inform the Americans of an imminent attack in early O ctober and believed that this
choice threatened the entire detente framework.163 A  State D epartm ent publication released
in June 1974 made clear tha t the passage of time did not mellow W ashington’s heated reaction
at the start of the war: “W e will react if a relaxation of tensions is used a cover to exacerbate
conflicts in international trouble spots.”164
W ith  the W atergate scandal occupying a majority of Nixon’s time, Kissinger became the
de facto head of U.S. foreign policy. Although Kissinger interpreted Soviet policy as essentially
discarding detente in favor of other interests, the Secretary of State decided with Nixon on the
morning of October 6 that detente should still guide U.S. policy:
O ur strategy was to use the then  prevailing policy o f  d eten te to seek  a joint approach w ith  the 
S oviet U n ion  from em erging as the spokesm an for the Arab side, isolating us in the Islamic 
world, and dividing us from Europe. A bove all, it w ould  also gain  tim e to perm it the military 
situation  to clarify, since we were still con v in ced  that w e w ould soon  have to deal w ith  the 
political con sequ en ces o f  a rapid Israeli victory.165
Kissinger’s strategy was emblematic of superpower behavior as a whole. D etente was many 
things for many reasons: a tool of national self-interest; a means of expressing one’s intentions 
to allies and enemies alike; and perhaps, most importantly, detente was seen as an essential 
component of crisis management in that it could buy time so tha t a local crisis would be 
understood before it erupted into nuclear war.
Ambassador Dobrynin observed that improved superpower communication -  one of the 
fundamental goals of detente -  was instrumental in the m aintenance of superpower tension
163Marshall Shulman, as cited in United States, Congress, D eten te. 1974, 39.
164United States, Department o f  State, The Meaning o f D etente. 2.
Henry A. Kissinger, Crisis: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises (New York:
Simon &  Schuster, 2003), 38.
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during crisis situations.166 Indeed, Soviet-American communication throughout the war was on 
the whole constructive and crucial in keeping a bloody proxy war at the local level. (Chapters 
2 and 3 will elaborate on how each superpower, over the course of the conflict, challenged the 
details of detente but did not break its basic purpose in avoiding a nuclear conflict.) After the 
war, Brezhnev declared in a speech: “If the current conflict would explode in an environment 
of general international tension and the sharpening of relations between... the United States and 
the Soviet Union, the confrontation in the Middle East could become far more dangerous and 
be on a scale threatening general peace.”167
Brezhnev was right. There were many ways that both superpowers could have taken 
steps to minimize both the local and global tensions that arose as a result of the Yom Kippur 
War. That the United States and the Soviet Union chose not to in certain areas, was illustrative 
of the overall meaning of detente in Cold W ar history. D etente was not “born” in the Nixon- 
Brezhnev era; rather it had developed over a long history of Soviet relations with the outside 
world. D etente never aimed to end the Cold W ar -  that would only come at the peaceful self- 
destruction of one superpower of the course of a mutually exclusive competition. Therefore, the 
major components of detente -  arms control and restraint in consolidating influence in the Third 
W orld -  never reached a point that would hinder the ability of one of superpower in gaining 
leverage over the other.
A n overview of the Soviet-American detente reveals a system characterized by deception 
and over-selling, domestic and international power politics, and even diametrically opposed
166Dobrynin, In Confidence. 201.
167L.I. Brezhnev, as cited in Hoffmann, “D etente,” in Nye, ed., T he Making o f America’s Soviet 
Policy, 245.
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interpretations of the meaning of relaxed tensions. It is certainly tempting to ascribe to the 
realist position as enunciated by Hans Morgenthau: “W hen you probe behind a term such as 
detente you realize that it is a typical ideology of foreign policy. T hat is to say, it is not a foreign 
policy by itself, but it is an attem pt to justify on rational and moral grounds whatever policy the 
term detente is invoked.”168 As Morgenthau would have it, detente was little more than  
whatever Cold W ar leaders said it was in order to suit their interests in  a particular time and 
place. Morgenthau was correct to a point. No amount of diplomacy could have produced a 
comprehensive definition of detente to be strictly followed at all points of conflict and 
compromise. But criticizing detente only by examining the gulf tha t existed between words and 
deeds misses a larger point. It is the one that explains the major transformation of each 
superpower’s foreign policy over the middle decades of the 20th century: in the Soviet Union, 
from Lenin’s call for an inevitable war against the bourgeois world to Khrushchev’s renunciation 
of thermonuclear conflict; in the United States, from Containm ent and massive retaliation to 
the Nixon Doctrine and linkage.
N either the United States nor the Soviet Union wanted nuclear war. By any measure, 
detente intensified in the Nixon-Brezhnev era, as a result of nuclear parity and the dangers such 
destructive capacity threatened, in a newly complex and multi-polar world. W hat W alter 
Laqueur concluded of Soviet actions during the Yom Kippur W ar was true of the United States 
and its ally as well: “The Soviet dilemma was not whether to support [the Arabs in] the war but 
how far involvement could go without antagonizing the American architects and advocates of
168Hans Morgenthau, “Detente: Reality and Illusion,” George Schwab and Henry Friedlander, 
eds., Detente in Historical Perspective (New York: Cyrco Press, 1975), 71.
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detente too much."169 Such was the threshold of detente: local conflict would continue so long 
as global nuclear war could be avoided. As the Cold W ar played out in the Middle East, the final 
months of 1973 demonstrated that detente had remained what it always had been: something 
to be valued, but never at the expense of self-interest; and something to be denigrated, but never 
to the point of nuclear war. In a system that rejected both  mutual destruction and mutual 
accommodation, there existed no alternative to the spirit of compromise created and sustained 
by detente.
27.
169W alter Laqueur, “Detente: W hat’s Left o f It?” N ew York Times Magazine, 16 December 1973,
Chapter III
Self Interest in a Client-State Relationship:
Soviet-Egyptian Affairs Through the Yom Kippur War
By 1973, the Arab-Israeli conflict fully evolved from a localized border dispute to a zone of major 
superpower competition. Following Israel’s crushing victory in the June W ar of 1967, the Arab 
border states immediately undertook a military and diplomatic program aimed at regaining 
Israeli-occupied territory. The Arabs’ goals were decisively more limited after the Six Day War; 
although recognition of Israel as a legitimate political entity was unthinkable, its American- 
supplied military superiority was unquestionable. The Arabs, led by Egypt, exercised their only 
acceptable option: increased support from, and dependence on, the Soviet Union. In public 
treaties and proclamations, Moscow stressed its interests in the Middle East in ideological terms. 
In the Soviet view (at least after Israel’s birth in 1948), Zionism and imperialism were two sides 
of the same coin, and the Middle East was one of several regions across the globe where, in the 
Cold W ar system, the Soviet Union vowed to support socialist wars of national liberation. But 
the historical record, which includes Moscow’s detente with the U nited States, reveals a 
considerably different and more complicated picture from the supposedly rigid dimensions of a 
bi-polar world.
Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar el-Sadat was staunchly anti-Communist, 
interested in doing business with the United States, and vigilant in preventing excessive Soviet 
influence in and around its borders. Egypt perceived relations with the Soviet Union, its 
superpower patron, therefore as a m atter of default. No other nation was willing or capable of 
supplying Egypt with the am ount of military and economic support undertaken by the Soviet 
Union beginning in 1955. But Moscow considered its default image in the Arab world as a
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manageable and minor problem in the scope of its own geo-strategic policies. The Middle East 
figured prominently in the Cold W ar system of vying for global domination. Industrialization was 
quickly making the oil-rich Persian Gulf region one of the world’s most valuable areas; the Suez 
Canal was the crucial link between the M editerranean Sea and the Indian Ocean; and Egyptian 
ports and airfields afforded strike and surveillance capabilities at the crossroads of Africa, Asia 
and nearby Europe.
The public diplomacy of problem-free Soviet-Egyptian ideological solidarity, therefore, 
must be couched in the Realpolitik of each nation’s self interest. This trend became intensified 
in the period leading up to, and including, the Yom Kippur W ar of O ctober 1973. Both Egypt 
and the Soviet Union moved toward adopting a singular, overriding foreign policy in the early 
1970s. For Moscow, the era of detente ushered in a relaxation of tensions with the United 
States. W ithin the framework of armaments reduction and increased trade, the Soviet Union 
was determined to avoid direct superpower confrontation at the precise time that Egypt (with 
the support of Syria on Israel’s northern border) was pressing its patron state for sufficient 
weapons to attack Israel -  an act Moscow believed would heighten the very threat that detente 
was designed to prevent. Consequently, the frictions within Soviet-Egyptian relations worsened 
with the imminence of the planned secret attack on the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. 
In October 1973, the Soviets had supplied its Arab clients with enough arms for its will to be 
ignored. Moscow’s vigorous support of Arab military aims during the Yom Kippur W ar can be 
explained, in part, by the Soviets’ inability to stop its clients. Soviet condem nation of Arab 
hostilities could have precipitated a rejection of Soviet influence in the region. In fact, the 
political nature of the Yom Kippur W ar (that is, to force Israel to the negotiating table) 
culminated in the realization of one of Egypt’s major foreign policy objectives: the resumption
of diplomatic relations with the United States. In a conflict with no real winners, the Soviets’ 
concern with the prospect of reduced prestige in the Middle East -  some twenty years in  the 
m aking-justified Moscow’s longstanding support of the “no war, no peace” Arab-Israeli deadlock.
Historical Background
Russian interests in the Middle East predates the Soviet era by at least two centuries. 
Landlocked Muscovite Russia equated international prominence with access to a warm-water 
port. Peter the Great worked toward free access through the Bosporus, beyond which lay 
Constantinople and India -  both as strategically important in the 18th century as they would be 
in the 20th century.1 In 1770, the Russian Black Sea Fleet defeated the Turkish navy in concert 
with British forces, as the scholar Aaron Klieman observed, “For the next four years the Russian 
fleet dominated the Eastern M editerranean.”2 Russia’s tsarist regimes maintained an interest in 
the Middle East and surrounding waters until the revolutions of 1917.
The Soviet application of Marxism-Leninism, strictly implemented in  the foreign policy 
of Josef Stalin, precluded Soviet interest in Middle Eastern affairs. Under Stalin’s “two camps” 
policy, Moscow’s foreign relations allowed no nuance between capitalist and Communist 
countries. Non-aligned nations tha t had recently gained their independence were generally 
shunned by the Soviets on the basis of their non-Communist (therefore, capitalist) status. In 
Nikita Khrushchev’s program of de-Stalinization, the Soviet Union began to fill the power 
vacuum created in the wake of post-World W ar II colonial independence movements.
*Aaron S. Klieman, Soviet Russia in the Middle East (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1970), 27.
2Lawrence L. W hetten, The Canal War: Four-Power Conflict in the Middle East (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1974), 18.
Khrushchev dismantled Stalin’s “two camps” policy in favor of the more fluid “two zones” 
framework.3 The “peace zone” was comprised of both socialist and non-socialist “peace loving” 
nations; i.e., those countries grounded in a national/anti-imperialist movement. This new policy 
helped to create a major feature of the Cold W ar system, namely, superpower competition for 
influence in the non-aligned world. Along with Southeast Asia, the eastern rim of the 
M editerranean became a focal point of superpower-client state relations.
A lthough the Soviet Union was among the first nations to  recognize the state of Israel 
in 1948, relations between the two countries quickly soured. As historian W alter Laqueur noted, 
“Once the state of Israel was established, it ceased to be an agent of revolutionary ferment, and 
thus had no further value for the Kremlin.”4 By 1956, Soviet policy toward Israel had completely 
reversed from warmer relations following World W ar II and Israel’s birth. In the wake of the 
Israeli, British and French tripartite attack on Egypt following Nasser’s nationalization of the 
Suez Canal, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko denounced Israel as an “instrum ent in the 
hands of extremist imperialist powers... [whose] actions are putting a question mark on the very 
existence of Israel as a state.”5
The increased friction between the Soviet Union and Israel coincided with the beginning 
of comprehensive agreements between Moscow and the Arab countries, led by Egypt, 
surrounding (and opposing) Israel. Despite the clearly emerging confluence of Soviet and Arab 
interests, it is im portant to note that the first two major initiatives of Soviet support to Egypt -
3Ben-Cion Pinchuk, “Soviet Penetration into the Middle East in Historical Perspective,” in 
Michael Confino and Shim on Shamir, eds., The USSR and the Middle East (Jerusalem: Israel University 
Press, 1973), 65.
4Walter Laqueur, The Struggle for the Middle East: The Soviet U nion in the Mediterranean 1958- 
1968 (Washington: MacMillan, 1969), 45.
5Andrei Gromyko, as cited in Alden Voth, M oscow Abandons Israel for the Middle East: Ten  
Crucial Years in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: University Press o f  America, 1980), 239-240.
the 1955 Czech arms deal and the process of funding the High Aswan Dam -  were commenced
by default. Nasser sought American aid first, was turned down in both cases, and only then
struck a deal with the Soviets. This legacy of “second best” Soviet-Egyptian dealings would harm
relations between the two countries through the Yom Kippur W ar.
In 1955, President Nasser sought to fortify Egypt’s military capabilities in order to
counter both Israel’s growing strength and Iraq, which had newly acquired W estern support and
was threatening to replace Cairo as the most influential regime of the Arab world. Nasser was
likely unsurprised when the Eisenhower Administration turned down his arms request; in effect,
he was asking the United States for weapons which could potentially be used against
W ashington’s regional allies.6 Nasser was attempting to prove Arab goodwill toward America by
underscoring the similarities of the Egyptian president’s anti-imperialist principles and
W ashington’s post-World W ar II history of supporting independence movements throughout
Asia and Africa -  the very relationship the Soviet Union would soon claim as its own.7 It was
Nasser’s anti-imperialist focus on Israel that helped attract the Soviets to his cause. The Egyptian
leader’s flaring prose would not have been out of place among the statements emanating from
the Soviet propaganda machine:
Imperialism is the great force that is im posing a murderous, invisible siege on e hundred times 
more powerful and pitiless than that w hich  was laid upon us in  our trenches at Faluja, or that 
w hich  encircled  our individual armies and our capitals where w e received  our orders.8
The Baghdad Pact, announced on January 12, 1955, was a decisive factor in the
6Robert Edward Hunter, “The Soviet Dilemma in the Middle East, Part I: Problems of 
Commitment,” London: Institute of Strategic Studies. Adelohi Papers. N o. 59, (September 1969), 6.
George Lenczkowksi, Soviet Advances in the Middle East (W ashington, D.C.: American 
Enterprise Institute for Foreign Policy Research, 1971), 81.
8Gamal Abdul Nasser, Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution (Washington. D.C.: 
Public Affairs Press, 1955), 97-98.
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development of Soviet-Egyptian mutual interests. The W estern-supported military alliance
between Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan posed two major threats to Cairo and Moscow. From the
Egyptian perspective, the pact was an attem pt to shift authority from the Cairo-centered
collective security pact of the Arab League to Baghdad. In the Soviet view, an alliance of three
W estern clients flanking its lower border posed grave security threats insofar as the military could
potentially be prevented from southerly thrusts toward the Middle East.9 O n September 27,
1955, the Soviet Union (operating under the cover of Czechoslovakia) and Egypt signed their
first arms agreement. Egypt received almost 300 combat aircraft, 100 tanks, heavy artillery, six
submarines, and a substantial number of guns -  valued at an estimated total of $250 million.10
Although the agreement significantly augmented Egypt’s military strength, the 1955 Czech deal
was primarily political in nature. As Uri Ra’anan, a scholar, noted, the Soviet Union’s objectives
w ould be to dem onstrate that the W estern  m onopoly over the supply o f  arms to the N ear East 
and, consequently, over the local military and political balance had com e to an end; therefore, 
N ear Eastern rulers n eed  no longer go along w ith  the W estern  defen se plans or accept the 
territorial status q u o .11
The Soviet Union fully realized its status as Egypt’s patron after Nasser nationalized the 
Suez Canal in 1956. The Soviets played their first major role in Middle Eastern international 
considerations when they opposed W estern intervention at the London Conference on the 
Canal.12 Moscow was beginning to use the Middle East as a point of leverage by which to 
proclaim its Great Power status. A lthough Moscow enjoyed credit for the restoration of the 
Sinai, it was United States President Dwight Eisenhower’s demand for tripartite withdrawal that
9Uri Ra'anan, The USSR Arms the Third World: Case Studies in Soviet Foreign Policy 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1969), 20.
10Lenczkowksi, Soviet Advances in the Middle East. 146.
11 Ra'anan, The USSR Arms the Third W orld. 30.
12W hetten, The Canal W ar. 27.
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ended hostilities. Nonetheless, Egypt’s army was destroyed, and the Soviets were faced with the 
choice of re-supplying their client or accepting a significantly downgraded role in Middle Eastern 
affairs. Moscow’s decision to rebuild Egypt’s armaments sparked a new and more intense Middle 
East arms race. Yigal Allon, an Israeli scholar observed, “T he Soviet supply of arms to Egypt 
grew in scale and caliber and with it Egyptian dependence on the Soviet Union.”13
Following Great Britain’s rather pathetic expulsion from the eastern Mediterranean, the 
region set the Soviet Union and the United States squarely against one another (thus making 
the Middle East one more major point of Cold W ar confrontation), and W ashington quickly 
moved to assume the position as defender of the W estern world’s interests in  the region.14 Also, 
the Arab-Israeli dispute cemented the clear demarcation of U nited States-Israel and 
Soviet-Egyptian client-patron relations. The Soviets began publicly to link the ideological 
mutuality of its support for national liberation movements and Nasser’s unique brand of 
anti-imperialist Arab nationalism.
In  addition to military support, Egypt’s major foreign policy objective was to secure 
sufficient economic aid to build the Aswan High Dam, a project that would greatly increase 
Egypt’s acreage of irrigable land. The Czech arms deal of 1955 served as a “wake-up” call to 
Washington, which initially expressed interest in this massive undertaking. Nasser first went to 
the United States for aid, was rejected, and only then turned to the Soviets. Initial American 
opposition to financing the project came from southern cotton growers wary of abundant and
13Yigal A llon, "The Soviet Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict," in Confino and Shamir, eds., 
The USSR and the Middle East. 150.
14United States, Congress, Subcommittee on Europe and the Subcom mittee on the Near East of 
the Committee on  Foreign Affairs, Hearings: Soviet Involvement in the Middle East and the W estern  
Response (W ashington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), 192.
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cheap Egyptian cotton on the world market; a strong pro-Israeli sentiment among the public; and 
a skepticism within the Eisenhower Administration regarding Egypt’s economic ability to absorb 
a project of such magnitude. Egyptian Ambassador to the U nited States A hm ed Hussein was 
“crushed” by U nited States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’ statem ent of rejection , which 
concluded, “the economic situation makes [the dam] not feasible for the United States to take 
part. W e have to withdraw our offer.”15
Dulles seriously miscalculated that Moscow would back the dam, and consequently, the 
Egyptian people, he believed, would oust Nasser for his inability to secure funding for the project. 
W ashington’s rejection did not help America’s image throughout the Arab world. The United 
States withdrawal was soon followed by Great Britain’s own aid withdrawal, and with it the 
withdrawal of a $200 million loan from the World Bank, which would not authorize grant 
support without United States and British backing. As A nthony Nutting, a biographer of 
Nasser, observed, Dulles’ decision not only “collapsed the house of cards” with his decision on 
the Aswan High Dam; “he had pulled down the pillars of the temple on W estern influence not 
only in Egypt, but throughout the Arab world as well.”16 In O ctober 1958, Nasser therefore 
accepted Moscow’s $100 million loan, but even then he took special care to demonstrate to the 
Americans (as well as the Soviets) tha t Moscow’s support could in no way be interpreted as a 
deviation from Egypt’s strict stance of non-alignment.17 The Soviet Union’s prestige in the area 
increased as a result of W estern refusal to fund the dam. Additionally, the 1958 Iraqi
15John Foster Dulles, as cited in Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into  
the Middle East in 1956 (Brattleboro, VT: Amana Books, 1988), 261.
16A nthony Nutting, Nasser (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1972), 140-141.
17Ibid., 254.
79
Revolution “ruined” the Baghdad Pact -  a welcome development in both  Moscow and Cairo.18
By the late 1950s the Soviet position in the Middle East had evolved from exploiting
weak spots in the Arab-W estern relations to a tangible -  and increasingly prestigious -  profile
among its Arab clients. Khrushchev’s “Speech on the Middle East,” presented to the 21st
Congress of the CPSU in January 1959, declared that “differences in ideological views must not
hinder the development of friendly relations between our countries and the cause of common
struggle against imperialism.” He went on to differentiate Soviet interests in the Middle East
from those of the imperialists, who
turn their econ om ic relations w ith  underdeveloped countries in to  the object o f  blackm ail and  
extortion; they im pose military and political conditions o n  them . O ur country builds its relations 
w ith all states o n  principles o f  com plete equality and collaboration  w ithou t any conditions o f  a 
military or political n atu re.19
Like most Soviet proclamations, Khrushchev’s speech was deceptively pleasant. W hatever
ideological solidarity that existed between Soviet and Egyptian leaders was consciously muted
by Nasser, who never accepted the divisive lines drawn by the Cold W ar leaders. Soviet
economic policy, exemplified by the Egyptian cotton trade, was in some ways also imperialist.
The Soviet Union bought Egyptian raw cotton at inflated prices and returned only finished
products. Anthony N utting described this relationship: “In short, Khrushchev’s policy had been
to help Russia by helping Egypt to become independent of the W est at the price of becoming
correspondingly dependent on the Soviet bloc.”20 John Domberg, a journalist, characterized most
18United States, Congress, Subcommittee on  Europe and the Subcommittee on  the Near East o f 
the Committee on  Foreign Affairs, Hearings: Soviet Involvem ent in  the Middle East and the W estern 
Response. 209.
19N.S. Khrushchev, "On the Middle East— Speech to the Twenty First Congress of the CPSU," 
reprinted in A lvin Z. Rubinstein, ed.,' The Foreign Policy o f the Soviet U nion (New York: Random House, 
1960), 401-402.
20Nutting, Nasser, 359.
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of the post-World W ar II Communist states “not as members of a commonwealth or alliance but 
as the satellites and buffers of a new empire”; it was becoming obvious tha t the Soviet Union saw 
the Middle East as a modified extension of its original post-war policy.21 In  fact, Soviet influence 
in the Arab world grew without any parallel expansion of Communist ideology in the region.22 
W hen Nasser began to accept large numbers of Soviet soldiers and technicians in Egypt, he 
frequently had to defend his policy against the general Egyptian concern of Communist 
influence. O ne of Nasser’s rebuttals to this concern is telling:
W e have 3 ,0 0 0  S ov iet technicians at A sw an  [military base] and as far as I know  n one o f  the
A sw anis have becom e Com m unists. O n  the other hand all the S ov iet techn icians now  eat lib
(roasted pum pkin seeds o f  w hich  Egyptians are enorm ously fon d ).23
Anwar el-Sadat, successor to Nasser, was more rigidly anti-Communist than  Nasser (this was 
likely one expression of his deeply religious convictions) and, in his view, the American standard 
of living was clearly superior to that of its Cold W ar adversary.24
From Nasser’s perspective, Communism, Israel, the arbitrary borders that Europe drew 
over the Arab world after W orld W ar I, and superpower competition in the region were all alien 
elements tha t exerted unwanted influence on the Egyptian way of life. Peter Woodward, an 
historian, observed, “It was the sense of his instinctive search for a more just political order that 
took him into the political maelstrom of international politics in the region.”25 The “maelstrom” 
forced Egypt to turn  to the Soviet Union, patron-by-default. N or did Moscow actively seek the 
expansion of communism in the Middle East, where the atheist ideology was particularly
21John Domberg, Brezhnev: The Masks o f Power (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 217.
22Laqueur, The Struggle for the Middle East. 181.
23Gamal Nasser, as cited in John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political 
Economy of Two Regimes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 393.
24Kirk J Beattie, Egypt During the Nasser Years: Ideology, Politics and Civil Society (Boulder: 
W estview Press, 1994), 36.
25Peter Woodward, Nasser (London: Longman Publishers, 1992), 151.
unwelcome among the leading regimes. While Marxism-Leninism was the theoretical guiding 
force in the Soviet military and political structure, the age of nuclear warfare challenged the 
efficacy of a doctrine that assumed violence of capitalist states to be the “midwife of history”; the 
threat of nuclear holocaust acted as a moderating influence on the Soviet U nion’s quest to 
overthrow the status quo in the Middle East.26 Soviet military support to Egypt can be described 
as a balancing act between pleasing its client and sustaining its influence -  always ensuring its 
self-preservation as top priority. This explains, in part, the Egyptians’ almost perpetual complaint 
of the quantity and type of weapons they received and the speed at which they arrived. Soviet 
success in the Middle East, then, must be measured by the exchange of economic aid for 
influence in a vitally im portant geo-strategic area.
In 1973, Leonid Brezhnev, successor to Khrushchev as General Secretary of the CPSU, 
declared, “In the developing countries, as anywhere else, we are on the side of the forces of 
progress, democracy, and national independence; we regard them  as our friends and comrades 
in arms.”27 The always-silent caveat to this and other Soviet proclamations regarding its 
relations with countries could be, “so long as the friendship primarily serves our own interests.” 
W hereas the Soviet explanation of national policy sought to persuade its audience that 
benevolence and camaraderie were its chief exports, Eugene Rostow, former Undersecretary of 
State saw a quite different agenda:
T h e first purpose o f  the Soviet effort is to achieve strategic and tactica l control o f  the
M editerranean, the M iddle East and the Persian G u lf area. O n  that footing, the n ex t step would
26Laqueur, The Struggle for the Middle East. 145.
27Leonid Brezhnev, Leonid Brezhnev: Pages From His Life (N ew  York: Simon and Schuster, 
1978), 197.
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be to drive the United States out of Europe, and to have NATO dismantled.28 
Robert O. Freedman, a scholar, is even more pointed: “T he overall strategic goal at this time 
[early 1970s] seems to have been the elimination of western military, economic and political 
influence in the Arab world to the greatest degree possible, while substituting Soviet influence 
in its place.”29 O f course, the tendency to focus on the niceties of foreign relations at the expense 
of realities is hardly a Soviet monopoly. But perhaps the most telling illustration of this divide 
was Egypt’s constant hostility toward a nation that supplied it w ith billions of dollars’ worth of 
arms.
In exchange for this aid, as Galia Golan, an Israeli historian noted, Egypt hosted the
“Soviets’ largest overseas presence in a non-Soviet bloc country.” Moscow enjoyed “partially
. exclusive rights in some six or seven air bases, at least two naval ports, and several naval facilities
as well as approximately 20,000 military personnel.”30 Lieutenant General Saad el-Shazly of the
Egyptian army outlined his country’s need for military strength and its dearth of options on how
and where to secure it:
W ith ou t the help  o f  the S ov iet U nion , our battle, [the Yom  Kippur W ar] w ould have b een  
im possible. I m ake n o  judgm ent for or against the S ov iet U n ion , its ideology, power structure 
or social system . I state a fact. N o  other country or group o f  countries cou ld  and w ould have 
supplied  Egypt w ith  the arms in the profusion and sophistication  n eed ed  to com bat 
Isr a e l...[p r ec ise ly  that fact led to the first o f  perennial problem s in our relationship w ith the 
S oviet U nion . A s a m onopoly supplier, the Soviet U n ion  cou ld  and  did control their release o f  
arms to us: the w eapons, the am ounts and dates o f  delivery.31
28Eugene V. Rostow, "The Middle Eastern Crisis in Perspecti ve o f W orld Politics," International 
Affairs 47, (April 1971), 275-276.
29Robert O. Freedman, "Detente and United States-Soviet Relations in the Middle East During 
the N ixon Years," in Della W . Sheldon, ed., Dimensions o f D etente (New York: Praeger, 1978), 83.
Galia Golan, Yom Kippur and After: The Soviet U nion and the Middle East Crisis (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1977), 6-7.
31Saad el-Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez (San Francisco: American Mideast Research, 1980),
100.
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Shazly’s remarks exemplify the view as seen through the clients’ perspective. The Egyptians were 
constantly aware of the near-total lack of non-Soviet sources of aid. Their only economically 
feasible alternative to Moscow was politically infeasible: as the patron of Israel, the United States 
was satisfied with the status quo, which Secretary of State and N ational Security Adviser Henry 
Kissinger and President Richard Nixon believed could be m aintained as long as Israel was 
ensured military superiority. After the Six Day W ar of June 1967, Egypt and its Arab allies were 
thus “stuck” with the Soviet Union. The Soviets, in turn, exploited their unique position by 
actively seeking opportunities on a case by case basis within the larger context of increasing 
Soviet influence at the expense of W estern interests.32 The Soviet policy of opportunity was not 
unique to the Middle East. Alvin Rubinstein, an expert on Moscow’s Middle East policy 
observed, “the more closely one examines Soviet diplomacy in  the Third World, the more one 
is impressed by the flexibility and opportuneness of its responses to the potentialities of each
... _• »33situation.
The simplest way to define opportunism is to frame choices in light of ability. The 
Soviets chose to exert military and diplomatic influence in Egypt because they were able to do 
so. But the more relevant question examines matters of degree: why did the Soviet Union focus 
so intently on the Middle East in general and Egypt in particular? In the Cold W ar system, the 
United States and the Soviet Union competed for global dominance. The superpowers, in the 
era of detente, actively sought to remove the threat of nuclear warfare from the range of
32Foy Kohler, Leon Goure, and Mose L. Harvey, Soviet Strategy in the Middle East: A  Special 
Report on Hiphliehts and the Implications for U nited States Security Interests (Coral Gables, FL: Center 
for Advanced International Studies, University o f Miami, 1975), 12.
33Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "The Soviet U nion and the Third World," in Stephen F. Cohen, Alexander 
Rabinowitch and Robert Sharlet, eds., The Soviet U nion Since Stalin (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1980), 328.
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available options by which to manage this competition. But detente did not erase the nature of 
the competition, and the Middle East offered two major points of leverage: geo-strategic 
centrality and oil.
The Soviet Navy Enters the M editerranean
Egypt sits at the crossroads of the Mediterranean, and the Suez Canal and Red Sea allow passage 
to the Indian O cean and beyond. Few countries offer access to three continents from as central 
a position as Egypt.34 Egypt’s location thus offered Moscow a unique base for its expanding naval 
and air forces. O ne Admiral of the Soviet Navy described the importance of the seas in the 
nuclear age:
T h e principal objective for the launching o f  the nuclear attacks from the sea against vitally  
im portant targets o n  enem y territory.... T h e oceans h ave lost their form er significance as 
protective barriers, w hich  during the two world wars effectively  separated the countries o f  the 
W estern  hem isphere from the devastation  and destruction  v isited  upon the nations o f  Europe.35
Soviet military doctrine held that the world’s oceans are defensive in nature only in the sense 
that they must be controlled for a deterrent effect. Intercontinental missiles effectively 
neutralized the vastness of the seas; for the Soviet homeland to be protected, its navy must be 
in position for a nuclear strike capability, designed not only to deter any opponents from attack, 
but also to strengthen Soviet bargaining leverage between and after wars.36 Soviet military 
commanders, like their political masters, espoused Marxism-Leninism as their guiding principle. 
This ideology, in their view, was a force of benevolence amidst an evil and capitalist world. O ne
34Klieman, Soviet Russia in the Middle East. 43.
35K. Stalbo, "The Significance of the Seas and Oceans in Combat Actions," in Selected Readings 
from Military Thought. 1963-1973, v. 5 pt. II. (W ashington D.C.: Governm ent Printing Office: 1982), 77-
36K enneth R. McGruther, The Evolving Soviet Navy (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 
1978), 58.
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Soviet colonel wrote:
In contrast to the aggressive b locs o f  the imperialist powers, the u n ion  o f  the countries o f  the  
socialist com m onw ealth  and their close military alliance h ave a firm objective basis for 
m onolith ic solidarity. This union  was formed and is develop in g  in accordance w ith  the principles 
o f Socialist in ternationalism , full equality o f  the m em ber states, strict observance o f  their 
sovereignty, national and international interests, and unselfish  fraternal m utual aid.37
The Soviet record bears a considerably different picture from this portrayal of a socialist fraternal
utopia.
Moscow had a strong impetus to build a large naval presence in the Mediterranean. The
Soviets’ retreat from the naval confrontation at Cuba was recent history, and weighed heavily
in the Soviet strategy, as one writer describes “to be taken seriously as a world power.”38 The
United States Sixth Fleet and Polaris submarine squadron lost its 15-year-long nuclear monopoly
in the region after the Soviet Navy commenced sustained exercises in the M editerranean in
1964. In a speech delivered in Egypt at Port Said in May 1964, Khrushchev sounded the alarm
over imperialist ambitions in the area:
T h e colonialists n ow  w ant to use the aircraft carriers and other warships against the national 
liberation m ovem en t o f  the peoples, to bring the policies o f  neutrality and non-alignm ent into  
range o f  their ships’ guns and m issiles....T h e imperialists w ant, w ith  the aid o f  aircraft carrier 
diplom acy, to restore reactionary regimes in  the countries o f  A sia  and A frica.39
The Soviet Union commenced its first prolonged presence in the M editerranean one 
m onth after Khrushchev’s speech. From the time Soviet Admiral Sergei Gorshkov commanded 
the navy to “sail upon the world’s oceans” in 1964 to 1968, the Soviet Union expanded its
37M.P. Skirdo, "The People, the Army, the Commander: A  Soviet View," in Soviet Military 
Thought, published under the auspices of the United States Air Force, v. 14 (W ashington D.C.: 
Government Printing Office: 1970), 13.
38Hunter, "The Soviet Dilemma in the Middle East," 24.
39George S. Dragnich, "The Soviet Union's Quest for Access to Naval Facilities in Egypt Prior to 
the June War o f 1967" in Ken Booth, John M cDonnell and Michael MacGuire, eds. Soviet Naval Policy: 
Objectives and Constraints (New York: Praeger, 1975), 253.
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out-of-area naval maneuvers by a factor of ten.40 The scope of this buildup, along with other 
considerations, allowed for a Soviet confidence unachievable directly after the Cuban missile 
crisis. According to one Soviet general, the Marxist-Leninist military doctrine of the Soviet 
Union provides a
stable foundation  [that] predeterm ines the stability o f  our governm ent and the invincible m ight 
o f  the S ov iet A rm ed Forces, their colossal com bat capabilities, and the decisive character o f  our 
military doctrine and strategy in the interests o f  the defense o f  the country.41
The new Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev declared in 1965: “W e are trying to make our
diplomacy active and thrusting, while at the same time showing flexibility and circumspection.”42
In this context, “diplomacy” is a euphemism for the maneuvering capabilities of the Soviet
military (the adjective “thrusting” would not, of course, be appropriate for describing an
embassy), which underscores the highly politicized nature of Soviet military doctrine. The
United States Navy regarded the Soviet strategy as a “conventional first-strike, optimized for a
preemptive attack against an opposing naval force that might be superior in overall combat
capabilities.”43 The Soviet navy would have unquestionably lost in any head-on confrontation
with the Sixth Fleet, bu t in a nuclear conflict, a first-strike capability did not require military
superiority to serve as an effective deterrent. Steve Kime, an American naval expert, defined
modern naval power as a “limited display of national will and power embodied in a ship or
squadron... [that] requires visibility for local effect.”44 In the Soviet view at the time, the United
40McGruther, The Evolving Soviet Navy, 36.
41S. Ivanov, "Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy," in Selected Readings from Military Thought. 
1963-1973. v. 5 pt. II, 25.
42Leonid Brezhnev, as cited in McGruther, T he Evolving Soviet N avy. 32.
43Cited in U nited States, Department o f Defense, Office o f the C hief o f Naval Operations, 
Understanding Soviet Naval Developm ents (Washington, D.C.: Department o f the Navy, 1975), 19.
44Steve F. Kime, A  Soviet Navy for the Nuclear Age: National Security Affairs Issue Paper No. 
80-1 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1980), 14.
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States had to be denied its nuclear monopoly in the M editerranean, and as a consequence, its
“natural” claim of dominance in the seas.45 The Soviet navy was working toward a combination
effect that satisfied both  security-defensive interests and political objectives during times of
peace. Admiral Gorshkov summarized the navy’s purpose:
By a w ell-balanced  navy we m ean a navy w hich  in com position  and arm am ent is capable o f  
carrying out m issions assigned it n ot only in  a nuclear war, b u t in a w ay w hich  does n ot make use 
o f  nuclear w eapons, and is also able to support state interests at sea in  peacetim e.46
These generalities of Soviet military doctrine were devised on a global scale, of which the
Mediterranean/Middle East was one vital theater. The scholar Ivo Lederer observed, “a
governing Soviet assumption would appear to be that a global power must exercise its power
globally.”47 In the words of one journalist, the Soviet Navy’s presence in the Middle East was
designed to “make the W estern powers step just tha t more gingerly in any future crisis.”48
Moscow’s search for facilities to accommodate its navy forced its objectives abroad, because the
European portion of the Soviet Union had strictly limited southerly access from its own ports.
Robert Freedman noted tha t “Egypt presented the best or optimum conditions and
communications facilities required by Soviet naval-military, political, and diplomatic strategy in
the Middle East after 1956.”49 In the north of Egypt, airfields accommodated Soviet bombers
that provided air cover to the Mediterranean squadron; in the south, the air base near Aswan
45Ibid., 15.
46John G. Hibbits,"Admiral Gorshkov's Writings: Twenty Years of Naval Thought," in Naval 
Power in Soviet Policy, published under the auspices o f the U nited States Air Force, v. 2. (Washington 
D.C.: Government Printing Office: 1982), 16.
47Ivo J. Lederer, "Historical Introduction," in Ivo J. Lederer and W ayne S. Vucinich, eds., The 
Soviet Union and the Middle East: The Post-World War II Era (Palo Alto: Hoover Institution Press, 
1974), 3.
48Economist, 18 May 1968, reprinted in Laqueur, The Struggle for the Middle East. 155.
49P.J. Vatikiotis, "The Soviet U nion and Egypt: The Nasser Years," in Lederer and Vucinich, eds., 
The Soviet Union and the Middle East. 131.
afforded a degree of dominance of Northeast Africa and the Indian O cean.50 The Egyptian 
airbases, as the United States Navy observed, enabled “Soviet land-based naval reconnaissance 
aircraft to operate over the eastern M editerranean without overflying [NATO members] Greece 
and Turkey.”51 Soviet docking privileges in the Egyptian harbors at Port Said and Alexandria 
additionally allowed the Soviet Navy a powerful and constant presence in the M editerranean 
after the Six Day W ar of June 1967.
The Soviet Navy’s major objective in the M editerranean was to check the dominance 
of the United States Navy’s Sixth Fleet. Egyptian airfields were the major facility for the TU-16 
aircraft, which specialized in surveillance of the Sixth Fleet.52 The Soviet M editerranean Fleet 
could boast of three advantages over its American opponent: a younger squadron; proximity to 
its home base in the Black Sea; and, as George Lenczkowski, an expert in the Middle East and 
international relations, observed, “access to facilities in the radical Arab states along most of the 
eastern and southern shores of the M editerranean.”53
None of these advantages, however, could be translated into actual superiority over the 
United States forces. The ability to deny the United States monopoly in the M editerranean (or 
any other theater, for tha t matter) did not require certain superiority, bu t did demand a 
well-equipped and visible presence large enough to prevent uninhibited maneuvers like the 1958 
American landing in Lebanon -  a move that the Soviet Union was in no position to deter at that 
time. However, had the United States decided to withdraw the Sixth Fleet for any reason, the
50Freedman, "Detente and United States-Soviet Relations in the Middle East During the N ixon  
Years," in Sheldon, ed., Dim ensions o f  D etente. 83.
51United States, Department o f  Defense, Office o f the C hief o f  Naval Operations, Understanding 
Soviet Naval Developm ents. 11.
52Hunter, "The Soviet Dilemma in the Middle East," 13.
53Lenczkowksi, Soviet Advances in the Middle East. 157.
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Soviet Union would have remained, as one group of experts argued,
T h e dom inant military power in the eastern  M editerranean and probably the Persian  
G u lf... [which] w ould reduce the risks o f  a S ov iet con frontation  w ith  the U n ited  States, and it 
w ould grant th e  S ov iet U n ion  naval and eventu al air superiority over the European N A T O  
countries bordering on  the M editerranean.54
Thus, the impetus to build a sizeable M editerranean fleet was indeed strong. As one 
scholar notes, the Soviet U nion’s acquisition of port and air field facilities in order to sustain a 
M editerranean fleet “alone would account for Khrushchev’s and Brezhnev’s persistent efforts to 
establish close working relations with a number of Arab states.”55 By the time of the Y om Kippur 
W ar of O ctober 1973, the Soviet squadron reached its peak with 96 ships, which outnumbered 
the United States Sixth Fleet.56
The Soviet Union’s interest in commanding a global reach through its navy was, as the
United States Navy understood it, indicative of Moscow’s policy toward “possessing a better
\
worldwide general purpose naval capability...[that is] increasingly capable of denying such 
control to others.”57 It is therefore apparent why Egypt was of great value to Moscow’s naval 
requirements. W ith Egypt as its major Soviet satellite base in the region, Moscow was able to 
project its naval power, under significant air cover, from southern Europe, northeast Africa, and 
the Middle East and into the Indian O cean -  a range not possible from any single domestic 
military base. Given Egypt’s vital importance in the scope of the Soviet U nion’s geo-strategic 
considerations, there is a clear disingenuousness to the Soviets’ oft-repeated tone of purely
54Kohler, Goure, and Harvey, Soviet Strategy in the Middle East, 58.
5501es M. Smolansky, "The Soviet U nion and the Middle East," in W illiam E. Griffith, ed., The 
Soviet Empire: Expansion and Detente (Lexington, MA: D.C. H eath and Co., 1976), 260.
John J. Herzog, "Perspectives on Soviet Naval Developm ent: A  Navy to M atch National 
Purposes," in Naval Power in Soviet Policy, published under the auspices o f the United States Air Force, v. 
2. (W ashington D.C.: Government Printing Office: 1982), 40.
57Thomas W . W olfe, "Military Power and Soviet Policy," in Griffith, ed., The Soviet Empire: 
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socialist camaraderie with the Egyptian people. Soviet military requirements necessitated 
policies that contradicted Marxist-Leninist policy. A n orthodox application of the doctrine 
would have prohibited relations with Egypt -  a country with a long history of persecuting local 
Communist parties. The central location of Arab states along the M editerranean rim, and the 
nature of their own weaknesses, can satisfactorily explain the Soviet U nion’s foreign aid policy.58 
But geo-strategic considerations constituted only part of Moscow’s (Egypt-centered) interest in 
Middle Eastern influence. The concentration and am ount of Arab oil factored as the other 
major determ inant that weighed heavily on the Soviet U nion’s Middle East policies.
The Soviet Union and Middle Eastern Oil
Middle Eastern oil is concentrated in the relatively small Persian Gulf region, which accounted 
for the great majority of “free world” oil reserves. As Abraham Becker, a specialist in 
international oil politics, noted, the Soviet Union “could not be indifferent to Persian Gulf oil 
affairs if she was at all concerned with the politics of the region.”59 This statem ent, while 
certainly true, begs for elaboration. The great influence of Persian Gulf oil over Arab politics was 
without question, but to what end did oil directly serve Soviet interests?
Precise data on Soviet domestic oil reserves was unavailable to foreigners under the 
Soviet State Secret Act. However, studies showed tha t the oil-rich Volga-Ural region 
constituted much of the oil exploration conducted throughout the Soviet U nion’s vast
58Klieman, Soviet Russia in the Middle East. 12.
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territory.60 In 1967, the Soviet journal International Affairs claimed:
T he rationalization for U n ited  States policy in  the M iddle East is the alleged threat o f  a Soviet  
takeover o f  the area’s oil. Imperialist spokesm en know, o f  course, that the U SSR , a large oil 
exp orter , has n o  n eed  o f  M iddle Eastern oil and does n o t take control o f  other people’s resources 
in  the im perialist m anner.61
In fact, the Soviet Union was importing a relatively small amount of Middle Eastern oil by the
late 1960s, mostly for consumption in the Eastern bloc countries for the purpose, as W alter
Laqueur noted, “to balance trade relations and to recoup the Soviet credits that have been
extended to [the Arabs] .”62 It was clear to W estern observers that, whatever the precise amount
of proven oil reserves within the Soviet borders, Moscow’s energy dilemma was nothing like that
of Japan’s or the countries of W estern Europe, which all were totally dependent on foreign oil
sources. Middle Eastern oil was an attractive import for Soviet policy, to the relatively minor
degree that production and transportation costs of domestic oil often exceeded the price of
imported Arab oil to the industrial and population centers of European Russia.63
The Soviet energy situation, then, had to contend with the rather enviable problem of
transporting and refining its own massive reserves. Between 1972 and 1982, as the historian
Anthony Stacpoole argued, “Russian oil sales have provided the bulk of Soviet hard-currency
earnings; latterly, this feature has become so marked that cynics have spoken of the USSR has
a ‘one-crop economy.’”64 In 1973, the year of the Arab oil embargo, Soviet oil production was
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planned at almost 1.5 billion tons of conventional fuel, of which 32 percent of all exports was 
marked for consumption in six Eastern bloc countries.65 The Soviet Union was the world’s 
greatest crude oil producer by the early 1970s. Soviet interests in Middle Eastern oil was, like 
its support of Egypt and other revolutionary Arab states, primarily strategic in character. 
Moscow was far more interested in denying the W estern and industrialized capitalist countries 
of Persian Gulf oil imports than they were in expropriating the valuable commodity for 
themselves. Moscow vigorously supported all three major Arab oil embargoes of 1956, 1967 and 
1973-74 for this reason.66 During the Cold W ar, there was m uch debate on the Soviets’ ability 
to sustain its impressive record of oil production. Today, we know tha t Soviet proven oil reserve 
capacity was not a fluke. David Remnick, a journalist, recently noted that today “Russia is lucky, 
floating on a tide of profits from the oil-and-gas industry.”67 Joe Duarte, another journalist, 
observed, Russia is “setting itself up as the potential undisputed oil and energy market 
heavyweight champion of the world.”68
The Soviet U nion worked to ensure the continued strength of its own robust oil trade 
in the Middle East. Soviet oil, which accounted for 62 percent of all fuel traveling south through 
the Suez Canal, was blocked from reaching its Asian markets when the Canal was closed in 
1967. The eight-year closure of the Canal forced a 32 percent decrease in Soviet.oil exports.69 
Moscow also actively sought to link oil to the Arab-Israeli dispute after the 1967 Six Day War.
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O ne expert argues that the Soviets “maintained that because an Israeli withdrawal from 
occupied Arab territories would lead to the reopening of the Canal, it was in the interest of W est 
European states to seek an Israeli pullback to the pre-1967 borders.”70
Moscow’s interest in oil was similar to Soviet military doctrine, as both followed strategic 
not ideological or economic considerations. W est European countries and Japan were the most 
important allies in the American industrial alliance and heavily dependent on Middle Eastern 
oil. The Soviet Union sought influence -  mainly through the auspices of its relationship with 
Egypt -  throughout the Arab world in order to gain influence over the Persian Gulf oil trade and 
eventually force a re-orientation of W est European and Japanese foreign policy away from their 
traditional superpower ally.71
Moscow also linked W estern oil interests with imperialism on the basis of a history of 
friendly relations between the conservative oil sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf and W estern oil 
corporations. Moscow saw an opportunity in the formation of OPEC, the founding principle of 
which espoused an anti-imperialist policy ensuring an equitable share of oil profits for the 
exporting countries.72 In the Soviet view, Arab oil interests in the 1960s and early 1970s were 
clearly coalescing into an anti-W estern orientation -  a trend tha t Moscow attem pted to exploit. 
In February 1973, the Soviet newspaper hvestiict called for “the very rich oil sources of the Arab 
world [to become] an effective weapon in the struggle against the forces of imperialism.”73 Two
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months before the impending October 1973 oil embargo, Anatoly Gromyko, son of the foreign 
minister, wrote:
W ith ou t a solu tion  to this [energy] problem in the n ex t few years, the U n ited  States will be 
unable to m aintain  any significant growth rate w hich  is fraught, for the U n ited  States, w ith  
far-reaching con sequ en ces under conditions o f  the acceleration  o f  com petition  on  the trade 
m arket and the presence o f  very acute social problem s.74
In other words, an oil embargo against the United States would be very good news for 
Moscow indeed. The Soviet Union’s support of the 1973 embargo stemmed from the double 
benefit it would enjoy from this action. N ot only would the American-led industrial alliance be 
weakened, but the fuel shortages would lead to an increased demand for, and consequently price 
of the USSR’s own oil.75 The 1973 embargo did not rupture the American economy to the 
extent that Moscow had hoped, but the United States was nevertheless ill prepared to brace for 
the Arab cutbacks. Easily accessible domestic reserves were mostly depleted, and new 
environmental regulations effectively halted new domestic exploration projects.76 The posted 
price of a barrel of oil nearly tripled by the end of 1973 as a result of the embargo. Ian Smart, 
a scholar, argued tha t this dramatic inflation “gave the Soviet Union an ideal opportunity to raise 
the prices...of its own exports, and thus to increase very substantially its earnings of hard 
currency.”77
Soviet oil policy in the Middle East, like its naval policy and general Cold W ar objectives, 
operated under the cover of ideological principles, while the record of their actions speaks 
primarily to  self-interested politico-strategic determinants. The increasing dependence of the
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industrialized world on Middle Eastern oil supplies presented the Soviet Union with an 
opportunity to link oil with a burgeoning anti-W estern sentim ent in  order to harm the industrial 
alliance economically. Ideologically, the Soviet Union and the conservative Arab oil states 
responsible for the embargo were at odds; but Moscow’s Middle East strategy planned for future 
support of anti-imperialist Persian Gulf oil diplomacy.
The Middle East served Moscow’s interests as one im portant region in a global, bi-polar 
system of East-W est competition. In the Soviet view, Egypt helped to satisfy all three of its 
major objectives in the area. Egypt’s need for weapons to combat Israel placed Moscow in an 
advantageous position as the only country willing and able to arm Israel’s primary enemy. In 
return, the Soviet Union enjoyed naval and air maneuverability tha t projected military force 
from Southern Europe to India, with Egypt serving as the major base of operations. Finally, since 
Egypt was the leading anti-Zionist state of the Arab world, the Soviet Union’s patron-state 
position served, as one group of experts argued, “its objectives in increasing Arab dependence 
on Soviet political and military support and that it facilitates the identification of the United 
States as being pro-Israel and thus an enemy of the Arabs.”78 The Soviet Union positioned itself, 
in the course of a decade, as a major power in the Middle East tha t did not exercise any presence 
there before 1955. Between 1954 and 1965 Egypt alone received almost $13 billion dollars in 
economic aid from the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc countries.79 Moscow’s interest in Egypt 
was part of a long-term strategy of influence as motivated by self-interest.
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Soviet Aid to Egypt After the 1967 Six Day W ar
Israel’s rout of its Arab enemies in the Six Day W ar posed more than one problem for the Soviet 
Union. N ot only did Moscow watch as Israel destroyed the billions of dollars’ worth of military 
equipment and weapons it had invested in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq; the Soviets had to come to 
terms with the incompetence of the Arab officer corps on which it placed its trust, and by 
extension, its prestige.80 W hy, after the Arabs’ total defeat, did the Soviet Union choose to 
re-supply its clients in a more vigorous manner than that which preceded the war?
O ne advantage the Arab defeat presented to the Soviets was its compatibility with the 
Marxist-Leninist position, that held, as George Lenczkowski observed, tha t “in its advanced 
stages, capitalism assumed the form of imperialism bent on subjugation of the less developed 
nations of the Third W orld.”81 This position was a convenient way for the Soviets to “save face” 
and exploit the Arabs’ much expanded dependence of economic and military aid from Moscow 
after the June War. The Soviets sensed a new Arab urgency to confront Zionism after Israel had 
occupied the Arab territories and believed that in the new desperate situation re-supplying the 
determined Arab armies would, eventually, result in a new era of Soviet prestige in the region. 
Former Egyptian ambassador Ashraf Ghorbal reflected on the Arab stance that refused to accept 
the new status q u o : “W hatever length of time, of money, and of effort it would take, [the Arabs] 
would have to deploy every means, including resort to arms, to get back their lands and rights.”82
This determination could be realized only with renewed and intensified Soviet support. 
The Suez Canal was closed at the conclusion of the Six Day W ar, and Egypt faced an estimated
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annual revenue loss of 100 million pounds. Nasser had no money to buy more weapons to guard 
against further Israeli advances. The Egyptian leader’s requests to Nikolai Podgomy ushered in 
a new era of Moscow’s influence when the Soviet President traveled to Egypt two weeks after 
the June W ar cease-fire had taken effect. As A nthony N utting observed, “N ot only did he ask 
for arms as a free gift, bu t he also pressed for Russian military advisers and instructors.... Nasser 
insisted that Soviet advisers and technicians should be attached to every brigade, and if possible, 
every battalion of the Egyptian army.”83 After Nasser’s ill-fated war in Yemen and disastrous 
confrontation with Israel, the Egyptian president had nowhere else to turn  but Moscow. Nasser 
defended his decision: “In the sphere of foreign policy, I found we had no relations.. .with any 
country except the Soviet U nion.”84
The 1967 war taught Egypt that any future confrontation with Israel must begin with a 
first-strike Arab attack. Arab military doctrine held tha t Israel’s preemptive strike set the stage 
for a rout.85 Nasser’s initial requests to Moscow were predicated by his aim of acquiring a 
sufficient quantity of offensive weapons to enable Egypt to regain the Sinai. The Soviets initially 
rejected the request on the grounds that it would increase the chance of direct confrontation 
with the United States. But Moscow eventually changed its position, reasoning that, in the 
words of Anthony Nutting, “by complying with Nasser’s requests, they would be able to keep 
Egypt’s armed forces under their control, [and] they agreed to provide not only the arms, but 
also the advisors and technicians for which they had been asked.”86 This new agreement would
83Nutting, Nasser. 431.
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afford the Soviet Union, unsurpassed influence in the Middle East, and in any event, as the 
scholar Robert H unter noted, “to change policy would be an admission of earlier miscalculation 
and a blow to Soviet prestige in the world generally.”87 Given all tha t Moscow had invested in 
Egypt up to the June W ar, rejecting Egypt’s requests would have been folly. W alter Laqueur 
concluded bluntly, “in the modern world big powers had to pay a high price for political 
influence.”88
The resurgence of Soviet arms shipments and consequent influence after the Six Day 
W ar did not constitute a military alliance in the formal sense, bu t there was no doubt that by 
1968 Egypt could no longer credibly claim membership to the non-aligned camp.89 Both Egypt 
and the Soviets stood to  gain from a mutual anti-Zionist relationship. The major Soviet presence 
would likely deter Israel from launching another catastrophic attack against Egypt; and in the 
words of Jon Glassman, an expert on arms proliferation, “a repetition of the Six Day W ar 
debacle could cause the Soviet Union to lose all credibility as a protector of those in the Arab 
world and elsewhere who were seeking to fight ‘imperialism.’”90 Moscow hoped that drawing 
Egypt closer to Soviet influence would have the “magnetic” effect of radicalizing more countries 
from the neutralist Third W orld.91
Moscow’s influence increased steadily between the Six Day W ar and Nasser’s death in 
1970. As Arnold L. Horelick, of the RAND Corporation, described it, the Middle East was on
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its way to becoming “the first substantial Soviet sphere of influence in a non-contiguous area.”92
The Soviets’ vigorous re-supply program replaced all materiel th a t Egypt had lost in the June
W ar by the end of 1968. Moscow also sent 3,000 Soviet advisors to m an the new equipment.93
In July 1970, the total number of combat aircraft in the Egyptian Air Force exceeded its
inventory before the June W ar by 32.94 Moscow’s ability to procure huge quantities of weapons
in a relatively short time was a project obviously m eant for public consumption beyond the
Middle East. In 1968, Secretary Brezhnev declared:
T h e b alance o f  forces on  a worldwide scale con tinu es to tilt in  favor o f  socialism  and its allies 
because the m ight o f  the socialist cam p is now  such  that the im perialists are afraid o f  the military 
rout in  case o f  a head -on  clash  w ith  the m ain forces o f  socialism .95
In fact, avoiding a direct superpower engagement was Moscow’s overriding foreign policy
concern. Brezhnev’s reference to “the might of the socialist camp” by no means accurately
portrayed of Soviet-Egyptian relations after the June W ar. The Soviet Union constantly
discredited American actions toward a negotiated settlem ent, while reminding its client that
Moscow was, as Galia Golan described it, “indispensable to the Arabs as the only superpower
pressing for all Arab demands.”96 This fact was not lost on Nasser, who would have preferred
not to be entirely dependent on any single nation. The Egyptian President defended himself
rhetorically: “So what should I have done? Should I have waited until the Americans would
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send me equal quantities of food and weapons? I’d have waited for ever if I had.”97 Nasser, of
course, was not complaining of the quantity of aid -  only its source. Indeed, the Soviets invested
approximately $4.5 billion in the Egyptian miltiary between 1967-1970 alone. Egypt was the
leading recipient of Soviet aid among all non-Communist countries during this period.98
A t the end of June 1967, Cairo was vulnerable to Israeli raids which could now be
launched from the east bank of the Suez Canal -  only 40 miles to the east. The Israeli
occupation of the Sinai was totally unacceptable to Egypt, and no diplomatic solution would
meet Nasser’s goal -  full Israeli withdrawal. The Egyptian army, fully supplied with Soviet
offensive weapons, commenced the W ar of A ttrition in 1969. The Egyptian Field Marshal
Mohamed Abdel Ghani El-Gamasy explained the reasoning behind Egypt’s renewal of hostilities:
Egypt’s purpose was to in flict enough  dam age o n  the Israeli forces in  the Sinai in  arms, 
equipm ent, and to its fortifications -  in addition to losses in life -  to con v in ce it that its stay in  
the occupied  Arab lands w ould be at a very h igh cost, n ot on ly in  terms o f  the actual losses 
sustained -  w ith  all the negative psychological im pact this w ould  have o n  the Israeli forces and  
people -  but also in  terms o f  the size o f  the forces it w ould h ave to com m it to Sinai and w ith  the  
need  for con tinu ous m obilization over long periods, w hich  w ould  inevitably have detrim ental 
con sequ en ces o n  Israeli society.99
In sum, N  asser launched the W  ar of A ttrition to test the endurance of the Israeli military 
-  a force not designed for protracted conflict. Nasser hoped to convince Tel Aviv that it could 
not occupy Arab territories indefinitely. During this “war of attrition,” Nasser was again forced 
to ask the Soviets for increased aid. Israeli air raids, which penetrated deep into Egypt proper, 
were wreaking havoc on the military and society in general. A t first Moscow rejected the request 
because sufficient protection would require a new level of Soviet influence that could lead to a
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superpower engagement. But Nasser’s visit to Moscow in January 1970 successfully played on
the other major Soviet concern. He declared:
I am a leader w ho is bom bed every day in his ow n country, w hose army is exposed  and whose 
people are naked. I have the courage to tell our people the unfortunate truth -  that w hether  
they like it or n ot, the Am ericans are the masters o f  the world. I am n ot going to be the one w ho  
surrenders to the A m ericans. Som eone else will com e in  my place w ho will have to do it .100
The Soviets deliberated for several hours before accepting Nasser’s request for aid.101 
Moscow undertook a missile defense shield, manned by Soviet technicians, to protect Egypt from 
the Israeli air force. As the historian Raymond Baker put it, “The only alternative to an enlarged 
Soviet presence was capitulation.”102
The “war of attrition,” which failed to expel Israel from the Sinai, illustrated the basic 
Soviet conundrum in the six-year interwar period. Moscow exercised caution with its military 
aid and presence so as not to provoke a direct American response in defense of its Israeli clients. 
The Egyptian leadership knew perfectly well that the only nation that would likely settle the 
Arab-Israeli conflict was the United States -  a fact they continually mentioned as leverage 
against Moscow in protest of its cautious air defense policy.
Nasser’s death (likely caused by the stress induced from Egypt’s intensifying conflict with 
Israel) did not come as a surprise to Moscow. Soviet doctors who examined the Egyptian leader 
knew they were dealing with a gravely ill patient at least one year before he died. In anticipation 
of a new regime in Cairo, the Soviets looked to install their “key m an” Ali Sabri to succeed 
Nasser. Nasser responded by naming the conservative and W estern-leaning Anwar el-Sadat as
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Vice President.103
W hen Sadat assumed the presidency following Nasser’s death in September 1970, he 
inherited relations with Moscow that had reached a curious, paradoxical level. The Soviet 
U nion’s massive aid package after the June W ar emphasized Egypt’s constrained and dependent 
relationship with its patron, not to mention the thousands of Soviet advisers in Egypt who acted 
as if they were sovereigns. Yet, as a result of Moscow’s support, the Egyptian military was 
reaching, as Peter Woodward, a biographer of Nasser, noted, a point “at which Sadat could plan 
secretly to cut free of his Eastern patrons.”104 In the colorful phrase of Robert Hunter, writing in 
1969, “The Soviet Union may be acquiring more influence with individual Arab states, but at 
the price of appearing often to be the dog wagged by the Arab tail.”105 Furthermore, the Soviets’ 
abrasive style, both  in regard to the members of the Politburo in Moscow and the advisors 
throughout Egypt, did not help the cause of socialist fraternity. Anwar Sadat summarized the 
situation: “W e had what one could call relations only with the Soviet Union -  a country that 
never made us feel there were advantages in having relations with it, since the Russians had 
practically no relations with anybody.”106
The Arab clients found m uch to complain about in nearly every aspect of 
Soviet-Egyptian relations. Egyptian generals grappled with terribly translated tactical handbooks 
in Soviet military academies, and were often instructed by lower ranking Soviet officers.107 In
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Sadat’s words, the “Soviet Union liked to see [Egypt’s] hands tied,”108 which resulted in an 
inverse relationship between Moscow’s involvement in Egypt and its popularity there.109 Lt. 
General Shazly was perhaps the most succinct in his characterization: “The Russians have many 
qualities, but concern for hum an feelings is not among them .”110 This helps to explain the 
popular moniker for the 18,000 self-segregated Soviet advisors stationed in Egypt: “the unsmiling 
ones.”111 More importantly the rising anti-Soviet sentiment spread from the general public to 
the army -  a trend tha t would bear heavily on Sadat’s future dealings with Moscow.112
Soviet-Egyptian Relations from Sadat’s Inauguration to the Yom Kippur W ar 
By the early 1970s the Soviet Union’s policy in the Middle East had undergone a major 
transformation since its introduction to the region in the 1950s and early 1960s. Arab 
nationalism, once a strong anti-W estern movement vigorously encouraged by Moscow, had, as 
the historian Adeed Dawisha described it, turned “against Soviet interests in the 1970s as they 
had been against the W est ten to twenty years earlier.”113
Sadat’s relations with Moscow began on a high note early in his administration. The 
opening ceremony of the Aswan High Dam on January 13, 1971, marked the successful 
completion of a structural feat comparable to the construction G reat Pyramids.114 The dam
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could not have been completed without Soviet assistance, bu t Sadat and the Egyptian military 
were not content with development aid alone; Egypt needed arms. Sadat set out for Moscow 
in early M arch to state personally his complaints on the quantity and type of weapons deliveries. 
The meeting ended with Sadat in a rage after the Soviets stipulated tha t certain weapons were 
only to be used upon receiving prior approval from the Kremlin. “Nobody,” he said, “is allowed 
to take a decision on Egyptian affairs except the people of Egypt itself -  represented by me, the 
President of Egypt!”115 This was the basic Soviet-Egyptian source of strained relations: the 
Soviet Union was careful not to arm its client to a level beyond which Moscow could dictate its 
will, and Egypt resented the political “strings” attached to all Soviet arms shipments, which 
Sadat perceived as a slight to Egyptian sovereignty.
A nother major source of friction was Moscow’s attem pted infiltration of the upper 
echelons of the Egyptian government, through its pro-Soviet Vice President Ali Sabri and his 
Communist faction. As a high-ranking government official, Sabri was a serious political liability 
to Sadat, who was having enough trouble building his own reputation w ithout Sabri’s repeated 
exaltations of Nasser’s legacy. As Mohammed Heikal, an influential Egyptian journalist, put it, 
“They wanted the dead leader to become a fourth pyramid in Egypt and for themselves to be 
installed as perm anent and exclusive high priests ministering to his shrine.”116 President Sadat’s 
name was mentioned during a private tea time with Soviet President Podgorny, to which Sabri 
joked, “what president?” Sadat was not amused upon hearing this story.117 O n  April 22, 1971, 
Sadat summoned the Soviet ambassador to notify Moscow tha t Ali Sabri, popularly known as
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the Soviet Union’s “number-one” man in Egypt, would be relieved of his duty.118 After Sadat’s
purge of pro-Soviet government officials, Moscow became even less inclined to risk involvement
in another Middle East war for a client government tha t barely disguised its hostility to the
Soviets. As Raymond Hinnebusch, a political scientist, observed of Egypt’s response, “Sadat and
those around him became convinced that Moscow either wanted to freeze the [Egypt-Israeli]
conflict for the sake of detente or to bring about a leftwing revolution in Egypt.”119
In the wake of the considerable cooling of relations between Cairo and Moscow as a
result of the Sabri purge, the May 1971 signing of the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation was not the warm commemoration that its title suggests. Moscow feared for its
relevance in Egypt, and for good reason. The treaty was signed at the Soviets’ urging, while
Sadat was considering a total break with the Soviets.120
The Soviet-Egyptian Friendship Treaty fits the pattern of disparity between diplomatic
niceties aired in public and the underlying animosities tha t marked the actual relations in this
client-state relationship. Article I of the treaty declared,
that unbreakable friendship will always ex ist b etw een  the two countries and their peoples. T hey  
will con tin u e to d evelop  and strengthen  the ex isting relations o f  friendship and all-around  
cooperation  b etw een  th e m ...o n  the basis o f  the principles o f  respect for the sovereignty  
territorial integrity, noninterference in the internal affairs o f  each  other, equality and m utual 
b en efit.121
The treaty, disingenuous as it was, marked the first time the Soviet Union clearly affirmed its 
commitment to the defense of a Third World non-Communist country.122 The Soviet Union’s
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major pledge, while interpreted in the W est as a sign of increased Soviet prestige in Egypt, was 
in reality a rather desperate move to keep Sadat from seeking a resolution to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict through the diplomatic efforts of the United States. This would render the Soviet 
position in the Middle East largely irrelevant.123 In Sadat’s view, the treaty was another Soviet 
bullying tactic; an Egyptian refusal to sign the treaty may have deprived him of future arms 
shipments.124
In July a Communist coup d ’etat in Sudan put another strain on Soviet-Egyptian 
relations. Ga’far al-Numayri regained power three days after he was deposed -  only with Libyan 
and Egyptian support. Moscow had supported the coup, and demanded tha t Sadat recognize the 
new government.125 O n this matter, Sadat wrote, “My attitude is firm. I said we condemned it 
because we would not accept a Communist regime established on our doorstep -  in a country 
sharing our borders.”126 In light of the recently signed Friendship Treaty, Sadat’s position is 
especially striking. O n  the one hand, the greatest Communist power in the world had pledged 
its support for the defense of Egypt; on the other, its client regarded a bordering Communist 
state as a grave threat to Egyptian security.
Moscow was ever concerned with maintaining its influence and investment in Egypt.' 
Sadat had repeatedly called 1971 the “year of decision,” i.e., a military confrontation against 
Israel with the stated aim of expelling its military from the Sinai. Moscow agreed to a major arms 
deal in October, promising to m eet Sadat’s military requirements by the end of the year.127 But
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the Soviet U nion had concerns elsewhere. The war in V ietnam still demanded Soviet aid and 
attention, and in the wake of Indo-Pakistani War, which started on December 8, required that 
many arms shipments earmarked for Egypt be re-routed to India, Moscow’s major client in South 
Asia. The Soviets clearly wanted to avoid managing three concurrent wars.128 O f the arms that 
did reach Egypt, there was insufficient time to train properly with the new equipment.
Sadat’s much heralded “year of decision” ended silently, and he was humiliated. 
Moreover, Egypt was furious with its clients’ Indian policy. From Cairo’s perspective, Soviet 
arms were being deployed for use against a fellow Muslim nation. Sadat could not understand 
why the Soviets were exercising caution against Israel -  an American friend -  while helping to 
escalate the war against Pakistan, a formal United States ally.129 In a mid-December interview 
with the New York Times, Sadat voiced his concern that the Soviets would unilaterally pull out 
of Egypt, which would make Egypt’s already grim military situation even worse.130 A n executive 
assessment meeting of military branch commanders held in the beginning of 1972 presented 
Sadat with a nearly total deficiency in offensive capabilities.131 The Egyptian leader may have 
declared war inevitable, but inevitability was no guarantee of im minence.132
In late April 1972 Sadat was compelled to travel to Moscow for assurance of continued 
Soviet support. The mounting detente between the superpowers threatened to neutralize the 
Arab-Israeli conflict -  a good strategy for avoiding a nuclear confrontation, but a blow, of course, 
to the Egyptians. The Soviets attempted to assuage Sadat’s fears by ending his visit with a pledge
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for a new Soviet-Egyptian communique, which stated, “the Arab states. ..have every reason to 
use other means to regain the Arab lands captured by Israel.”133 A lthough the language of the 
communique was implicit, it marked the first time that Moscow condoned war -  provided that 
a diplomatic solution was impossible and that Egypt was militarily ready to resume hostilities.134 
The major caveat to the communique was the second stipulation. W hile a diplomatic solution 
did not look any more feasible in 1972 then it had in 1968, Egypt’s preparedness for war was 
entirely contingent on Moscow’s willingness to support its client accordingly. Sadat was 
convinced that in the climate of detente, adequate Soviet support would not be forthcoming. 
Additionally, all diplomatic initiatives with W ashington had proved fruitless. As the scholar 
Raphael Israel noted, “The United States had become a ‘lost cause’ for Sadat, as he felt that it 
had lent its blessing to Israel, ‘slamming all doors’ in his face.”135
Sadat’s interpretation of the Nixon-Brezhnev summit in May 1972 left nothing to the 
imagination: “It was clear to me that in Moscow the two superpowers had agreed that there was 
to be no war in the Middle East area. There was to be nothing for us but surrender.”136 Sadat’s 
dramatic assessment of the meeting was correct. Following the May summit, Soviet arms 
shipments were delayed and did not include offensive weapons.137 Brezhnev was living up to his 
part of the detente bargain, which vowed, among other things, to relax military tension in the 
Middle East. In the Egyptian view, the projected sequence of events was extremely grim. A  
“military relaxation” m eant that Egypt was to receive neither the quantity nor type of weapons
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sufficient to launch the war against Israel. Since Israel, backed with implicit United States 
support,138 gave no sign of withdrawing from the occupied territories before directly negotiating 
with the Arabs, Egypt’s continuing inability to forcibly expel the Israeli military was tantam ount 
to acceptance of the status quo, which in turn m eant surrender.139 Moscow simply did not want 
to jeopardize its new position vis-a-vis the W estern world because of a Middle Eastern border 
dispute.
Sadat sent Brezhnev a memorandum after the May summit, which asked for an 
explanation on the affairs of their respective countries. The Egyptian President waited over a 
m onth for a reply, which contained only pleasant generalities with none of the specific points of 
information Sadat dem anded.140 In response, Sadat had a prepared message to be delivered to 
Moscow by the stunned Soviet ambassador:
It seem s that the S ov iet U n ion  has no con fidence in the Egyptian leadership  and fails to 
appreciate the dangers o f  the situation. W hile Egypt is anxious to m aintain  the friendship o f  the  
S oviet U n ion  she is unable to subm it to a position o f  trusteeship to anyone, including the S ov iet  
U n io n .141
Sadat decided to  expel the 15,000 Soviet advisors currently stationed in Egypt and to banish all 
Soviet equipment that Moscow was unwilling to sell to him .142 As Adeed Dawisha noted, Sadat 
decided “that the Russians had become not just a nuisance, but a positive obstacle to his future 
Middle Eastern and international policies.”143
Sadat’s decision was politically brilliant. As Alvin Rubinstein argued, “N ot since Nasser
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had nationalized the Suez Canal Company almost sixteen years earlier to the day had an 
Egyptian leader so captured the attention and imagination of the Arab world and the 
international community.”144 Nasser’s legacy weighed heavily on this momentous event. Before 
the expulsion, Soviet military personnel had obtained near-sovereignty on Egyptian army bases 
-  a fact most Egyptians believed Nasser would never have perm itted.145 This was a highly 
debatable, but for a relatively new president still working in the shadow of his predecessor, 
invoking Nasser’s spirit was beneficial for Sadat’s domestic standing. The expulsion was also 
militarily brilliant. If detente worked toward preventing war between Egypt and the Israelis, 
Sadat believed that launching a war with a large number of Soviet advisers in harm’s way would 
be impossible.146
The Soviets complied with Sadat’s order. Soviet advisors and weapons were promptly 
evacuated from Egypt. Moscow hoped that its comprehensive response would remind the client, 
in the words of Galia Golan, “of the American commitment to Israel -  as well as the fact that 
the Soviet Union was their only true friend -  lest they think they would find satisfaction in the 
W est.”147 The message was lost on Sadat, who was no longer interested in finding “satisfaction” 
elsewhere. The Israelis and the Americans misinterpreted Sadat’s expulsion order as a break in 
Soviet-Egyptian relations that would render another war unlikely. American military and 
diplomatic analysts were quoted in a July 19 article in the New York Times interpreting the effect
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of the expulsion as hampering Sadat’s ability to expel the Israelis from the Sinai.148 The 
expulsion led to one faulty justification of United States support for Israel. As the prominent 
Israeli historian Nadav Safran observed, Sadat’s decision “was seen in the United States as the 
major payoff of a policy of close support for Israel rather than as a possible ground for changing 
that policy.”149 Sadat, then, tricked his enemies into believing tha t their policies would 
indefinitely prevent war -  which was exactly the kind of intelligence climate that would fail to 
prevent a surprise attack.
The next few months saw another considerable cooling in Soviet-Egyptian relations. 
Moscow had stepped up its military supply effort to Syria, which would become a crucial factor 
in the two-front Yom Kippur War. In October, Egyptian Premier Azziz Sidqi traveled to Moscow 
for high-level talks in order to smooth over the hostilities between the two countries, thus paving 
the way for a return -  albeit downgraded -  of Soviet military personnel to Egypt. The Soviet 
expulsion in May had successfully transmitted Sadat’s intentions to the Americans, Soviets, and 
Israelis, but Egypt still required Moscow’s support for war.
A  February 1973 mission to Moscow, headed by Major General Ahmed Isma’il, finally 
netted the Egyptian military the offensive weapons it needed, most im portant of which were the 
SCUD missiles capable of striking Israel and thus serving an im portant deterrent effect.150 The 
arms deal was the biggest in the history of Soviet-Egyptian relations, and not insignificantly, the 
shipments arrived in a prompt fashion -  also unique in Sadat’s dealings with Moscow.151 Upon
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surveying the new situation, the Egyptian President exclaimed, “they are drowning me in new 
arms!”152
Sadat had many reasons to be happy. In a Newsweek interview in early April, he equated 
the arms shipments with the ability to act independently of Soviet wishes.153 This rather bold 
statem ent -  made in an American periodical, no less -  explains Sadat’s satisfaction. From the 
beginning of his presidency, the Egyptian leader viewed his relations with Moscow by a single 
criterion: his patrons’ willingness to provide arms. The Soviet opposition to war was no secret, 
but as the expulsion demonstrated, Moscow’s influence in Egypt was unwelcome if its policies 
would prevent Sadat from freedom of military action. In the Egyptian view, relations with the 
Soviets were useless unless they produced the means to complete Egypt’s major foreign policy 
objective.
Sadat knew all too well that Moscow’s intentions in the Middle Eat were strategic, not 
ideological in nature. W hile detente m eant accommodation between the superpowers, it was 
by no means a signal toward ending competition for global dominance in a bi-polar system. 
Between its oil and its geo-strategic centrality, the Middle East remained a crucial theater of 
influence from which Moscow was unwilling to part. Nor were the Soviets prepared to confront 
the United States directly, which partly explains their “back-and-forth” arms policy with Egypt. 
However, the Soviet Union decided to resume their arms deliveries to Egypt for another reason. 
W hereas Nasser had managed to alienate most of the Persian Gulf States as a result of his 
Yemeni War, Sadat was able to marshal significant support -  in the form of outright cash grants 
and pledges to embargo oil shipments as a sign of pan-Arab power -  from the billionaire oil
152Anwar Sadat, as cited in Heikal, The Road to Ramadan. 181.
i53“The Battle is N ow  Inevitable” Newsweek, 9 April 1973.
113
sheiks, headed by Saudi Arabia’s King Faisal. After Israel occupied Arab lands after 1967, the 
conflict spread beyond the “first circle” border-states to the “second and third circle” Persian 
Gulf states.154 A t least in terms of the conflict with Israel, Sadat enjoyed the support of most of 
the Arab world, and Moscow was pleased to obtain oil-derived hard currency, care of Sadat’s 
Persian Gulf backers, who agreed to pay for the massive arms shipments.155
By M arch 1973, Sadat had the arms and financial support to wage war. O n March 26 
he spoke before the Peoples’ Assembly in Cairo:
T h e stage o f  total confrontation  has becom e inevitable and w e are entering it w hether we like
it or not. T h e military situation m ust be m ade to m ove, w ith  all the sacrificing this entails. W e
m ust tell the world that we are here and that we can  d ictate our w ill.156
Despite Sadat’s previous threats, 1973 was to be the real “year of decision” for the simple fact 
that Moscow was finally willing to supply its client with an arms cache at least quantitatively 
equal to that of Israel’s. Moscow no longer denied its client offensive weapons in the months 
preceding the war, w ithout which Sadat could never have attem pted to dislodge Israeli forces 
from the Suez Canal region.157 Moscow’s public statements on the Middle East reflected Egypt’s 
new capabilities, and (implicitly at least) recognized tha t Soviet arms were now potentially 
capable of contravening Soviet policy. A t an April 5 press conference in Stockholm, Soviet 
Premier Aleksei Kosygin cryptically responded to a question about Soviet arms deliveries to 
Egypt: “We believe that Egypt has a right to possess a powerful army now in order to defend itself 
against the aggressor and to liberate its own lands.”158
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In late summer of 1973 the Soviets considered the many benefits of another Arab-Israeli 
war. European imperialism was becoming a distant memory in the Arab world, and Moscow was 
struggling to sustain its relevance in the region -  which could only be accomplished through 
public opposition to Israel, the “new imperialist”. In Moscow’s view, a new war could deflect 
widespread anti-Communist sentiment throughout the Arab world and allow the Soviets an 
opportunity to demonstrate their solidarity with progressive Arab states. W hile a rapprochement 
with the conservative Persian Gulf monarchies was a pipe dream, the Soviets (correctly) 
reasoned that a war could engender a serious breach in their relations with the Americans, 
especially during a time of detente.159 All of these positive hypotheticals were augmented by one 
of Moscow’s major concerns. Opposition to war could very well lead to another Soviet 
expulsion. Given the Arabs’ concerted anti-Zionism and their new military capabilities, there 
was a chance that they could win the war -  a t which point it would be unlikely tha t the Arabs 
would again invite a major Soviet presence in the region.160
But none of these considerations, of course, existed in a vacuum. In the new era of 
detente, avoiding confrontation with the United States was still Moscow’s greatest foreign policy 
goal. (See Chapter 1 for an expanded discussion on this point.) The May 1973 Nixon-Brezhnev 
summit renewed the leaders’ mutual commitment to detente, which included pledges to contain 
local conflicts before they erupted into a superpower crisis.161 In Brezhnev’s thinking, detente 
was one-half of a contradictory policy. As Paul Murphy, a biographer of Brezhnev, put it, the 
Soviet leader aimed for both “normalized state-to-state relations with Soviet Union [and
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demonstrated] vigorous support of national liberation movements and sympathetic factions and 
regimes engaged in regional conflicts.”162 Moscow’s equivocal policies between 
detente/opposition to war and support of Egypt’s objectives reflected Brezhnev’s desire to 
maintain both positions. This was known as the Soviet U nion’s policy of “no war, no peace”; i.e., 
a stalemate that would neither force Egypt to accept the status quo, nor precipitate a war that 
could lead to a superpower engagement. Moreover, since the Soviet Union’s relevance in the 
region centered on its ability to assist the Arabs, as the scholar Roman Kolkowicz argues, “a 
peaceful settlem ent of the Middle Eastern situation would erode the rationale for Soviet 
presence and would diminish Arab dependence on their Moscow patron.”163
While the Kremlin grappled with this uncomfortable position, Egypt had already resolved 
to go to war. Sadat laid out his case on the grounds tha t the situation was not likely to become 
any more conducive to attack: the Soviets were not going to send any more weapons; Egypt 
should not expect any more support from the Arab world or the international community; and 
Egypt’s Persian Gulf financial backers stipulated that future aid was conditional upon 
commencement of hostilities.164
Soviet Policy Toward Egypt During the Yom Kippur W ar
Moscow’s policy of balancing detente peace initiatives with maintaining its influence on the 
Middle East took a sharp turn toward the latter in the days preceding the Arab attack on 
October 6. The Soviet Union had advance knowledge of Sadat’s plans and, in the interest of
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maintaining the Arabs’ military strategy, failed to alert the U nited States accordingly.165 
Moscow’s decision violated the spirit and letter of detente by maintaining secrecy, which was 
mandatory for the successful execution of the Syrian and Egyptian two-front surprise strategy. 
Additionally, the Kremlin may have considered the confidentiality of the Arab attack as 
sufficient “payback” for W ashington’s failure to notify Moscow of the Chilean coup -  of which 
the Americans had comparable advance knowledge.166
For obvious reasons, Sadat did not think he could trust the Soviets with his plans until 
the last possible minute. During an October 3, 1973, meeting between the Egyptian President 
and Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Vinogradov, Sadat said, as recounted by one Soviet diplomat, 
that he was planning to “break the deadlock in the Middle East situation.”167 Sadat did not 
elaborate on the day tha t the battle was to begin, but there is no question but that Moscow knew 
that hostilities were imminent, as evidenced by the Soviet response. Vinogradov scheduled a 
critical meeting with Sadat on the following day to report: “I have an urgent message from the 
Soviet leadership. Moscow asks you to allow four big aircraft in Egypt to fly the Soviet families 
out of Egypt.”168 By that evening, the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko told his staff at 
the Kremlin that he had learned of the date and time when the war was scheduled to begin: 
October 6 at 2:00 p.m. W hen one of his subordinates asked about how the Americans and 
Israelis might interpret the Soviet evacuation, Gromyko answered bluntly: “The lives of Soviet
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people are dearer to us.”169 More likely, as Alvin Rubinstein observed, Moscow “wanted to 
maintain a certain diplomatic distance from the attack: it wanted to be sufficiently aloof so that 
when war broke out it could not be accused by the United States of complicity, thereby 
endangering the advantages it gained from detente.”170
The disingenuousness of Soviet rationale is striking, given tha t the evacuation -  
regardless of the response it evoked -  was proof that Moscow could have shared its intelligence 
with W ashington but instead chose to violate (at least in the strict interpretation) detente policy 
for its own interests.171 The United States and Israeli intelligence failed to recognize the 
mounting Arab attack began after the Soviet evacuation; then  interpreted it as yet another 
rupture in Soviet-Egyptian relations.172 This misinterpretation worked to Egypt’s advantage, but 
the Soviet evacuation irked Sadat nonetheless: “T hat episode showed a total lack of confidence 
in us and our fighting ability.”173
Moscow’s actions immediately preceding the war were consistent with its well-established 
balancing act between detente and Middle East influence. In keeping with detente and other 
considerations, the Soviet Union was unequivocally against the Arab resumption of hostilities 
on October 6. Vladimir Kirpitchenko, a KGB agent stationed in Cairo during the war, makes 
this point clear: “O ur leadership proceeded from the fact that the effects of military preparations
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would inevitably damage Soviet foreign policy.”174 By the time the Arabs had sufficient arms, 
they were able to do exactly what Moscow hoped its weapons shipments would prevent: the 
rendering of Soviet foreign policy considerations irrelevant. In  other words, Moscow did not 
want a war, the Arabs were unmoved by Soviet wishes precisely because Soviet arms allowed 
them the means for war, and Moscow officials in turn  believed they could maximize their own 
Middle East objectives by dispensing with detente principles when they became aware of the 
war’s imminence.
Soviet public objection to the war could have irreparably damaged whatever Arab
loyalty Moscow had gained as a result of its weapons shipments.175 The Soviets were besieged
by their contradictory policies in the Middle East and W estern-oriented detente. But one more
factor weighed heavily on Moscow’s policies. China, Moscow’s giant Communist neighbor to
the southeast, had begun to take the Soviets to task for their gradually accommodating policies
vis-a-vis the United States. Vasilii Kozaetsov, chief of the Kremlin’s American Affairs
department, exemplified Moscow’s “China syndrome” at the beginning of the war, when top
officials were deliberating on United States-Soviet cooperative measures:
C an you im agine w hat would happen if som e o f  the Arabs oppose our joint steps w ith  the 
A m ericans, and the C hinese consequently veto  the resolution? D o  you w ant the C hinese to  
becom e leaders o f  the national liberation, anti-im perialist forces?176
In the Soviet view, a Middle East border war was not worth an erosion of detente, but neither 
was excessive “imperialist accommodation” worth jeopardizing the Soviet position throughout 
the developing world. These factors shed light on Moscow’s vigorous support of Egypt and its
174Vladimir Kirpitchenko, as cited in Parker, ed. The October War: A  Retrospective, 45.
175Glassman, Arms for the Arabs. 119.
176Vasilii Kozaetsov, as cited in Israelyan, Inside the Kremlin. 37-38.
119
Arab allies for the Yom Kippur W ar -  given that Moscow did not want tha t conflict.
The Soviet U nion’s initial public acknowledgment of the war was a bald-faced lie. The
lead article in the October 8 edition of Pravda stated:
In recent days Israel had con centrated  considerable arm ed forces o n  the cease-fire lines w ith  
Syria and Egypt, had called  up the reservists, and, h aving thus h eated  up the situation to the 
limit, unleashed military operations. T h e responsibility for the present d evelopm ent o f  events  
in  the M iddle East and their con sequ en ces falls wholly o n  Israel and those external reactionary  
circles, w hich  con stantly  encourage Israel’s aggressive am bitions.177
In the larger sense, assessing blame for the cause of the Yom Kippur W ar is, of course, a
subjective exercise. Determining who actually started the conflict is not. In fact, Sadat’s
decision to launch the war on Yom Kippur can be partly explained by Israel’s reduced
mobilization capability during the holiest day of the Jewish calendar.178
The Soviets’ disregard for the tru th  at the onset of hostilities was probably a function of
their low regard for Arab military capabilities. For all the thousands of tons of Soviet military
supplies in Arab hands, Moscow predicted another defeat by the Israelis.179 The Soviets’
completely wrong assessment bears testimony to the antagonistic and non-cooperative climate
of Soviet-Egyptian military relations in regard both to Arab-attended tactical schools in Russia
and the unpopular presence of Soviet advisors at Egyptian military ports and bases. Just three
hours into the war, top Kremlin officials expressed concern of an Israeli counter-attack that
could threaten the overthrow of the Egyptian and Syrian governments. Brezhnev assumed that
the Arabs would regret ignoring Soviet advice to abstain from war.180
Israeli and American intelligence knew of an Arab military buildup but failed to
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appreciate its meaning. The first several days of the war witnessed unquestioned Arab victories 
that capitalized on a masterful surprise attack. O ne-third of Israel’s air force was lost against 
Syrian and Egyptian advances during the first three days alone. But more importantly, a war that 
was undertaken for political reasons -  to force the Israelis to the negotiating table for a 
settlem ent on the occupied territories -  succeeded in disabusing Israel of its belief tha t military 
superiority would m aintain the occupation. In  the Israeli view, occupation of the Sinai and 
Golan Heights afforded a security through natural barriers tha t no treaty or superpower could 
guarantee. A  1972 publication from the Israeli Foreign Ministry summarized this line of 
reasoning: “The boundaries are such as will not again expose Israel to temptations of Arab 
aggression or give an Arab aggressor decisive advantage in various sectors.”181 The Arab surprise 
attack, led by the Egyptians, demonstrated that the land occupation would not guarantee Israeli 
invulnerability. As Sadat argued: “The myth of Israel’s long arm, of her superior, even invincible 
air force, armory, soldiers— was finally shattered.”182
Egypt and Syria demanded that their Soviet patron ensure tha t no UN peace resolutions 
would pass as long as the Arabs were on the offensive.183 O n  O ctober 8 the Soviet 
representative to the UN argued against any cease-fire initiatives, on the grounds tha t a cease­
fire “would be exploited by the aggressors again only to distract attention from this key issue and 
to continue to occupy and annex other peoples’ lands.”184 The Soviet representative instead 
called for the im plementation of UN Resolution 242, and argued tha t there should be no cease­
18ICited in M ichael Brecher, Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy (N ew  Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1975), 447.
182el-Sadat, In Search o f Identity, 255.
183Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to Six Cold War Presidents (New  
York: Random House, 1995), 290.
184Cited in Kohler, Goure, and Harvey, The Soviet U nion  and the October Middle East War, 57.
fire until the Arabs secured the land they lost after the Six Day W ar.185 During the first week 
of conflict, the superpowers deliberated over strategies of containing the war and ensuring a 
reasonable time frame for a cease-fire. A t the same time, however, Moscow was encouraging 
other Arab and African states to join the struggle against Israel. A  message delivered on 
October 9 from Brezhnev to Algerian President Houari Boumedienne stated: “In our view, there 
must be fraternal Arab solidarity, today more than  ever. Syria and Egypt must not remain alone 
in the struggle against a treacherous enemy.”186
Moscow maintained its basic stance in the years preceding the Yom Kippur W ar, that 
is, keeping in place concurrent (and contradictory) policies of detente toward the W est and 
maintenance of its prestige and influence among the “progressive” nations of the non-aligned 
world. Indeed, Moscow saw many benefits stemming from a united Arab front. Ideologically, 
the Arab world might connect the cause of liberation movements to  Soviet policy. And 
militarily, Arab unity could have decreased the chance tha t Moscow would have to resort to 
direct defense of its Arab clients.
The Arabs’ successes reverberated in the United States as well. As the scholar Burton 
Kaufman observed, “By almost defeating Israel in the first week of the O ctober W ar, the Arab 
states in the Middle East have shattered the aura of military invincibility. No longer could 
W ashington assume that Israel’s military superiority over its Arab neighbors would ensure
185U nited Nations Resolution 242 ofN ovem ber 22 1967, Article 1(1): "[Affirms]...Withdrawal of  
Israel Armed Forces from Territories Occupied in the Recent Conflict," 
< http://www.un.org/documents.htm>  on 28 October 2003.
186Houari Boumedienne, as cited in Kohler, Goure, and Harvey, The Soviet U nion and the 
October Middle East W ar. 59.
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stability in the region.”187 As long as the conflict remained localized, Moscow was willing to 
augment Arab military prowess with a massive weapons airlift commenced on October 8. 
Although the airlift was initially a blatant attempt to enhance the Arabs’ identification of Arab 
success with Soviet support, by O ctober 10 Israel launched its first major counter-offensive -  
thus making the Soviet deliveries indispensable for the Egyptian and Syrian armies.188
Sadat’s response to the airlift was typical of the suspicious/gracious stance he had always 
assumed when- dealing with Soviet support. Upon receiving news of the airlift, Sadat told 
Ambassador Vinogradov: “Yes, yes. Magnificent! Magnificent! Tell comrade Brezhnev tha t it 
is Soviet arms which achieved the miracle of the [Suez] crossing.”189 The Egyptian president, 
always the astute politician, made sure to tell the Kremlin leaders exactly what they wanted to 
hear. But to Sadat’s close aide, Mohamed Heikal, the President said, “I don’t think they will 
miss this chance” to restore their prestige in the Arab world.190 Sadat’s expulsion of the Soviet 
advisors in 1972 was still fresh in the minds of his patrons; in a sense the Soviet airlift was a 
culmination of Cairo’s policy of denying Moscow the pleasure of feeling it had stability and 
prestige on Arab soil.
Even after Egypt began receiving weapons en masse, Sadat shunned Soviet military 
advice, to Moscow’s great annoyance.191 The value of Soviet weapons supplied to the Arabs 
during the war was roughly equal ($2.2 billion) to tha t sent to Israel by the United States.192 But
187Burton I. Kaufman, The Arab Middle East and the U nited States: Inter-Arab Rivalry and 
Superpower Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 87.
l88Golan, Yom Kippur and After. 88-89.
189Anwar Sadat, as cited in Heikal, The Road to Ramadan. 214.
190Anwar Sadat, as cited in ibid.
I91lsraelyan, Inside the Kremlin. 72.
l92Dobrynin, In Confidence. 292.
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qualitatively, the Soviets simply could not m atch American air technology.193 This fact likely 
muted the Arabs’ appreciation of Soviet support and strictly limited their willingness to heed 
Moscow’s advice advocating a cease-fire on the existing lines.
Israel was on the offensive by the second week of the war, at which point Moscow 
assumed a more active political role in the conflict. In keeping w ith Arab wishes, the Soviets 
refrained from cease-fire initiatives until Israel threatened to beat back the Arabs to their 
original lines. 194 Soviet Premier Kosygin’s trip on October 13 to Cairo reflected the changing 
military situation. The Soviets wanted a cease-fire on the present position of each side, because 
they did not think it likely tha t the Arabs would advance m uch further -  especially with the 
commencement of the United States airlift to Israel. Sadat described Kosygin as “vicious” and 
“aggressive” and in no position to dictate Egyptian military strategy.195 As usual, the Soviets and 
the Egyptians were working at cross-purposes.
Kosygin and Sadat agreed to a cease-fire, but the Egyptians believed that a termination 
of the war at the present time was premature.196 Kosygin did not help matters by making 
frequent (and negative) comparisons of Sadat to his predecessor, Nasser.197 Exchanges between 
the two leaders were testy, which partly explains Moscow’s failure to secure an Egyptian cease­
fire from October 13. Sadat did not appreciate what he perceived to be Moscow’s overly 
cautious position, asking: “Are you afraid of Israel?” to which Kosygin replied: “W e are afraid of 
nobody, but we have an obligation to world peace and are committed to search for a just and
193el-Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez. 273.
194Kohler, Goure, and Harvey, The Soviet U nion and the October Middle East W ar. 59.
195el-Sadat, In Search o f  Identity. 258.
Israelyan, Inside the Kremlin, 108.
197Ibid„ 112.
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durable solution of the Middle East problems on the basis of Resolution 242.”198 Sadat sensed 
Moscow’s near total lack of confidence in the Arab military machine -  even after their successful 
offensive. He replied sharply to Kosygin’s stated concern for the integrity of Cairo: “I’m sorry to 
disappoint you, bu t no threat will ever be posed to Cairo.”199 Between two “progressive” states 
supposedly ideologically united against imperialist aggression, one wonders: why would Sadat 
claim that Cairo’s safety would “disappoint” his patrons?
Sadat called for a cease-fire at the existing lines on O ctober 19. The Egyptian leader 
recognized tha t his military’s capability had peaked, and decided to accept the basic premise that 
caused the Soviets to urge term ination six days earlier. He told Ambassador Vinogradov: “The 
two superpowers should guarantee the cease-fire and immediate im plementation of Security 
Council Resolution 242.”200 Brezhnev was greatly perturbed by Sadat’s refusal to accept the 
cease-fire when Moscow first wanted it. He called Sadat’s O ctober 19 message “desperate... [h] e 
got what was coming to him .”201 O n October 22 Sadat notified Vinogradov of Egypt’s intention 
to comply with U.N. Resolution 338, which proposed a halting of all activity at each side’s 
present position.202 Both Egypt and the Soviet Union interpreted Resolution 338 as a cease-fire 
that would be guaranteed jointly by the United States and the Soviet Union. But only a few 
minutes before the cease-fire was to become effective, Soviet supplied SCUD missiles -  under 
almost total Soviet control because of their ability to strike Israel proper -  were being launched
198Anwar Sadat and A lexsei Kosygin, as cited in Heikal, The Road to Ramadan. 246.
199el-Sadat, In Search o f  Identity. 259.
200Ibid„ 264-265.
201Leonid Brezhnev, as cited in Israelyan, Inside the Kremlin. 130-131.
202United Nations Resolution 338 of October 22 1973, Article 1: "Calls upon all parties to the 
present fighting to cease all fighting and terminate all military activity immediately; no later than 12 hours 
after the m oment o f the adoption of this decision, in the position they now occupy," 
< http://www.un.org/docum ents.htm >  on 3 November 2003.
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against Israeli targets.203 Soviet Defense Minister Andrei Grechko authorized the launch, which 
contravened Moscow’s official policy. Foreign Minister Gromyko ordered Vinogradov to halt the 
launch, but his order came too late. The SCUDS all missed their targets, but despite their 
impotence, the Israelis interpreted the SCUD episode as a direct Egyptian-Soviet escalation of 
hostilities.204
Cairo and Tel Aviv exchanged accusations concerning the violation of the cease-fire. 
Militarily, at least, Israel was clearly on the offensive with the encirclem ent of Egypt’s Third 
Army division, beyond which lay an undefended Cairo. Sadat’s calls to Moscow for a guaranteed 
cease-fire O n October 23 became desperate as Israel refused to halt its advances. The Kremlin 
issued a warning to Israel:
T h e con tinu ation  o f  crim inal acts by Israel will lead to grave con seq u en ces for Israel itself. T h e
Soviet U n ion  believes that an end o f  Israel’s acts o f  v io len ce, the liberation o f  Israeli occupied
territory, is the basis for establishing a just and lasting peace in  the M iddle East.205
The Israelis were confident tha t Moscow’s warning of “grave consequences” was merely a bluff. 
Sadat further intensified the situation on October 24 by calling for a unilateral presence of Soviet 
troops on the Egyptian side of the front if the United States refused to send its own troops.206 
Like the Israelis, Sadat did not think that Moscow was willing to intervene directly; his request 
was really a tactic aimed at forcing the Americans to cooperate in the cease-fire. Sadat correctly 
believed that the Soviets were unprepared to commit troops to the war. In the Politburo, 
Defense Minister Grechko and President Podgorny advocated a “demonstration of our military 
presence in Egypt and Syria,” while Premier Kosygin, Foreign Minister Gromyko, and Secretary
203W hetten, The Canal W ar. 234.
204Israelyan, Inside the Kremlin. 144.
205Cited in Golan, Yom Kippur and After. 95.
206Israelyan, Inside the Kremlin. 166.
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Brezhnev decided against a unilateral move as too risky.207 Additionally, the Kremlin took
Nixon’s message of O ctober 20 at its word. N ixon’s statem ent lobbied Brezhnev for
commitments “from both of us.. .to provide the strong leadership which our respective friends
in the area will find persuasive.”208
Brezhnev’s note to Nixon, delivered on October 24, declared:
I will say it straight, that if you find it impossible to act together w ith  us in  this m atter, we should  
be faced w ith  the necessity to urgently consider the question  o f  taking appropriate steps 
unilaterally. Israel can n ot be allowed to get away w ith  its v io lation s.209
While unquestionably harshly worded, the note was nonetheless written under the assumption
that W ashington would agree to direct intervention in order to prevent Israeli forces from
destroying the Egyptian Third Army. If the Soviets were confident of W ashington’s agreement
to send a bilateral force to the front, and if the top Kremlin leaders decided beforehand against
unilateral action, why did Brezhnev choose such strong wording with the explicit threat to act
alone?
The tone of Brezhnev’s note was probably indicative of Moscow’s grave concern of the larger
implications of Israel’s continued operations. As Jon Glassman observed,
A t s ta k e .. .was n o t simply the S oviet U n ion ’s M iddle Eastern clients but, rather, the integrity o f  
the entire ‘socialist’ -  ‘progressive’ security structure. If Israel was perm itted to exercise military 
suprem acy over the ‘progressive’ Arabs, w hat w ould cause other ‘aggressive im perialist’ forces to  
shrink from m oving strongly against other S oviet c lien t stats and m ovem ents?210
While Brezhnev’s strong language was, of course, written to Nixon, the implied threats were
actually reflective of Moscow’s internal concerns regarding the threatened state of Soviet
207Cited in Dobrynin, In Confidence. 295.
208Richard N ixon, as cited in Israelyan, Inside the Kremlin. 161.
209Cited in W illiam B. Quandt, "Soviet Policy in the October Middle East War-II," International 
Affairs 53
(October 1977), 598.
210Glassman, Arms for the Arabs, 175.
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influence throughout the world. The note’s meaning was not the only miscommunication
between the superpowers. A t an O ctober 26 news conference, U nited States Secretary of
Defense James Schlesinger explained the American response to Brezhnev’s note -  the
heightened military alert status to DEFCON III -  as a reaction to the Soviet alert of its own air
force.211 Given the Soviet alert status, interpreted in conjunction with Brezhnev’s sharp note
declaring unilateral action if necessary, this may have seemed like an appropriate response to
imminent Soviet movement. The problem with Schlesinger’s stated rationale was that the
Soviet military had been on heightened alert since the beginning of the war; its status did not
change when Brezhnev sent his October 24 note.212
Brezhnev’s message was not intended to be an ultimatum; the Kremlin likewise
responded to the DEFCON III alert with uniform disgust and surprise at what they considered
an unjustified provocation. Soviet Ambassador to the U nited States Anatoly Dobrynin
summarized the misunderstanding:
W ashington  n ever had  any real cause for alarm because the Politburo did n ot have any in tention  
o f in tervening in the M iddle East. It w ould have b een  reckless b o th  politically and militarily, for 
at that tim e the S ov iet U n ion  was n ot prepared to m oun t im m ediately a large-scale intervention  
in  the region. A n d  ev en  if we cou ld  have done so, it w ould  have transformed the Arab-Israeli 
war in to  a direct clash b etw een  the S ov iet U n ion  and the U n ited  States. N obody in M oscow  
w anted  that.213
The Soviet Union maintained a balance between detente politics and its continuing Middle East 
influence through the major auspices of Egypt to the end of the Yom Kippur War. The 
communication breakdown with the United States on O ctober 24-25 represented the 
culmination of Moscow’s fractured policy. The Soviet Union was determined to prevent the
21'United States, Department o f State, Bulletin, N o. 1795 (1973), 621.
212Israelyan, Inside the Kremlin. 190.
213Dobrynin, In Confidence. 296.
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defeat of Egypt, which was the recipient of billions of dollars’ worth of Soviet aid distributed over 
a period of 18 years. Egypt’s stature among Moscow’s policy of supporting national liberation 
movements made tha t country, in the Soviet view, emblematic of the entire Soviet-led socialist 
global order. But the Soviets, in the climate of detente, were also determined to avoid a 
superpower clash tha t may have expanded beyond a regional conflict into general nuclear war. 
This was the basic contradiction that explained the Soviet Union’s unambiguous opposition to 
Sadat’s march toward war. Moscow’s faulty “no war, no peace” solution to the contradiction of 
W estern accommodation and world socialist prestige was most strongly opposed by Egypt -  the 
client state on which Moscow staked a great amount of its reputation among the non-aligned 
world.
The Yom Kippur W ar did not plunge the superpowers into a nuclear confrontation. By 
this fundamental criterion, detente was upheld, but not without major damage to Moscow’s 
other basic foreign policy objective. The record of Soviet-Egyptian relations in the interwar 
period betrays a self-interested client-patron state structure that traded arms for geo-strategic 
influence on a sliding scale. Immediately after the cessation of hostilities, Sadat demonstrated 
his utter disregard for Moscow’s wishes. Soviet arms allowed the Egyptian army to gain a toehold 
in the Sinai, thus allowing the Egyptian leader to break the diplomatic stalemate after the Yom 
Kippur W ar with direct negotiations, which could finally be conducted with dignity. Beyond this 
Clausewitzean victory, as Alvin Rubinstein observed, “with not so much as a nod to Moscow’s 
role, Sadat resumed full diplomatic relations with the U nited States for the first time since Egypt 
had severed them  on June 6 ,1967.”214 Moscow’s contradictory foreign policies, not surprisingly,
214Rubinstein, Red Star on the N ile . 284.
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culminated in a bitter irony. Sadat concluded that the only viable path  to regaining its lost 
territory was improved relations with the United States -  a diplomatic coup only achievable 
through the force of Soviet arms.
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Chapter IV
The Challenge of an “Unbreakable” Bond: 
American-Israeli Affairs Through the Yom Kippur War
“Israel,” wrote historian Stephen E. Ambrose, “is not America’s ally. There is no alliance 
between the United States and Israel. But there is an American moral commitment to Israel, one 
that is so strong as to be unbreakable, in part precisely because nowhere is it spelled out in a 
treaty.”1 Senator Joseph Clark, upon returning from a 1966 trip to the Middle East, proclaimed, 
“The United States would never permit the Arabs to overrun the State of Israel.”2
The “why” and “how” of these statements, and many like them, are generally not 
discussed in the American political discourse largely because of their fundamental truth, 
reaffirmed at both ends of the 20th century. The Balfour Declaration of November 1917, 
declaring Britain’s support of “the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish 
people,”3 enjoyed overwhelming United States Congressional support on grounds ranging from 
religious conviction, humanitarian sympathy, acknowledgment of nationalist aspirations, and 
notably, distaste for “M ohammedan” rule over Middle Eastern lands.4
Only Cordell Hull, Representative of Tennessee, equivocated on the m atter by vaguely
'Stephen E. Ambrose, N ixon. Volume Three: Ruin and Recovery. 1973-1990 (New York: Simon  
& Schuster, 1991), 240-241.
2Joseph Clark, as cited in U nited States, Congress, Committee on Foreign Relations, Report by 
Senator Joseph S. Clark: War or Peace in the Middle East? (W ashington, D.C.; Government Printing 
Office, 1967), 14.
3The Balfour Declaration is reprinted in United States, Congress, Comm ittee on Foreign 
Relations: A  Select Chronology and Background Documents Relating to the Middle East, 2nd revised ed. 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), 136.
4This theologically incorrect term, which assumes that Muslims pray to M ohhamed as Christians 
pray to Jesus, signals an ignorance o f Islam and preference o f allied Britain’s post-World War I 
predominance in the Middle East over the Islamic Ottom an Empire. Both o f  these factors would begin to 
change in the years following W orld War II.
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calling for the “Palestine question” question to be decided “by the wishes and the welfare of 
those affected by the proposed plan.”5 Fiorello H. LaGuardia, Representative of New York, was 
alone in his opposition to a Jewish homeland in Palestine, reasoning that such a state would 
further ghettoize the Jews and retard the advances they have made in such liberal democracies 
as the United States and England.6 In May 1998, a joint resolution, celebrating the 50th 
anniversary of Israel’s birth, reaffirmed Congress’s tradition of staunch support for the Jewish 
homeland, declaring that the United States “reaffirms the bonds of friendship and cooperation 
which have existed between the United States and Israel for the past half-century and which 
have been significant for both countries.”7 The American government’s attitude toward 
Zionism at both extremes of a remarkable 80-year odyssey of nationhood, bookends American- 
Israeli relations during the Cold W ar. These decades, however, considerably complicated 
truthful yet simplistic affirmations of United States-Israeli relations.
Events leading up to, and culminating in, American policy toward Israel during the Yom 
Kippur W ar of October 1973 were arguably the most convoluted in the history of this “unique” 
international relationship. A lthough Stephen Ambrose and others have assumed the m atter 
as self-evident, it is worth examining the sources of the “moral” and “unbreakable” American 
commitment to Israel. The historical record, from Harry Trum an to Richard Nixon, bears one 
essential truth: the “unbreakable” bond was neither absolute nor exclusive of other interests.
5Cordell Hull, as cited in Zionist Organization o f America, The American War Congress and 
Zionism: Statements bv Members o f the American War Congress on  the lewish National M ovem ent (New  
York: Zionist Organization of America, 1919), 211.
6Ibid, 166
7United States, Congress, United States Statutes at Large. 1998. Public Law 105-175, Joint 
Resolution, “Friendship Between the United States and Israel,” 11 May 1998 (W ashington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1999), 112.
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This fact tends to get obscured in light of more recent developments, which significantly 
intensified the American-Israel security relationship. Following the Yom Kippur W ar, United 
States foreign aid policy to Israel underwent something of a revolution: annual aid to Israel in 
1974-1978 jumped to $1.6 billion from $360 million before the war; only 20% of pre-war aid was 
slated for military purposes while tha t figure increased to 65% by 1974; and most significantly, 
before the Yom Kippur W ar, 96% of all United States aid to Israel came in the form of loans -  
following the conflict Israel enjoyed as much as 60% of all aid in the form of outright grants.8
Although Ambrose, writing in 1991, was technically correct in noting tha t no alliance 
exists between the U nited States and Israel, Ronald Reagan, following the unprecedented direct 
United States military involvement in the Lebanon W ar of 1982, recognized Israel in the 
following year as a “strategic partner,” and thereafter a de facto American ally.9 A lthough Cold 
W ar tensions had heightened in the 1980s after the detente of the previous decade, superpower 
competition in the Middle East had abated, due in no small part to  Moscow’s diminished 
regional prestige following the Yom Kippur W ar. American policy in the Middle East since the 
mid-1970s became less concerned with “losing” the Arab world to the Com m unist orbit, and 
more preoccupied with protecting its interests abroad and at home from terrorist attack by Arab 
radicals.
There existed no such equation of American with Israeli interests in  the 1945-1973 
period, and the reasons generally cited as the foundations for the “unbreakable” bond between
8Figures cited in M oshe Efrat, “The U SA  and the Israeli Military-Economic Dimension: A  
Realpolidk Perspective,” in M oshe Efrat and Jacob Bercovitch, eds., Superpowers and Client States in the 
Middle East: The Imbalance o f  Influence (London: Routledge, 1991), 132.
9U nited States, Department of the Army, Israel: A  Country Study (W ashington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1990), 234.
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the two countries -  namely religious and political affinity -  generally did not override the 
strategic concerns tha t prevented a policy of unswerving United States support for Israel. Those 
matters, in fact, served to complicate an already difficult relationship.
The most important, and for that matter, simplest, factor tha t accounts for the 
"unbreakable bond" of the American-Israeli relationship is the sheer number of Jews who live in 
the United States. The Israeli historian Yossi Beilin wrote, "Israel is the only W estern state in 
the Middle East,"10 by which he m eant that despite a religion and revived language that are 
firmly rooted in Middle East traditions, Israel's founders and leading Ashkenazi classes have 
transplanted American and European conventions into the heart of the Arab world. A  majority 
of American and Israeli Jews are white, modern, and secular leaning. The Americans learn 
Hebrew and the Israelis learn English, and both groups traverse the A tlantic with relative ease. 
In this sense, if large numbers of Jews were attracted to the U nited States for reasons no different 
from other immigrant groups, namely for political, economic, and religious liberties, then these 
are the same ideals built into the core of modern Israeli society. In other words, when American 
Jews lobby the United States government to support Israel, they are, in a very real sense, 
lobbying to support themselves.
The Jewish political action committees, among the most influential in Washington, D.C., 
have allowed Israel a certain confidence in their abilities to influence American politics as few 
other countries can.11 Throughout the first thirty years of America's search for a just settlem ent 
for the Arab-Israeli conflict, there was virtually no Arab lobby consisting of actual Arabs in
10Yossi Beilin, Israel: A  Concise Political History (London: W eidenfeld andN icolson, 1992), 1.
n Seth P. Tillman, The United States in the Middle East: Interests and Obstacles (Bloomington, 
Indiana University Press, 1982), 158.
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Washington. Those who did advocate Arab wishes were generally diplomats and State 
Departm ent "Arabists," or oil executives whose interests in the Persian Gulf rarely impacted the 
diplomacy of negotiating between Zionists and the northern, more radical Arab states.12 As the 
Israeli historian Nadav Safran noted, it was only in the period directly preceding the 1973 Yom 
Kippur W ar that the conservative oil sheikdoms became central to the pan-Arab cause of anti- 
Zionism.13
The Jewish lobby has repeatedly emphasized the moral imperative of the United States 
to support the only democracy in the Middle East,14 and to an extent the image of Israel as a 
pioneering democracy in its early years became a running theme in  American popular culture 
with particular emphasis on Jewish masculinity and association with America's own folkloric 
tradition of rugged individualism.15 Yet after the June 1967 W ar, Israel forfeited much of its 
ability to advertise itself as a beacon of freedom in an unfree region -  however unwilling Israel 
may have been to become a police state exercising political control over Arabs living in the 
occupied territories, its leaders were forced to qualify the ethos of freedom in terms of cultural 
and racial exceptionalism.16
In sum, viewing the American-Israeli relationship in ideological terms, albeit religious, 
cultural, or political, is a shaky proposition, which is largely a consequence of one of the basic
12M itchell Bard, “The Israeli and Arab Lobbies,” < http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/us- 
israel/lobby.html>  (28 October 2002).
13Nadav Safran, “The War and the Future of the Arab-Israeli C onflict,” Foreign Affairs 52 
Qanuary 1974), 219-221.
14See, for example, U nited States, Congress, Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian 
Affairs, Hearings: Priorities for Peace in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: Governm ent Printing Office, 
1975), 22.
15See, for example, M ichelle Mart, “Tough Guys and American Cold War Policy: Images of 
History, 1948-1960.” Diplomatic History 20 (Summer 1996), 357-380.
16Gabriel Sheffer and M enachem  Hofnung, “Israel’s Image,” in Gabriel Sheffer, ed., Dynamics of 
Dependence: U .S.-Israeli Relations (Boulder: W estview Press, 1987), 14.
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paradoxes of Zionist/Israeli foreign policy. Israel and the Zionist movement have always sought 
Great Power protection, not out of choice, but necessity. Theodor Herzl had become convinced, 
after failing to secure support for the Zionist cause by the European leaders, that Jews could rely 
only on themselves to create their own nation. The Nazi Holocaust highlighted both the truth 
of Herzl's conviction and the impossibility that sovereignty could be achieved without the 
support and recognition of other countries. W ithout the strenuous efforts of American Jews, the 
United States may never have become central to the support of Israel in its earliest years. Yet, 
without the consideration tha t Israel was a potential strategic value to American Cold W ar 
policy -  itself a questionable proposition until the second term of Richard Nixon's administration 
-  it is highly unlikely that any ideological factors alone could have sustained the American-Israeli 
influence relationship.
American Zionism and the Birth of Israel
Despite strong Congressional support, United States’ interest in the Zionist question faded in the 
years following W  orld W ar I, a symptom of America’s withdrawal after its unpleasant experience 
on the international stage. American interest in the Zionist question did not reemerge until the 
later years of W orld W ar II. In 1944, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee moved to pass 
a resolution securing Jewish emigration to Palestine with statehood as the ultimate goal. 
Secretary of W ar Henry L. Stimson -  who was deeply sympathetic to the plight of European 
Jewry -  rejected the plan for strategic reasons. W ith  the Normandy invasion quickly 
approaching, Stimson did not want any crises developing elsewhere. It was a reasoned prophecy 
of what would happen four years later.
Franklin Roosevelt, in characteristic fashion, was so impressed with his mediating skills
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that he seemed to have convinced himself that he alone could solve the Zionist-Arab conflict. 
Roosevelt vacillated on the matter, promising both the Zionist organization tha t he would help 
establish a Jewish state in his next term, and Ibn Saud, Saudi Arabia’s ruler, that no major 
American policy would be formulated before consultations w ith both  Jews and Arabs.17 
Roosevelt died a week after his promise to Saud, leaving this and all other foreign policy matters 
to his inexperienced and excluded vice president, Harry Trum an.
Trum an undoubtedly anguished over the moral implications of post-Holocaust Jewish 
nationalism placed before him, but he never lost sight of the larger and more threatening 
developments of the emerging Cold War. A t the end of W orld W ar II, the United States likely 
would have been content with British predominance in the Middle East. The Greek civil war 
and Soviet encroachment in Turkey and Iran soon compelled the U nited States to replace war- 
torn Britain as the major power in the region, a policy formalized by the Trum an Doctrine.
State D epartm ent officials had begun to view the Zionist-Arab conflict in Cold W ar 
terms, whereby American support for Zionism would translate into increased prestige for Moscow 
in the Arab world.18 The Zionists’ argued against this view by noting tha t Palestine Jews proved 
to be worthy fighters against the Nazis during World W ar II,19 and would likewise be useful
17Herbert Feis, The Birth o f  Israel: The Tousled Diplomatic Bed (New York: W .W . Norton, 
1969), 16.
1SRichard Stevens, American Zionism and U .S. Foreign Policy (New York: Pageant Press, 1962),
143.
19The Palestine Jewish struggle against Nazism became so important to the Zionist movement -  
both for domestic and foreign policy purposes -  that a note about it was included in Israel’s Declaration of 
Independence, Paragraph 8: "In the Second World War, the Jewish com m unity o f this country contributed 
its full share to the struggle o f the freedom -  and peace-loving nations against the forces of Nazi wickedness 
and, by the blood o f its soldiers and its war effort, gained the right to a life of dignity, freedom and honest 
toil in their national hom eland.” The Declaration o f the Establishment o f  the State of Israel is reprinted in 
Israel, Office o f Information, Israel’s Struggle For Peace (New York: Israel Office o f Information, 1960), 
161-164.
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against the Communists, gained little favor in the State Departm ent, where officials took
seriously Ibn Saud’s 1947 threat to Trum an that should a Jewish state be created in Palestine,
the Arab world “will lay siege to it until it dies of famine.”20 Leading policy makers in both the
State and newly-created Defense Departments, including George Kennan, James Forrestal, and
George Marshall, were convinced that American support of the Jews would jeopardize W estern
access to Middle Eastern oil, a commodity not yet essential to American domestic needs but
central to the rebuilding of post-war Europe.21
The State D epartm ent clearly wanted to avoid the situation entirely, but after the
Zionists had achieved their goal, that proved to be impossible. Officials publically blamed the
Zionists for the strategic nightmare tha t the Palestine conflict was creating. United States
representative to the UN W arren Austin, in a speech to the General Assembly on April 20,
1948, dispensed with the subtleties of diplomacy: “W e hoped tha t the Jews would make every
possible effort to compose their differences with the Arabs in an effort to reduce the violence
which persisted in Palestine. Events have not fulfilled these hopes.”22 A n exasperated
memorandum from then-Director of the Office of the United Nations Dean Rusk to
Undersecretary of State Robert A. Lovett predicted a Middle East war nine days before Israel
declared its independence:
T h e Jews will com e running to the Security C ouncil w ith  the claim  that their state is the object 
o f  arm ed aggression and will use every m eans to obscure the fact that it is their ow n  arm ed  
aggression against the Arabs inside Palestine w hich  is the cause o f  Arab counter-attack . There  
will be a decided  effort, g iven  this eventuality , that the U n ited  S tates will be called  upon by
20Ibn Saud, as cited in Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Q uest for Oil, M oney &. Power (New  
York: Free Press, 1991), 425.
21John P. Miglietta, American Alliance Policy in the Middle East. 1945-1992: Iran. Israel, and 
Saudi Arabia (New York: Lexington Books, 2002), 106. The United States boasted major domestic 
reserves in the early postwar era.
22Warren Austin, as cited in United States, Department o f State, Bulletin N o. 461 (1948), 569.
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elem ents inside this country to support Security C oun cil action  against the Arab states.
T o  take such action  w ould seem  to me to be morally indefensible w hile, from the aspect 
o f  our relations w ith  the M iddle East and our broad security aspects in that region, it would  
alm ost be fatal to  pit forces o f  the U n ited  States and possibly Russia against the governm ents o f  
the Arab world.23
The Trum an administration, against the heated objections of the diplomatic and military
elite, backed the U N ’s Palestine partition resolution. If the U nited States had withdrawn its
support for the Zionists, the resolution probably would not have obtained the necessary two-
thirds majority vote of the General Assembly, without which Israel would have been denied
international recognition as a sovereign state. John P. Miglietta, a specialist in Middle East
alliance politics, summarized the American motives:
T h e T rum an adm inistration’s policy toward Israel was driven by dom estic politics in the U nited  
States. Trum an, faced w ith  electoral pressures, sided w ith  his dom estic political advisers over 
his foreign policy councilors. A m erican  support for Israel was based o n  dom estic politics as 
opposed to perceptions o f  A m erican national in terest.24
After fifty years of lobbying for Great Power support from the stance of moral and strategic
imperatives, Zionists ultimately had to thank the unpopularity of an incumbent president for
the political support they needed. Facing reelection, Trum an understood tha t no president (with
the exception of Woodrow Wilson in 1916) won election without winning New York, where the
greatest concentration of voting Jews made clear to Trum an tha t their support was contingent
on the president’s Zionist policy.25 Truman, never one to mince words, declared, “I’m sorry
gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of
23Dean Rusk, as cited in United States, Department o f State, Foreign Relations of the United  
States. 1948. V, “The Near East, South Asia, and Africa," part 2 (W ashington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1976), 895.
24Miglietta, American Alliance Policy in the Middle East. 115.
25James Lee Ray, The Future of American-Israeli Relations: A  Parting o f Wavs? (Lexington: 
University Press o f Kentucky, 1985), 7.
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Zionism. I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents.”26 The 
president received a letter from Chaim Weizmann on May 13, informing him that the Zionists 
would declare the existence of the Provisional Government of the Jewish State on midnight of 
May 15. Trum an relented only after his political advisors convinced him tha t he would lose the 
election if he did not abandon United States recognition of a temporary trusteeship of the Jews 
in Palestine.27 The U nited States recognized Israel’s independence minutes after it was 
proclaimed. In the end, the Zionists had forced Trum an’s hand. Chaim W eizmann declared 
in his memoirs, “I was convinced that once we had taken our destiny into our own hands and 
established the republic, the American people would approve our resolution, and see in our 
successful struggle for independence the image of its own national liberation a century and three 
quarters ago.”28 American policy makers, at least, were unmoved by the comparison, for now the 
perpetual conflict they had foreseen was becoming a reality.
Israel and the Eisenhower Years
Dwight Eisenhower, a Republican, did not feel beholden to domestic Jewish interest groups 
because they were nota significant part of the Republican constituency. The president believed 
that this allowed him a greater leeway in Middle East Cold W ar policy, which basically meant 
that he and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles could improve relations with the Arab 
world w ithout concern of encumbering political constraints at home. Dulles publicized this
26Harry Truman, as cited in Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S 
Truman. 1945-1948 (New York: W .W . Norton, 1977), 322.
27Stevens, American Zionism and U.S. Foreign Policy , 204-
28Chaim W eizmann, Trial and Error: The Autobiography o f Chaim W eizm ann (London: Hamish 
Hamilton, 1949), 582.
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strategy:
W e are in  the present jam because the past adm inistration had always dealt w ith  the area [the 
M iddle East] from a political standpoint and had tried to m eet the w ishes o f  the Zionists in  this 
country, and that had created a basic antagonism  w ith  the Arabs. T h at was w hat the Russians 
are n ow  capitalizing o n .29
A lthough Dulles and Eisenhower were still pressing Gamal Nasser, leader of Egypt, to 
enlist in the American Containm ent strategy as late as 1955, they had realized two years earlier 
that the Egyptian strongman refused to see Moscow as the primary threat to the Arab world.30 
Nasser reserved that title for Israel. Dulles believed that establishing a security alliance nearer 
to the Soviet Union's southwest flank would better serve American Containm ent policy. The 
resulting American-supported Baghdad Pact of 1955, consisting of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and 
Pakistan turned into an unmitigated disaster, having failed to prevent Moscow from gaining 
prestige in the region. The Joint Chiefs of Staff quickly concluded that the alliance lacked the 
military capability to deter Soviet aggression, and Israel denounced the American plan, in part, 
because of its inclusion of Iraq, a country still technically at war against the Zionists.31 Most 
damaging, however, was Nasser's incensed reaction to the Pact. He believed that the United 
States was deliberately attempting to shift the power center of the Arab world away from Egypt 
and into the hands of his Hashemite rivals in Iraq, thereby encouraging Nasser to move squarely 
into the Soviet orbit. "By 1956," the Cold W ar historian Thomas Paterson concluded, "the 
Eisenhower Administration was tangled in Arab-Israeli, Arab-Arab, and Arab-British rivalries,
29John Foster Dulles, as cited in Thomas G. Paterson, M eeting the Communist Threat: Truman to  
Reagan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 164.
30Shlom o Aronson, Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East: A n  Israeli Perspective (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 115.
31Steven Z. Freiberger, Dawn Over Suez: The Rise of American Power in the Middle East, 1953-
1957
(Chicago: Ivan R. D ee, 1992), 106.
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while the Soviets through their stunning weapons deal with Cairo, leaped over the northern tier
and into the Arab core."32
Nasser, emboldened by his arms deal with Moscow, announced on July 26, 1956, that
Egypt had nationalized the Suez Canal. The move threatened to choke the French, British, and
Israeli economies. W hile these three countries were clamoring for war, Eisenhower sharply
rebuked any aggressive recourse, preferring diplomacy over force. There could be no more of
a damaging blow, Eisenhower reasoned, than collusion between the Zionists and the once-great
colonial powers, which would likely drive the Arabs directly to the Soviets. A nthony Eden of
Great Britain, however, began to compare Nasser to Hitler, and the Israelis were eager to deliver
a blow to their arch-nemesis in Egypt. The tripartite attack of late O ctober 1956 led to some of
the harshest criticism to come out of the W hite House in the post-war era: O n  October 31,
Eisenhower announced:
W e believe these actions to have b een  taken in  error. For w e do n o t accept the use o f  force as 
a wise or proper instrum ent for the settlem ent o f  in ternational disputes.... T h e actions taken can  
scarcely be reconciled  w ith  the principles and purposes o f  the U n ited  N ation s to w hich  we have 
all subscribed. A n d , beyond this, we are forced to doubt ev e n  if  resort to war will long serve the 
perm anent interests o f  the attacking nations.33
The president was referring, without much subtlety, to the opportunity Moscow would take to
enhance its already growing influence throughout the Arab world, which in turn would
jeopardize W estern access to Middle Eastern oil.34
The Suez Crisis served to sharpen Eisenhower’s Cold W ar concerns in two ways. First,
the rather pathetic withdrawal of France and Britain from the region signaled an end to W estern
32Paterson, M eeting the Communist Threat. 168.
33Dwight Eisenhower, as cited in United States, Department o f  State, Bulletin N o. 906 (1956),
744-45.
34Yergin, The Prize, 484.
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imperialism in the region, and, in turn proved to be a boon to Arab nationalism. Second, the
tripartite attack made Israel appear as an agent of W estern imperialism, which provided Moscow
with the valuable pretext of encouraging the Arabs to think of Zionism and imperialism as one
and the same. In a special message to Congress on January 5,1957, Eisenhower proposed a new
strategy which came to be known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, tha t would assist every nation in
the Middle East, economically, militarily, and politically in order to protect “against overt
aggression from any nation controlled by international Communism.”35 The Eisenhower
Doctrine sought to deter Soviet aggression (which up to this point was non-existent) directly
through the auspices of American power, thus replacing the client-state Containm ent strategy
of the Baghdad Pact. The Eisenhower Doctrine used different means to achieve the same ends,
and proved no more successful in consolidating W estern orientation on the countries in the
region. As Avi Shlaim observed, the Eisenhower Doctrine
helped turn the M iddle East in to  a jousting ground for the superpowers and international politics 
into a zero-sum  gam e in w hich  one player’s gain was seen  as the other’s loss. T h e region's hom e 
grown conflicts, bitter en ou gh  on  their ow n, becam e virtually unsolvable w ith  the involvem ent  
o f fiercely com petitive outside powers.36
In terms of arms shipments, the Eisenhower Doctrine practiced equal treatm ent of the 
Middle East Countries in name only. W ith the exception of 100 recoilless guns sold in 1958, the 
Eisenhower administration refused to sell Israel any arms at all, while providing heavy artillery 
to Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Jordan.37 In the faulty logic of the Eisenhower Doctrine, the nations
35Dwight Eisenhower, as cited in Stephen J. Genco, “The Eisenhower Doctrine: Deterrence in the 
Middle East, 1957-1958,” in Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign 
Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 312.
36A vi Shlaim, War and Peace in the Middle East: A  Critique o f  American Policy (New York: 
Viking, 1994), 32.
37Mordechai Gazit, “Israeli Military Procurement from the United States,” in Sheffer, ed., 
Dynamics of D ependence. 92.
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that benefitted the most were those seen to be under the greatest pressure to the Communist 
threat. A lthough the Kennedy administration continued Eisenhower’s tendency to view the 
Middle East through the distorting lens of the Cold W ar, United States policy in the 1960s 
increasingly saw Israel as a pillar against Communism.
The 1960s. Israel and the “Special Relationship”
The Kennedy administration believed that American policy in the Middle East during the 
Eisenhower years lacked the nuance necessary to support Arabs and Israelis under the umbrella 
of anti'Communism without alienating one of the sides in support of the other. Kennedy hoped 
to improve relations with Israel while the honeymoon between Nasser and his Soviet patrons was 
becoming strained. Kennedy’s task was not going to be an easy one. He viewed the Arab-Israeli 
conflict primarily in terms of the Palestinian refugee problem, an issue he thought could be 
solved either by Israeli willingness to repatriate them or compensate their resettlem ent in other 
Arab countries. Kennedy’s plan seemed like an outgrowth of his Peace Corps optimism, and 
betrayed either bullheaded determination or naivete on his part. Repatriation would have 
threatened to erode a Jewish majority, and with it, the existence of Israel.
But David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s Prime Minister, also recognized how m uch Kennedy 
cherished the cause of global resistence to Communism. The title of W arren Bass’s study on 
Kennedy and the Middle East, Support Any Friend, referred to Kennedy’s inaugural address, in 
which he declared America’s intention to "support any friend...to assure the survival and success 
of liberty.”38 David Ben-Gurion heard those words not as a departure from official United States
38John F. Kennedy, as cited in Warren Bass, Support and Friend: Kennedy’s Middle East and the 
Making o f the U .S.-Israel Alliance (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 1.
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policy but at the least a willingness to obtain the security assurances and weapons that had been 
absent since Israel’s birth.
Kennedy followed a dual track policy. O n the one hand, he called for a reinvigoration 
of the Tripartite Declaration, because, he reasoned, “once the actions of the Middle East have 
a firm and precise guarantee, the need for continuing the arms race will disappear....”39 O n  the 
other hand, Kennedy was determined to counter the Soviet flood of arms into the region. This 
was a concern shared by the State and Defense Departments tha t ultimately allowed for the sale 
of Hawk anti-aircraft missiles in 1962. The decision shattered the arms embargo in a big way; 
the technology was the finest of its kind and required extensive training of Israeli technicians in 
the United States. W arren Bass argued that “the Hawk precedent remains perhaps the most 
underappreciated milestone in the U.S.-Israel special relationship. ”40 Although Kennedy resisted 
the idea of granting Israel a security guarantee, he assured then  Foreign Minister Golda Meir in 
December 1962 tha t the United States would not allow Israel’s destruction by its Arab enemies 
who were rapidly arming themselves at the time. Kennedy hoped that this promise would induce 
Israel to give up its nuclear program at Dimona.41
Lyndon Johnson presided over America’s first overtly pro-Israel administration. Johnson 
himself made his Zionist sympathies well known during his days in the Senate, and the Rostow 
brothers Eugene and W alter (Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs and National Security 
Adviser, respectively) strongly encouraged Johnson’s friendly policies toward Israel. United
39John F. Kennedy, as cited in Jacob Baal-Teshuva, ed., The Mission o f  Israel (New York: Robert 
Speller & Sons, 1963), 12.
40Bass, Support and Friend, 145.
41Kennedy’s reasoning betrayed his spotty understanding o f  Zionism and the importance it 
attached to self-reliance. David Ben-Gurion had sought to possess a nuclear capability since Israel’s birth 
and would not abandon the program for any reason. This is the central thesis o f Avner Cohen, Israel and 
the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
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States policy in the Middle East during Johnson’s tenure tended to downplay the Cold W ar 
concerns that had shaped the perceptions of previous administrations. The war in Vietnam 
sapped American resources both at home and in other regions of the world. Johnson’s major 
contribution to Middle East geopolitics centered on accelerating arms transfers to Israel. 
Although Kennedy intended his Hawk sale to  satisfy Israel’s security appetite -  instead this 
historic precedent only whetted it.
The Israelis were eager to replace France, its major arms supplier, both nuclear and 
conventional, with the United States. W arren Bass noted, “Ben-Gurion had made the support 
of a Great Power the central pillar of Israeli foreign policy, and his first choice had virtually 
always been the U nited States. For Ben-Gurion, America was an aspiration, France a 
consolation.”42 As France was winding down its brutal war in Algeria, Israeli policymakers 
recognized that the French would soon enough move to improve relations with the rest of the 
Arab world, which essentially meant that it would reduce arms transfers to Israel and supply 
Israel’s enemies instead.43 Johnson moved enthusiastically to replace France. In 1965, the 
United States became Israel’s largest military supplier. W ashington sold 200 Patton tanks and 
Skyhawk jet bombers to Israel. As John Miglietta observed, “The United States thus began the 
process of providing Israeli military with the capabilities to attain  military superiority in the 
region that would become a major component of relations between the two countries and a goal 
of American foreign policy in the region.”44
By 1967, Israel possessed advanced radar, missile, anti-aircraft and artillery systems
42Bass, Support A ny Friend. 4.
43Stockholm  International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), The Arms Trade with the Third 
World (Stockholm: Alm qvist &  Wiksell, 1971), 530-531.
44Miglietta, American Alliance Policy in the Middle East. 134-
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capable of both short-range Blitzkrieg style attacks and long-range “pin-prick” missions against
hostile regimes in Libya and Iraq. Israel’s main security threat until the crisis preceding the Six
Day W ar in June 1967 were guerilla-oriented incursions -  menacing, American policymakers
figured, but not catastrophic. The United States assumed tha t Israeli military superiority would
effectively deter a major Arab attack -  the guerilla incursions seemed to prove that the Arabs
were willing to go no further. Abba Eban observed, “The U nited States had grown so
accustomed to periodic eruptions in the armistice system tha t it had ceased to believe that any
outburst could destroy the entire structure.”45 This explains why the Pentagon dismissed large-
scale Syrian and Egyptian mobilization in May 1967. They assumed tha t an Arab attack was
unlikely, because the Arabs knew the Israelis could wipe them  out. W ashington thus pressed
Israel to wait out the heightened tensions for a diplomatic solution.46
Lyndon Johnson’s account of the weeks preceding the Six Day W ar reads like an
extended and desperate plea to the Israelis not to preempt: “I have always had a deep feeling of
sympathy for Israel and its people,” he remembered,
gallantly building and defending a m odern n a tion  against great odds and against the tragic 
background o f  Jewish experience. I can  understand that m en  m ight d ecide to act on  their ow n  
w hen  hostile forces gather o n  their frontiers and cu t o ff a major port, and w hen  antagonistic 
political leaders fill the air w ith  threats to  destroy their n ation . N on eth eless, I have never 
con cealed  my regret that Israel decided  to m ove w hen  it did.47
The toll of V ietnam was persuading Johnson of the limitations of military solutions, and 
he could not bring himself to support military action until all other means had been exhausted, 
which he believed had not happened by June 5. Second, Johnson’s confidence in Israeli military
45Abba Eban, My Country: The Story o f M odem  Israel (New York: Random House, 1972), 239.
46Aronson, Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East. 71.
47Lyndon, B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives on  the Presidency. 1963-1969 (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and W inston, 1971), 297.
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superiority was high, but not absolute. In the event tha t Israel got into trouble, the president 
was in no mood to intervene in what could become a full blown Cold W ar crisis.48 Finally, 
although Nasser’s blockade of the Straits of Tiran could not be mistaken for anything other than 
an act of war,49 Euguene Rostow believed that Nasser was exercising his freedom of movement 
within Egyptian territory, thereby breaking no international laws. A n Israeli preemptive strike, 
he reasoned, would be “a very serious mistake.”50
Yet, Johnson’s famous injunction to Abba Eban, “Israel will not be alone unless it decides 
to go alone” and his May 17 letter to Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, in which he warned, “I cannot 
accept any responsibilities on behalf of the United States for situations that arise as the result 
of actions on which we are not consulted,” hardly constituted threats against Israel on par with 
Eisenhower’s guarantee in 1957 tha t W ashington would protect Israel's right to access 
international waterways.51 The United States was in a bind. Meir Amit, head of Israel’s foreign 
intelligence agency (Mossad) concluded after a mee ting in W ashington designed to ascertain an 
American response to preemption, that, “it became totally clear that they were not planning to 
do a thing.”52 In addition, Johnson was enticed by the prospect tha t a crushing defeat would lead 
the Arabs to become disenchanted with the Soviets, which could lead to the downfall of Nasser
48William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israel Conflict Since 
1967 (W ashington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993), 28.
49Even M ichael Walzer notes that Nasser’s actions constituted a “just fear” for the Israelis, thereby 
making, in  Walzer’s mind, the Six Day War one of Israel’s few morally defensible conflicts. See Michael 
Walzer, lust and Unjust Wars: A  Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. 3d ed. (New York; Basic 
Books, 1977), 84-85.
50Eugene Rostow, as cited in Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: lune 1967 and the Making o f the 
Modern Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 77.
51Johnson, The Vantage Point. 293 and 290.
52Meir Amit, as cited in Michael Brecher, “Eban and Israeli Foreign Policy: Diplomacy, War, and 
Disengagement,” in Gordon A. Craig and Francis Loewenheim, eds., T he Diplomats: 1939-1979 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 408.
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and a begrudging acceptance that Israel could not be destroyed.53 It was under this pretext of 
implicit American acceptance that Israel launched an attack tha t resulted in what Donald Neff 
aptly called “one of the most humiliating defeats in warfare.”54
The immediate United States reaction to the Israeli strike came from United States 
Representative to the UN, A rthur J . Goldberg, who heatedly denied American complicity in the 
Israeli attack. His address to the Security Council on June 6 meticulously recounted Johnson’s 
efforts to stave off war in the preceding three weeks.55 Israeli hegemony presented the United 
States with a problem tha t would not be swept away with immediate denials. The Arab-Israeli 
conflict would become the preeminent security issue of the Middle East and would divide along 
Cold W ar lines. “Many Israelis,” observed the Israeli historian Shlomo Aronson, “developed a 
consciousness of ‘the right of the W estern bastion in the Middle East,’ after having defeated a 
heavily Soviet-armed Arab world.”56 A  bastion Israel had indeed become. Israel boasted 
casualty rates 25 to 1 in its favor, and had decimated nearly all of the Arabs’ war-making 
capacity.57 The Jewish state occupied the Sinai, the Golan Heights, and the W est Bank (thereby 
uniting Jerusalem) -  42,000 square miles in total, more than  tripling the original size of Israel.
In a series of events eerily similar to the Yom Kippur W ar of 1973, the Soviet Union 
issued a warning to Israeli troops marching on Damascus on the last day of the war that Moscow 
would exert military means to save the Arabs. Prime Minister Alexsei Kosygin's use of the
53George W . Ball and Douglas B. Ball The Passionate Attachm ent: America’s Involvement with 
Israel. 1947 to the Present (New  York: W .W . Norton and Company, 1992), 55-56.
54Donald Neff, Warriors for lerusalem: The Six Days that Changed the Middle East (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1984), 240.
55United States, Department of State. Bulletin N o. 1461 (1967), 934.
56Aronson, Conflict and Bargainine in the Middle East. 84-
57Oren, Six Days of W ar. 305-306.
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phrase "utmost gravity” was code for a nuclear threat. But it was a desperate threat at the end 
of the war. The Soviets could save face by only breaking diplomatic relations with Israel. In a 
milestone in the history of American-Israeli relations, Johnson declared after the war that Israel 
would should not have to evacuate the territories it took by force until a comprehensive 
settlement was reached.58
No such negotiation was forthcoming. The Soviets were rapidly re-arming their Arab 
clients, while the Jewish lobby, with solid backing from Congress, pressured Johnson to sell Israel 
50 F-4 Phantoms in order to maintain the balance of power. The Republican candidate for 
president, Richard Nixon upped the ante in a speech to the B’nai Brith organization, declaring 
that
T h e balance o f  power m ust be tipped in Israel’s favor... [we] support a policy that w ould give 
Israel a techn ological military margin to more than  offset her hostile neighbors’ num erical 
superiority. If m aintaining that margin should require that the U n ited  States supply Israel w ith  
supersonic P hantom  F-4 jets w e should supply those P hantom  jets.59
Johnson relented, and Israel came to possess technology available previously only to America’s
N A TO  allies. If American foreign policy was easing into the notion tha t an impregnable Israel
would serve W ashington’s interest by deterring Arab/Soviet military plans, the Phantom sale
represented a flawed logic. Israeli hegemony discouraged neither Arab rearmament nor Soviet
deployment of military advisers to the region. As a result, Cold W ar tensions increased yet
• 60 again.
Under the circumstances it is hardly surprising tha t UN Security Council 242 of
58Aronson, Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East, 86.
59Richard N ixon, as cited in Robert B. Semple, Jr., “N ixon Stresses Comm itment to Israel,” New  
York Times, 9 September 1968.
60Robert O. Freedman, “The Superpowers and the Middle East,” in Roy Allison and Phil Williams, 
eds,, Superpower Competition and Crisis Prevention in the Third W orld (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 124-
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November 22, 1967 (what Nadav Safran aptly called, “tha t masterpiece of ambivalence”61) 
became more a sign of deadlock than one of settlement. The resolution called for a “withdrawal 
of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict”; Israel had no intention 
of doing so, perhaps ever or until Arabs recognized its right to exist. The resolution also called 
for a “termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for an acknowledgment of 
the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and 
their right to live in  peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of 
force,” something the Arabs had no intention of doing, perhaps ever, or at the very least until 
Israel relinquished the occupied territories.62
“Arab nationalism,” observed Abba Eban, "drew no...lesson from its failure in war. The 
Arab reaction to defeat was not to assume that the anti-Israel policy had failed, but rather that 
it had not been sufficiently applied."63 Nasser proved Eban correct, announcing to his National 
Assembly, “T hat which was taken by force will be regained by force,” thus managing to defy both 
affirmations of the UN resolution in one sentence.64 Nasser spoke with confidence, since Israel’s 
victory and despised occupation of Arab territory had created a unity unprecedented in Arab 
interstate politics. A t the Arab Summit Conference held in Khartoum in September of 1967, 
the heads of state agreed to combine their efforts to push Israel back to its boundaries of June 
4. The communique declared: “This will be done within the framework of the main principles 
to which the Arab States adhere, namely: no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no
61Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 430.
62U nited Nations. 2004. U .N . Security Council Resolutions. 1967. 
< http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1967/scres67.htm>  (12 March 2004).
63Abba Eban, A n  Autobiography (New York: Random House, 1977), 453.
640 re n , Six Davs o f War, 326.
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negotiations with it....”65
United States policy supported Resolution 242. Since it was obvious that the Arabs and
Israelis would never reach a settlem ent under the 242 rubric on their own accord, the only other
recourse -  short of abandoning the resolution entirely and accepting a permanent state of
belligerency -  called for an imposed settlement from without. In May 1968, a memorandum
from Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State, to Johnson, considered the methods available to get
this problem  off o f  dead center.... O ne possibility w ould be th a tw e a n d  the S o v ie tU n io n  discuss 
this m atter secretly and in com plete detail -  putting together a package w hich  the two o f  use 
w ould th en  try to  im pose o n  the countries o f  the area. I do n o t b elieve that this w ould work. 
I doubt that w e and the Soviets w ould agree simply because their and our interests are in direct 
conflict.66
By that point, the U nited States gave up hope that Israel could be prodded into indirect 
negotiations with the Arabs, a policy that Israelis flatly refused because it would allow the Arabs 
to avoid recognizing its existence.67 A t the beginning of the U N ’s diplomatic initiative, headed 
by Special Envoy G unner Jarring in 1968, Johnson offered his full support bu t hinted at the 
futility of any third party solution: “It is the parties themselves,” he declared, "who must make 
the major effort...in this much needed peacemaking process.”68 Five years later, Nixon repeated 
in his foreign policy report to Congress what Johnson had believed since the beginning: “A  
solution cannot be imposed by the outside powers on unwilling governments. If we tried, the
65Arab Summit Conference, 1 September 1967, Communique reprinted in U nited States,
Congress, Committee on  Foreign Relations: A  Select Chronology and Background Docum ents Relating to 
the Middle East. 249.
66Dean Rusk, as cited in United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations o f the United  
States. 1964-1968. XX, “Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967-1968” (W ashington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
2001), 356.
67A nn M. Lescsh and Dan Tschirgi, Origins and Developm ent o f the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
(London: Greenwood Press, 1998), 94.
6SLyndon B. Johnson, as cited in United States, President, Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the 
Unites States: Lyndon B. Johnson. 1968 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), 947.
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parties would feel no stake in observing its terms, and the outside powers would be engaged
indefinitely in enforcing them .”69
It is impossible to know how Israel would have reacted if the Arabs had abandoned their
belligerence, and accepted Israel’s existence through direct negotiations because no such thing
occurred. It is certain, however, that the Israelis, seeing no reason to give up territories in
exchange for nothing were at least strategically satisfied with their post-war position. The Israeli
writer Chaim Herzog summarized Israel’s reasoning:
T h e depth  afforded by the territories taken by Israel in  the S ix  D ay W ar gave the country for the  
first tim e in  its history a strategic option. A ll Israeli centers o f  population were now  rem oved  
from the Egyptian forces and a desert barrier som e 150 miles w ide separated Israel from the Suez 
Canal, in  itself a barrier o f  n o  m ean p rop ortion s....70
The Israelis concluded that they won a crushing victory without the benefit of buffer zones; their 
acquisition thus made Israel far less vulnerable. Israel also found political justification for the 
occupation, summarized neatly by Henry Kissinger: “Israel, having never lived within accepted 
frontiers, saw no essential difference between locating its boundaries in one unaccepted place 
and another; condemned to Arab belligerency, it sought the widest imaginable security belt.”71 
Israel’s postwar position had a profound effect on its society. The Israeli military elite 
attained something of a celebrity status. General Ariel Sharon enjoyed telling anyone who 
would listen that the Zahal (Israeli Defense Forces) could defeat any Arab regime in any location 
and that he would be too old to fight in the next Arab-Israeli war.72 In fact, the 39-year old 
Sharon found himself on the front lines in both the 1969 and 1973 wars. The writer Max Jacobs
69Richard N ixon, as cited in United States, President, Report to Congress. “U.S. Foreign Policy for 
the 1970s: Shaping a Durable Peace,” (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), 136.
70Chaim Herzog, The War o f A tonem ent (London: W eidenfeld and N icolson, 1975), 3.
71Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), 197.
72Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally. 257.
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wondered in his travelogue w hether “undue emphasis on materialism during the six years
between the Six Day W ar and the Yom Kippur W ar produced a softening of Israel’s fiber,
resoluteness, strength.”73 Yitzhak Rabin recalled in his memoirs returning to Israel in 1973 after
his tenure as Ambassador to the United States: “The Israel I came home to had a self-confident,
almost smug aura to it, as befits a country far removed from the possibility of war.”74 Levi Eshkol
bordered on the obnoxious in a February 1969 interview with Newsweek: “After the Six Day W ar
it is a miracle tha t we are still here -  so why should we now crawl on our hands and knees to the
Arabs and say: ‘please do us a favor and take it all back....’ O ur occupation of the territory is the
outcome of war.”75 But no Israeli could best Defense M inister Moshe Dayan’s chutzpah. He
informed Time in an interview conducted in July 1973:
N obod y has faith in  the U nited  N ations. First o f  all, because it has n o  power and its com position  
is absolutely against us. It can  never have any positive decisions for us. A ll those C om m unist 
countries and Arab countries and African countries. It is the worst place for us to  go and put
76our case.
In effect, Israel in these years became so confident of its strength that it blinded itself to 
the Arab perspective. By offering only direct negotiations w ithout any prior conditions, Israel 
confronted the Arabs with an offer merely to negociate from a position of weakness. This Israeli 
policy had the unintended effect of convincing the Arabs tha t launching a general war -  even 
if they were likely to lose it -  was preferable to passive acceptance of a political surrender. Five 
years of standstill diplomacy and a pointless “war of attrition” during Richard N ixon’s first term 
reinforced the assumption among Israeli and American policymakers that the Arabs would never
73Max W . Jacobs, Day o f A tonem ent (New York: Vantage Press, 1976), 86.
74Yitzhak Rabin, T he Rabin Memoirs (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 254-
75Newsweek, “Eshkol: A  Reply to Nasser,” 17 February 1969.
76Time, “Israel: W aiting in the W ings,” 30 July, 1973.
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exercise the “third option.” It was this framework tha t ultimately created one of the most 
astounding intelligence blunders of the 20th century.
Nixon Inherits and Accepts Israeli Hegemony
As the Republican candidate for the presidency in 1968, Richard N ixon was eager to show the 
Israelis that as leader of the U nited States, he would view American and Israeli foreign policy 
objectives as one and the same. He informed Israeli Ambassador to the United States Yitzhak 
Rabin:
I believe it necessary to reach an understanding with the Soviets, and I am convinced that the 
only language they respect is the language of force. You can't reach an agreement with them 
unless you do so from a position of strength.
Nixon elicited in Rabin exactly the response that he wanted: “W e too believe that it is vital to
reach an agreement with our adversaries in the Middle East,” Rabin replied. “But negotiations
can only begin when Israel speaks from a position of strength and has concrete backing.”77
As Nixon understood the situation, Israel’s smashing victory in June of 1967 saved the
American position from collapsing altogether in the Middle East. A  victory by Nasser and his
coalition would have m eant a victory of Soviet arms over W estern arms. If Israel remained
strong, Nixon reasoned, the Arabs would eventually become disenchanted with Moscow’s
inability to change the situation. Politically, the Soviets were in no position to pressure Israel;
they had after all broken relations with the Israelis during the Six Day W ar. T hat left Moscow
with only one strategy to retain its prestige in the region: arm the Arabs and send Soviet soldiers
to operate the most lethal equipment. In this influence system, American policy would counter
77Richard N ixon and Yitzhak Rabin, as cited in Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs. 133.
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the Soviet weapon transfers with more sophisticated equipment to be used by more competent 
clients. As the option for war would be neutralized indefinitely, the Arabs would agree to direct 
negotiations under American auspices.
Like past presidents, Nixon did tend to inflate Soviet capabilities, but his commitment 
to Israel, inherited from the past two administrations, could not change before the Arabs 
abandoned their belligerent policy. Nixon understood perfectly well the implications of his 
policies on Arab-American relations, as dem onstrated in his 1972 Foreign Policy Report to 
Congress. He declared that the Arab-Israeli conflict was harmful because: “It has drawn the 
Soviet Union and the United States into close military association with the combatants, with 
all the danger that poses to world peace.” And: “It has caused the disruption of normal U.S. 
relations with a number of Arab countries. This, in turn, has increased the already excessive 
Arab dependence on Soviet support, and therefore their dangerous vulnerability to excessive 
Soviet influence.”78
As Harry N. Howard, a former U.S. foreign service officer, observed, Nixon’s frequent 
invocation of balance of power in the Middle East “all too often seemed a transparent 
euphemism for the maintenance of Israeli military superiority.... [I] t became clear by 1972 that 
more military and economic assistance had been given to Israel during the Nixon administration 
than in those of all his predecessors since 1948.” 79 Such was N ixon’s Middle East policy. Had 
the Arabs and Israelis found common ground in Resolution 242, N ixon would have gladly
78Richard N ixon, as cited in United States, President, Report to Congress. “U.S. Foreign Policy for 
the 1970s: The Emerging Structure o f Peace,” (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), 
123-124.
79Harry N . Howard, “The United States and the Middle East,” in  Tareq Ismael, The Middle East 
in World Politics: A  Study in Contemporary International Relations (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 
1974), 135.
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accepted it. In the meantime, Middle East intransigence was best kept at a low boil. T hat is why 
Nixon placed the region in the jurisdiction of the State Departm ent, headed by Secretary of 
State William Rogers. This freed the president and his N ational Security Advisor Henry A. 
Kissinger to focus on the more pressing problems of how to end the war in Vietnam.
Rogers, an old friend of Nixon’s, had been A ttorney General under Eisenhower. He had 
little experience in  foreign policy, and his easygoing m anner would not likely steal attention from 
Nixon, who believed tha t foreign policy belonged to the W hite House. W ith a diplomatic 
breakthrough in the Middle East unlikely, Nixon reasoned that the inevitable problems could 
be blamed on the State Department.80 The policy revealed N ixon’s unique conception of 
friendship to say the least. Thus, one must refer to two Middle East foreign policies, which is a 
distinction some observers have failed to make.81 Nixon cited the Rogers Plan as evidence -  
contrary to Arab “propaganda”-  that Nixon sought an even-handed approach to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. In actuality, Nixon did not believe an “even handed” approach was possible -  a fact 
that did not necessarily affect his views on Israel. As Kissinger recalled, rather undiplomatically, 
“During the first term Nixon had initially left the Middle East to the State Department, partly 
to placate Rogers, partly because Nixon thought Middle East diplomacy was a loser from the 
domestic point of view and sought to deflect its risks from himself.”82
The State Departm ent, both Arab-leaning and anti-Communist, served Nixon’s interest 
well. Its officials and the W hite House shared a belief in the Middle East’s central role to Cold 
W ar strategy. Joseph Sisco, the Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and South Asia,
80Quandt, Peace Process. 67.
81See, for example, Theodore Draper, “The United States &. Israel: T ilt in the Middle East?,” 
Commentary, April 1975, 34-
82Kissinger, Years of Upheaval. 196.
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explained American interests in the Arab-Israeli dispute, in April, 1969:
In a shrunken, in terd ep en dent world, areas o f  instability are too dangerous and cou ld  becom e  
the source o f  major power conflict. In  this con n ection , we are keen ly  aware that the expansion  
o f  Soviet in fluence in the area in the past dozen  years, and m ore particularly since the June W ar, 
has added a n ew  dim ension  and com plexity. W e have strategic interests in  the area.83
The State Departm ent, like Nixon and Kissinger, clearly wanted to expel Soviet
influence from the region. Their strategies parted in how to go about accomplishing that goal.
Secretary of State Rogers made clear his interpretation of Resolution 242. In testimony before
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in March 1969, Rogers declared, “There can be no
secure and recognized boundaries without withdrawal.”84 In  other words, the State Department
planned to embark on its Middle East initiative with the expectation tha t Israel must withdraw
from the territories before any meaningful settlem ent could occur. N ixon and Kissinger knew
that the Israelis would fight the State D epartm ent’s assumption to a stalemate, which would
create a delaying tactic tha t the W hite House had wanted. As N adav Safran observed, the
State D epartm ent’s interpretation of Resolution 242, “considered tha t a complete identification
with Israel not only hurt the American interests in friendly Arab countries but was precisely
calculated to give the Soviet Union the best opportunities to score against the U nited States.”85
Such were the methods used by the State Department, as plainly evidenced by the first
two articles of the preamble of the 1969 Rogers Plan: I) “As part of a package settlement, Egypt
and Israel would determine a timetable and procedures for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces
from UAR territory occupied during the conflict of 1967;" II) “The state of war between Egypt
and Israel would end, and a formal state of peace would be established. Both sides would
83Joseph Sisco, as cited in U nited States, Department o f State, Bulletin N o. 1558 (1969), 391.
84William Rogers, as cited in United States, Department o f State, Bulletin N o. 1555 (1969), 385.
85Safran, Israel: The Embattled A lly. 439.
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undertake to prevent all forms of aggressive actions from their territory against the people and
armed forces of the other.”86
Kissinger was never one to let moral scruples get in the way of his personal ambitions.
As his perceptive biographer W alter Issacson noted, “Kissinger had worked to delay any
progress” in the Middle Eastern diplomacy. “His rivalry with Rogers m eant that he was not
rooting for a quick success, no doubt he would have seen less value in a stalemate if he had been
given the portfolio for the Middle East.”87
Seymour Hersh, one of Kissinger’s harshest critics, may have been correct in his
allegation that Kissinger’s need to dominate Rogers was all-consuming,88 but the charge does
not diminish Kissinger’s rejection of the Rogers Plan on strategic grounds. “As long as Egypt was
in effect a Soviet military base,” Kissinger observed,
W e cou ld  have n o  in cen tive to turn on  an ally [Israel] on  b eh a lf o f  a S ov iet clien t. This is why  
I was always opposed to com prehensive solutions that w ould  be rejected by b oth  parties and that 
cou ld  only serve S ov iet ends by either dem onstrating our im potence or being turned into a 
showcase o f  w hat cou ld  be exacted  by M oscow ’s pressure.89
Elsewhere, Kissinger wrote, the Rogers Plan “never solved the problem of how to persuade Israel
to give up all its conquests when Syria rejected any terms and Egypt refused to make peace
86The Rogers Plan preamble is reprinted in Quandt, Peace Process. 80-81. As late as October 
1971, Rogers was still convinced that Israel could be prodded into accepting his interpretation of Resolution 
242: “Both sides to the conflict are comm itted to the fundamental and reciprocal principles to which the 
Jarring Mission is dedicated: living in peace with each other and withdrawal from territories occupied in the 
1967 conflict as set forth in Security Council Resolution 242.” William Rogers, as cited in “Statement on  
Interim Peace, Before the U nited Nations General Assembly, 4 October 1971,” reprinted in United States, 
Congress, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Report: The Search for Peace in the Middle East: 
Documents and Statements. 1967-1979 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979), 301.
87W alter Issacson, Kissinger: A  Biography (New York: Simon &. Schuster, 1992), 511.
88Seymour Hersh, T he Price of Power: Kissinger in the N ixon  W hite House (New York: Summit 
Books, 1983). Hersh argues throughout his book that Kissinger’s moral deficiencies had grave consequences 
on American foreign policy.
89Henry A. Kissinger, W hite House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 1279.
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without Syria or the Palestinians, who were determined to destroy Israel.”90
The pressure to which Kissinger referred came in the form of withholding arms from 
Israel during its 1969-1970 “war of attrition” with Egypt along the Suez Canal. Because Israel’s 
defense structures, which relied on reserve units to mobilize quickly and fight with fewer, yet 
more sophisticated weapons, the State Departm ent believed that it could force Israel to be more 
amenable to indirect negotiations in the face of the vicious bloodletting on the Sinai canal 
border. As Israeli political scientist Nitza Nachmias noted, the strategy rested on a paradox: It 
assumed “that Israel was strong enough to deter Arab threats, yet sufficiently dependent on 
American arms so tha t leverage could be effectively applied without endangering Israeli 
security....”91 The strategy betrayed either the State D epartm ent’s profound misunderstanding 
of, or disregard for, one of the central historical concerns of Zionism. This “stick” approach, 
argued Michael Brecher, h it “a fear rooted in the Holocaust psychology of the Jewish State and 
periodically confirmed by Great Power behavior.”92
The Israeli government could not understand why the Rogers Plan accepted the Arabs' 
unwillingness to negotiate directly with a state recognized by the U nited Nations. For Israel, this 
unwillingness clearly signaled a fundamental Arab rejection of peace tha t had become bolstered 
by American complicity.93 Golda Meir declared as m uch in her December 1969 address to the 
Knesset:
90Kissinger, Years o f  Upheaval. 200 [emphasis Kissinger’s ] .
9'Nitza Nachmias, Transfer o f Arms, Leverage, and Peace in the Middle East (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1988), 50.
92Michael Brecher, Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975),
508.
93Aronson, Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East. 113.
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[The Rogers Plan does] n ot obligate the Arab states expressly to recognize Israel’s sovereignty, 
they don't advocate the delineation  o f  secure, n egotiated , and agreed borders by free 
negotiations b etw een  the parties, they do n ot obligate the Arab states effectively to put an  end  
to territorial activities from their territories.94
The Rogers Plan came under heavy domestic criticism as well. Eugene Rostow published
an article in April 1971 warning against excessive concern tha t support of Israel would forever
polarize the Arab world against the United States:
M any Arab leaders w ould be relieved to m ake peace w ith  Israel. T h ey  realize that the idea o f  
revenge against Israel is sterile and destructive, and that its true purpose is n ot the destruction  
o f  Israel, but th e radicalization o f  Arab politics, and the ex ten sio n  o f  S ov iet in fluence.95
In a Spring 1971 article, Michael Curtis, a Cold W ar scholar, employed the ultimate (if
overused) historical analogy of appeasement in his criticism of the Rogers Plan:
T h e U n ited  S tates has vacillated in its attitude in the M iddle East crisis, and a policy o f  firmness 
is now  required. Israel can n ot becom e another M unich . T h e 'even  handed' policy o f  Secretary 
o f S tate Rogers, w ith  its parallel refusal to supply planes to  Israel, is tantam ount to acquiescence  
in S ov iet dom ination  o f  the area.96
Nixon virtually declared the so-called Four Power talks dead in his 1970 Foreign Policy 
Report to Congress, intimating tha t the guiding assumption of the Rogers Plan -  imposed peace 
from without -  was not a viable solution: “W e have gone as far as we believe useful in making 
new proposals,” he contended, “until there is a response from the other parties.”97 Hearing (and 
expecting) no such response, Nixon declared at a news conference his support for Israel’s 
strength, something no State Departm ent official ever had: “W e will do what is necessary to
94Golda Meir, as cited in Bernard Reich, “Israel in US Perspective: Political Design and Pragmatic 
Practices,” in Efrat and Bercovitch, eds., Superpowers and Client States in the Middle East. 58.
Eugene V. Rostow, “The Middle Eastern Crisis in the Perspective of W orld Politics,” 
International Affairs 47 (April 1971), 276.
96Michael Curtis, “Soviet-America Relations and the Middle East Crisis,” Orbis 15 (Spring 1971),
418.
97Richard N ixon, as cited in United States, President, Report to Congress. “U.S. Foreign Policy for 
the 1970s; A  N ew  Strategy for Peace,” (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), 79-80.
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maintain Israel’s strength vis-a-vis its neighbors, not because we want Israel to be in a position 
to wage war -  tha t is not it -  but because that is what will deter its neighbors from attacking it.”98
The G unnar Jarring Mission, which was the U N ’s forerunner to the Rogers Plan during 
two years of failed diplomacy after the Six Day W ar, and essentially an international extension 
of the State D epartm ent’s policy for the next two years, met its end on February 26,1971. The 
UN Proposals never deviated from its support of indirect negotiations as a means to achieving 
the implementation of Resolution 242, and Israel gave its final reply to Jarring, the well-meaning 
Swedish diplomat: “Israel will not withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines.”99 This was the 
response Israel had issued repeatedly since June 11, 1967.
It was a stance Israel had the confidence to make, indefinitely it seemed. Even before 
the Six Day W ar, Abba Eban wrote, “The plain tru th  is tha t Arab nationalism emerges from 
nearly two decades of uncompromising anti-Israel struggle in total strategic defeat.”100 By the 
time the diplomatic initiatives that had been based on indirect negotiations had run their course, 
Israel saw no qualitative evidence of an improved Arab strategic position. Additionally, the 
powerfully dem onstrated Israeli strength during the Six Day W ar, observed Shlomo Aronson, 
reinforced in the United States “Jewish support for Israel and silenced Jewish groups that were 
anti-Zionist or that had reservations about Israel.”101 The post-war period saw an unprecedented 
unity among Israel’s American co-religionists which helped to make the Israeli embassy one of 
the best funded, organized, and politically influential of any in W ashington. Most important,
98Richard N ixon, as cited in United States, Department o f State, Bulletin N o. 1618 (1970), 112-
113.
99As cited in Quandt, Peace Process. 122.
Abba Eban, “Reality and Vision in the Middle East: A n Israeli V iew ,” in Ihud Olami, ed., Israel 
Today: A  N ew  Society in the Making (Tel Aviv: Labour Zionist W orld M ovem ent, 1967), 31.
101 Aronson, Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East, 94.
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Israeli leaders were quickly learning how to tell the “right” policymakers either what they wanted 
to hear, or to a greater effect, what they did not. In a July 1, 1970 letter to Nixon, Golda Meir 
raised the tensions of the “war of attrition” along the Suez Canal by threatening to bomb the 
Soviet-manned SA-2 and SA-3 anti-aircraft missile batteries. By blatantly acknowledging the 
possibility of an Israeli-Soviet clash, which could quickly escalate into a dreaded superpower 
confrontation, Meir was in effect attempting to blackmail the Americans into sending more arms 
and aircraft.102 The episode constituted a radical departure from the traditional structure of the 
American-Israeli influence relationship. By this point, both  countries were using the carrot-and- 
stick approach against one another. Israeli hegemony had clearly evolved from post-war 
exhilaration to established reality.
Sadat and the Soviets: Pretext to the Surprise A ttack on Yom Kippur 
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat expelled the Soviet advisors in July of 1972.103 “By that time,” 
noted Nadav Safran, “American policy in the Middle East became completely oriented on Israel, 
sharing with it no t only basic goals but also an identical evaluation of the situation and a 
common conception of means and ends.”104 In hindsight, the first instance tha t exposed the 
dangers of this increasingly comfortable relationship can be traced to May 27,1971, a year before 
the expulsion. O n  that day, Soviet and Egyptian leaders signed a Friendship Treaty, the 
contents of which American and Israeli leaders accepted at face value: the two countries were 
intensifying their relationship to challenge American-Israeli predominance. In fact, the
102Kissinger, W hite House Years. 582.
103The dynamics o f this episode are discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
104Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally, 448-449.
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Friendship Treaty was a sign of extremely strained relations between Moscow and its Egyptian 
clients. Israeli hegemony had succeeded in producing exactly what Nixon and Kissinger had 
wanted: Arab frustration at the Soviet’s inability to deliver either a military or diplomatic 
settlement. W here the Friendship Treaty served to camouflage this fact, more alert American 
analysis would have picked up its real meaning. Kissinger was forthcoming about his 
interpretation:
N o t know ing Sadat, I had to conclude that he was still playing N asser’s gam e. Furthermore, 
Sadat’s im patience was becom ing ev ident in  repeated declarations that 1971 had to  be the 'year 
o f  decisions' in  the M iddle East. O ur strategy had to  be to frustrate any Egyptian policy based  
o n  military threats and collusion  w ith  the Soviet U n ion . Therefore Sadat’s Friendship Treaty  
w ith the Soviets, w hatever its m otives, did n ot ga lvan ize us to help  him  as he m ight have 
h oped .105
W ashington got it backwards. In Sadat’s subtle way, he was telling the W hite House that their 
support of Israel had succeeded in forcing Arab frustrations. But Kissinger believed that the 
Friendship Treaty was another threat of Arab belligerence, and Sadat was not to be rewarded 
out of fear that the Arabs would attack Israel with full Soviet backing. Subtlety had hardly been 
Nasser’s forte; there was not yet any reason to assume tha t Sadat was any different.
Predictably, N ixon responded with further staunch support of Israel. Between 1970 and 
1972, American military aid to Israel increased ten  times over, from $30 million to $300 million, 
and the Jewish State was well on its way to becoming the largest recipient of American foreign 
assistance.106 The fourteen months between the Friendship Treaty and Sadat’s Soviet expulsion 
proved to be a particularly bad time for any revolutions in United States Middle East geopolicy. 
Kissinger and Nixon were almost totally focused on building detente with the Soviet Union and
105Kissinger, W hite House Years. 1285.
106Miglietta, American Alliance Policy in the Middle East, 169.
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ending the war in V ietnam -  two closely linked projects. Most significantly, N ixon wanted to
prevent any turmoil in the Middle East during an election year. As Kissinger recalled, “My
principle assignment was to make sure that no explosion occurred to complicate the 1972
election -  which m eant in effect that I was to stall.”107 All of this succeeded in frustrating Sadat,
and so he kicked out the Soviets in what was widely perceived as the final proof tha t the Israeli-
hegemony policy had worked. It had not; like Egyptian strategy and the Friendship Treaty,
Sadat’s decision to expel the Soviet advisers defied intuition. Now Sadat became set on war, a
decision supported by the fact tha t he would soon become silent on the matter.
Kissinger claimed in his memoirs that he considered the possibility that the expulsion
“may well refer to the possible fact that the presence of Soviet advisors with Egyptian units could
serve as a Soviet break on Egyptian offensive movements."108 (In fact, this was Sadat’s principle
motive for the expulsion.) If this was an honest self-appraisal of Kissinger’s analysis, he
nonetheless deserves only limited credit. The Israelis, on whom the Americans relied for most
of their intelligence, overwhelmingly interpreted the expulsion as vindication for Israel’s massive
deterrent-oriented arms buildup. Abba Eban summarized the Israeli reaction:
T h e general b elie f was that Sadat had obtained  an  em otional satisfaction at the expense o f  his 
strategic and political pow er....T here had b een  an obsessive fear in  Israel that W ash ington  would  
exercise pressure for a settlem ent w hich  w ould relieve it o f  the m enace o f  global war. From now  
on , this nightm are seem ed  to have faded. W ith  the departure o f  S ov iet troops, the powder keg  
was defused .109
Senator Frank Church reported after his August 1972 study mission to Israel that the Soviets 
were happy to avoid a potential strategic nightmare:
107Kissinger, Years o f Upheaval. 196.
108Kissinger, W hite House Years. 1296.
109Eban, A n  Autobiography. 479.
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Israel’s military leaders consider that the narrow straits limiting entrance by naval forces to the 
Mediterranean presented the Soviet Union with a difficult strategic problem. Every Israeli 
official to whom I talked, military and civilian, gave the American F-4 Phantom the credit for 
making the crucial difference in the power equation. ‘The F-4 is not just a machine,' one said, 
'it has changed the entire strategic picture in the Middle East.’110
This prevailing complacency punctuated Golda Meir’s M arch 1973 trip to Washington.
Kissinger recalled, “W ith  respect to negotiations, Golda’s attitude was simple. She considered
Israeli military impregnable; there was, strictly speaking no need for any change.”111
A n Intelligence Failure: American-Israeli Assumptions Before the Yom Kippur W ar 
In the early 1970s Israel treaded a fine line between fantasy and reality. The collective memory 
of Judaism related Israel’s current strength to biblical times. The scenario was all the more 
poignant because of the compression of time between destruction and regeneration. The Nazi 
Holocaust destroyed nearly half of world Jewry; by the summer of 1967 Israel controlled the Old 
City of Jerusalem, and Jews could pray at their spiritual home. A nd the United States, the most 
powerful country in history, had finally become the political, military, and economic guarantor 
that David Ben-Gurion had sought since the birth of Israel. Israel was very much blinded by its 
good fortunes.
Yet, on the day-to-day level the possibility of an Arab attack never faded completely. 
The Israelis thought a good deal more about their response to an attack than the attack itself. 
Kissinger’s biographers, Marvin and Bernard Kalb, quote one of their subject’s constant 
admonishments to Israel. “D on’t ever preempt! If you fire the first shot, you won’t have a
110Frank Church, as cited in United States, Congress, Comm ittee on Foreign Relations, Report by 
Senator Frank Church: Prospects for Peace in the Middle East: The View from Israel. (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1972), 2.
11’Kissinger, Years o f Upheaval. 221.
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dogcatcher in this country supporting you. You won’t have presidential support. You’ll be alone, 
all alone. W e wouldn’t  be able to help you. D on’t preempt! ”112 Kissinger’s crude warning rested 
on the same concerns that had guided Lyndon Johnson’s failed opposition to preemption before 
the Six Day War: the United States had no desire to allow the Arab world an opportunity to 
associate American arms and assistance with Israeli aggression. And while Israel enjoyed the 
power it could project, it had lost virtually all of its support from Europe and the non-aligned 
world. This added a certain credibility to Kissinger’s threat.
Such was Israel’s strategy: stay armed to the teeth  and never preempt an attack that 
would not occur. It was a bizarre defense posture that m atched a profound misreading of Arab 
intentions.113 Sadat, as the world was about to find out, was not Nasser; he and his allies wanted 
only to regain the occupied territories. The cherished notion of destroying Israel had, for all 
intents and purposes, died on the Arab airfields on June 5,1967. In  O ctober of 1973, they were 
fighting for their own dignity, something they feared would be lost forever if they recognized 
Israel while it occupied Arab lands. The military historian Lawrence L. W hetten  surveyed the 
situation:
If in  fact the war was w aged from the Arab side, as was alleged, on ly for the recovery o f  Arab  
honor and lost territories, then  Israel was fighting m erely for land it had b een  attem pting to  
exchan ge for security for the past five years. In this case Israel fought the w rong war, at the 
wrong time, for the wrong aim s.114
But it was the false sense of security afforded by the occupied territories tha t prevailed over a
112Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974), 460.
U3The CIA, for that matter did not do much to counter Israeli prejudices. American  
investigations into the failure of the CIA to predict the Arab attack yielded this embarrassing passage from a 
1971 CIA handbook: “Arabs lack the necessary physical and cultural qualities for performing effective 
military services." Cited in Village Voice, “The Select Com m ittee’s Investigative Record -  The Middle East 
War: the System Breaks D ow n,” 16 February 1976.
U4Lawrence L. W hetten, The Canal War: Four-Power Conflict in the Middle East (Cambridge: 
The MIT Press, 1974), 278.
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political understanding of the conflict. Yitzhak Rabin wrote an article in Ma'ariv on July 13,
1973 explaining Israel’s strategy:
Our present defense lines give us a decisive advantage in  the Arab-Israeli balance o f  strength. 
T h ere is n o  n eed  to mobilize our forces w henever we hear Arab threats, or w hen  the en em y  
con centrates his forces along the cease-fire lines. Before the S ix  D ay W ar, any m ovem en t o f  
Egyptian forces in to  Sinai w ould com pel Israel to m obilize reserves on  a large scale. Today, there 
is no n eed  for su ch  m obilization so long as Israel’s defense line extend s along the Suez C anal.115
“The concept,” as Israel’s defense posture was simply nicknamed, held that Syria would 
not attack from the north without a simultaneous Egyptian attack from the south. It was a 
reasonable assumption given tha t neither Arab army could m atch the full deployment of the 
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) - and one that ultimately proved true on O ctober 6,1973. But the 
problem with “the concept” was that it assumed that Egypt would only attack with a superior air 
force. This meant that, with the introduction of the F-4 Phantom  to the Middle East arms race, 
Israel discounted the possibility of a two-front war, and accordingly, reduced its annual reserves 
call-up from two to one m onth.116 Israel compounded its faulty strategic considerations with an 
operational blunder tha t ultimately compelled the United States to airlift supplied to Israel 
during the Yom Kippur War. Elmo Zumwalt, Jr. Chief of U.S. Naval Operations, observed: 
“Israel always had assumed it would defeat the Arabs in  a num ber of days, and it had stocked 
military ‘consumables’ -  ammunition, spare parts, all the things tha t get used up fast -  on that 
basis.”117
Ian Black and Benny Morris made the useful distinction between political and statistical 
intelligence: “Knowing the Arab war plan or plans was one thing; believing that the Arabs
115Yitzhak Rabin, as cited in Eban, A n  Autobiography. 488-489.
116United States, Department of the Army, Israel: A  Country Study. 260.
117Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., O n Watch: A  Memoir (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1976), 432.
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cost an average of $ 10 million but also forced the country into a virtually frozen state. The IDF’s
citizen-soldiers comprised both a bulk of the army and a fair size of the country's labor force.
W hile the “crying wolf’ theory holds up generally, it fails to explain several unusual
situations that had occurred in the first days of O ctober 1973. O n  October 3, three days before
the war began, the Soviet Union m ounted a major evacuation of its nationals from Egypt,
civilian and military alike. Israel assured the United States tha t the move was yet another
rupture in Soviet-Arab relations. As Alexander George, an expert on international relations,
noted, “Nothing in the available record indicates that Kissinger considered asking the Soviets
why they were taking their citizens out of Egypt and Syria and w hether they expected war.”122
Moscow wanted to get its people out of the way of a massive Arab troop concentration preparing
for war. Golda Meir recounted in her memoirs that the deployments -  in fact the largest ever
assembled on Israel's borders -  were regarded as no reason for concern. “Nobody,” he recalled,
“at the [Monday, O ctober 3 intelligence] meeting thought tha t it was necessary to call up the
reserves, and nobody thought tha t war was imminent.”123
The CIA essentially parroted Mossad’s interpretation of the Arab concentrations. Nixon
recounted, “The news of the imminent attack took us completely by surprise.”124 Kissinger went
one step further in his O ctober 12 news conference, where he basically heaped all of the blame
on the CIA, thus excusing himself entirely:
W e asked our ow n  intelligence as w ell as Israeli in telligence, o n  three separate occasions during 
the w eek  prior to the outbreak o f  hostilities to give us their assessm ent o f  w hat m ight happen.
122Alexander L. George, “The Arab-Israeli War o f October, 1973: Origins and Impact,” in 
Alexander L. George, et. al., Managing U.S.—Soviet Rivalry: Problems o f Crisis Prevention (Boulder: 
W estview Press, 1983), 147.
123Golda Meir, Mv Life (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1975), 422..
124Richard M. N ixon, RN: The Memoirs o f Richard N ixon . 2d ed. (New  York: Simon &
Schuster, 1990), 920.
T h ere was the unanim ous view  that hostilities were unlikely to the point o f  there being n o  
ch an ce o f  it happen ing.125
Nixon wrote in his memoirs that he was disappointed in the CIA. A  more accurate account
would have included a note tha t the CIA, in turn, was disappointed in the W hite House.126
Israel experienced bureaucratic shortcomings of its own. Michael Brecher observed that Abba
Eban’s influence before and during the Yom Kippur W ar had significantly diminished from his
central role in the Six Day W ar.127 Eban’s jurisdiction in 1973 was the UN; for matters of
national security, Eban’s political gifts were relegated to the periphery. His reduced capacity was
indicative, in fact, of a larger intelligence problem in the United States. As Yitzhak Rabin
recalled, “Nixon believed that national leaders should maintain direct and regular contacts
without going through their respective foreign ministries.”128
In short, Nixon, and of course Kissinger, disdained bureaucracies and they paid the price
for it when the Arabs launched their surprise attack on October 6. In  a damning article, Ray S.
Cline, Director of Intelligence and Research at the State Departm ent from 1969-1973, called
the National Security Council an “empty shell” under Nixon and claimed that had Kissinger
bothered to ask Cline of the State D epartm ent’s assessment of the Arab buildup, he would have
told the new Secretary of State that the chance of a war erupting from O ctober 4 onward were
“better than even.”129 Congress had long complained that Kissinger’s immunity from
l25United States, Department o f State, Bulletin No. 1792 (1973), 534.
126See Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy 2d ed. (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1989), 176-193, for an excellent account o f the strained relations between the W hite 
House and the CIA. Jeffreys-Jones contended that N ixon  and Kissinger politicized intelligence for their 
own gain, which crippled the CIA’s ability to influence policy and guard against surprises.
Brecher, “Eban and Israeli Foreign Policy: Diplomacy, War, and Disengagement,” in  Craig and 
Loewenheim, The Diplomats: 1939-1979, 418.
128Rabin, T he Rabin Memoirs, 154.
129R ayS. Cline, “Policy W ithout Intelligence.” Foreien Policy 17 (W inter 1974-75), 132-133.
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Congressional inquiry -  which he cherished and fought to protect -  as N ixon’s National Security
Adviser had become a danger to American democracy and security.130 If Cline’s charges are to
be believed, Kissinger’s self-imposed insulation as Secretary of State raised im portant questions
of Constitutional propriety. John Lewis Gaddis concluded,
Bureaucracy, properly used, can  m onitor disparate and com plex even ts w ithout 
oversim plification, advise ahead o f  time o f  approaching dangers, and thus reduce the chances  
o f  being caught o ff  guard. A  major liability o f  the N ixon-K issinger adm inistrative style was that 
it virtually precluded using the bureaucracy in that w ay.131
The location of American and Israeli principals at the time of the Arab attack 
underscores just how off guard the two countries found themselves. Richard Nixon, Henry 
Kissinger, Gold Meir, Abba Eban, and Israeli Ambassador to the United States Simcha Dinitz, 
were all away from their command posts on the morning of O ctober 6 .132 It was the ultimate 
victory for Sadat’s long game of disinformation. William Bundy observed, “Essentially Sadat took 
advantage of a failure of imagination as m uch in Israel as in W ashington.”133 Having achieved 
his major pre-war objective, Sadat ordered his troops to cross the Suez Canal at 2:00 p.m., in 
coordination with a massive Syrian forward thrust on the Golan Heights.
130 See, for example, United States, Congress, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings: 
National Security A ct Am endm ent (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), 122-123.
131]ohn Lewis Gaddis, Strategies o f Containment: A  Critical Appraisal o f Postwar American 
National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 334-
132T.G. Fraser, T he U S A  and the Middle East Since World War II (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1989), 99.
133W illiam Bundy, A  Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in  the N ixon Presidency (New  
York: Hill and W ang, 1998), 434.
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The Eruption: A  Different Kind of Middle East W at
“W e won the war,” Golda Meir wrote in her memoirs.134 The statem ent is among the best 
evidence that Israel did not win the Yom Kippur War. O ne would be hard pressed to find an 
Israeli leader make a similar claim about the Six Day War; it is no t necessary to insist upon 
something that is self-evident.
This is not to say that Israel lost the war, either. Israel stayed on the offensive from 
October 15 to O ctober 28, rejuvenated by an enormous American resupply effort until all 
fighting was halted. By the end of the war, the IDF was in position to strike and occupy Cairo 
and Damascus -  a show of brute force even greater than the blitzkrieg of the Six Day W ar, and 
restrained only by superpower intervention. But Israel, in any event, lost the war, for two 
reasons. First, the Arabs’ surprise attack demonstrated that the occupied territories were a 
strategic liability, not the crucial buffer zones Israeli leaders claimed them  to be. In effect, Israel’s 
entire defensive stance since the Six Day W ar was turned on its head. Second, the Arab 
victories of the first week of fighting shattered Israel’s invincibility myth, which restored some 
of the dignity the Arabs had lost in June of 1967.135 Egypt’s gains ultimately set in motion the 
normalized relations between these two bitter enemies in later years. For this reason, those who 
view the Yom Kippur W ar in technical terms -  as a tactical Israeli victory -  diminish its larger 
diplomatic significance.
O f course, none of this was apparent on the morning of October 6. Henry Kissinger was 
asleep in his suite at the Waldorf-Astoria in M anhattan when Joseph Sisco, the Assistant
l34Meir, Mv Life. 420.
135Burton I. Kaufman, The Middle East and the United States: Inter-Arab Rivalry and 
Superpower Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 87.
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Secretary of State, shook him awake to warn of an imminent outbreak of hostilities in the Middle 
East. The groggy, and thoroughly perturbed, Secretary of State had no idea which side had 
initiated the crisis, and so he immediately began to  work the phones, informing the Israelis, 
Arabs, and Soviets that the United States strongly disapproved of any preemptive actions.136 
Golda Meir was well aware of the likely American reaction to any preemptive strike. Against 
the advice of her military advisers, Meir declared, “I know all the arguments in favor of a 
preemptive strike, but I am against it. W e don’t know now, any of us, what the future will hold, 
but there is always the possibility that we will need help, and if we strike first, we will get nothing 
from anyone.”137 The Prime Minister’s decision was a prudent one from a political standpoint, 
but strategically moot. O n the Sinai front, the Egyptians and Soviets had amassed one of the 
most fortified air defense systems in the world, complete w ith the latest surface-to-air missile 
(SAM) technology and aircraft housed in bomb-proof hangars. There was to be no repeat of the 
June 1967 debacle. As Lawrence W hetten  noted, the missiles and fortifications “combined to 
make an effective Israeli preemptive attack impossible.”138
Meanwhile, the outbreak ofwar had not ended W ashington’s intelligence blunder. Two 
hours after the Arab attack, the CIA remained convinced tha t Israel fired first.139 Secretary of 
Defense James Schlesinger insisted, “I just don’t see any motive on the Egyptian-Syrian side.”140 
The reality of the situation, however, quickly became apparent, and the Arab advances were 
transforming American strategy as the Israelis endured a severe beating. A t first, Nixon and
136Henry A . Kissinger, Crisis: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 2003), 18-19.
137Meir, Mv Life, 426.
138W hetten, The Canal W ar. 274.
139Quandt, Peace Process. 152.
James Schlesinger, as cited in Kissinger, Crisis, 34.
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everyone else in W ashington assumed that the Israelis would deliver another decisive knockout. 
The president believed tha t the likely outcome would be yet another setback to diplomacy. He 
told Kissinger, “The one thing we have to be concerned about...is tha t the Israelis, when they 
finish clobbering the Egyptians and Syrians, which they will do, will be even more impossible to 
deal with than before....”141 Nixon’s statem ent speaks clearly to the fact tha t his acceptance, and 
encouragement, of Israeli hegemony centered on his confidence in Israel’s deterrent 
effectiveness. He and Kissinger did not want a negotiated settlem ent any less than the State 
Department; they simply remained convinced that no such breakthrough was forthcoming. T hat 
is why the initial Arab victories, once they became apparent, came as welcome news to the 
W hite House.
The prevailing rationale was quickly transformed from staunch support of Israeli strength 
to quiet desire to let the Israelis suffer at the hands of the exhilarated Arabs. Nixon recalled: “I 
believed that a battlefield stalemate would provide the foundation on which fruitful negotiations 
might begin.”142 Marvin and Bernard Kalb elaborate on Kissinger’s fundamental agreement with 
Nixon’s strategy:
From the earliest days o f  the war, it had never b een  Kissinger’s policy to  encourage the Israelis 
to w in another decisive victory, such  as they had w on  in 1967. S u ch  a victory w ould  n o t buy  
peace, but rather create tensions that would trigger still another war. Besides, Kissinger believed  
that in  the current diplom atic clim ate, a clear-cut Israeli victory w ould  contribute to a further 
isolation o f  Israel, and, g iven  A m erica’s close ties to the Jewish state, encourage a new  wave o f  
anti-A m ericanism  in the M iddle East.143
The fact that neither side wanted a cease-fire in the first days of fighting suited the
141 Richard N ixon, as cited in Kissinger, Years o f Upheaval. 490.
142N ixon, RN, 921.
143Kalb and Kalb, Kissinger. 487. Kissinger spelled out this line o f reasoning in both his October 
12 and October 25 news conferences. See United States, Department o f  State, Bulletin N o. 1792 (1973), 
539 and United States, Department of State, Bulletin N o. 1794 (1973), 585.
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NixoivKissinger strategy quite nicely. The Security Council m et four times in the first week of
fighting to no effect; the Arabs were enjoying their victories over Israel for the first time, and
Israel, in a sort of national shell shock, was unwilling to accept a cease-fire with Arab armies
planted in the occupied territories. Both the Arabs and Israelis counted on victory -  neither
wanted the UN to spoil their chances.144
Three days into the war, Israel began to understand its dire position, thus overcoming
its faulty strategy of five years in a m atter of days. Abba Eban explained:
For several years the exp ectation  had b een  that if  war broke ou t at all, it w ould  be swiftly ended  
by the superiority o f  Israeli arms. T h e idea that Israel w ould n o t be able to deal the Arabs a fatal 
blow w ith  its existing w eaponry had n ot entered  an yone’s h ead .145
By October 9, Israel had already depleted large portions of its stocks in every category: planes,
tanks, bombs, ammunition, even guns. Ambassador Simcha Dinitz informed Kissinger that
Golda Meir was willing to come to the United States herself to underscore how badly Israel
needed a major American resupply. Kissinger rejected the proposal immediately without asking
N ixon.146 He reasoned:
S uch  a proposal cou ld  reflect only either hysteria or blackm ail. A  visit w ould  take G olda away 
from Israel for a m inim um  o f  thirty-six hours. Leaving w hile a major battle was going on  would  
be a sign o f  such panic that it m ight bring in all the Arab states still on  the sidelines.147
To Kissinger’s likely chagrin, N ixon authorized El A1 (Israel’s commercial jet fleet) to pick up
Sidewinder missiles and ammunition. Compared to the Soviet airlift -  carried out by the Soviets
144Thomas A . Bryson, American Diplomatic Relations with the Middle East. 1784-1975: A  
Survey (M etuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1977), 267.
145Eban, A n  Autobiography. 512.
146It was a pattern Kissinger followed throughout the war. N ixon ’s troubles with the Watergate 
scandal were worsening by the day, consuming nearly all o f his attention. Kissinger essentially directed 
United States foreign policy on  his own.
147Kissinger, Years of Upheaval. 493.
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themselves -  the American supply was modest.148 Thus began a major American-Israeli 
disagreement tha t would last the course of the war. The Israelis pushed the idea that a major, 
and immediate, resupply effort ought to have been as attractive to the Americans as it was to 
them. Golda Meir’s O ctober 8 request for a major shipment of F-4 Phantoms implored: “The 
aims of our fighting are absolutely clear to you. It is our objective that the heavy blows we will 
strike at the invaders will deprive them of any appetite they will have for any future assault.”149
Meir’s line of reasoning likely would have gained favor in the W hite House before the 
Yom Kippur W ar. But she was advocating the benefits of a strong deterrent effect -  for which 
the Phantoms played a crucial role -  after deterrence had plainly failed in preventing the outbreak of 
war. The Israeli Prime Minister could not grasp how and why the Arabs’ successful attack was 
quickly producing a revolution in American policy, a fact that was emphasized by a statem ent 
she made at an O ctober 13 news conference: “You cannot imagine what would have happened 
to us had we moved back to the June 4, 1967 lines, when this attack on us took place.”150 In 
fact, what Meir herself could not imagine, was that the Yom Kippur W ar was not a war of 
annihilation like the Six Day War.
The Airlift: Anatomy of a Showdown
Israel’s struggle to obtain war materiel from its unwilling patron reintroduced a basic policy 
argument tha t had been going on from the time of Israel’s birth to the beginning of the Yom 
Kippur War: did a strong Israel facilitate or hinder United States interests in the Middle East?
148Bundy, A  Tangled Web. 435.
149Golda Meir, as cited in Kissinger, Crisis. 123.
150Golda Meir, as cited M ichael Brecher, Decisions in Crisis: Israel. 1967 and 1973 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1980), 175.
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There never existed any consensus in the debate, and domestic pressures had always added an 
element that resisted objective strategic considerations. In the Trum an and Eisenhower 
administrations, Israel was perceived as more of a threat to Arab-American relations than as an 
ally in the Cold W ar. Over the course of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, United 
States policy slowly shifted to emphasize the latter of these two considerations. After the Six 
Day W ar polarized the radical Arab states and Israel along Cold W ar lines, Nixon moved to 
accelerate a trend largely begun with Kennedy’s Hawk sale to Israel in 1962.
The fact tha t Israel needed arms so early and so desperately in  the fighting was itself an 
intelligence failure: the Israelis simply misread their enemies. A nd when they could not 
understand W ashington’s hesitation in uncritically supplying them  with any and every weapon 
they had requested, the Israelis had come to misread their own Great Power patron. For four 
years, Israel nurtured the fantasy tha t their Cold W ar role in the N ixon Doctrine existed 
independent of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It did not. Nixon and Kissinger correctly perceived 
within a few days of the fighting that a new opportunity had arisen. If the Arabs could use 
Soviet weapons to force the Israelis to the negotiation table (and in doing so regaining the honor 
they had lost in the June 1967 debacle), they would likely negotiate under American auspices, 
simply because no other country could exert significant pressure on Israel. In short, the Middle 
East version of the Nixon Doctrine supported Israel at the exclusion of the Arabs out of 
necessity, no t choice. The Yom Kippur W ar presented the W hite House with the first possibility 
of encompassing an Arab-Israeli settlem ent while excluding the Soviets. It was not an 
opportunity to be missed.
A n examination into the details of the delay in the airlift invariably pits Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger against Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. In imploring Kissinger
178
to begin Israel’s urgently needed airlift, Israeli Ambassador Dinitz would hear of bureaucratic foot 
dragging at the Pentagon, logistical concerns, and Schlesinger’s “pro-Arab” concern that a direct 
American airlift would trigger an Arab oil embargo. Schlesinger countered that the delay was 
part of Kissinger’s Machiavellian design; the Secretary of Defense claimed to do what he was 
told.
Leonard Garment, an aide to Nixon, observed, “to this day I am not sure who was 
primarily responsible.”151 Essentially, it is a fruitless task to blame one at the expense of the 
other, unless one is looking to make a character judgement.152 In  the first place, as Edward N. 
Luttwack and W alter Laqueur have pointed out, m uch of the diplomacy conducted during the 
airlift episode was communicated verbally; what was recorded was done so selectively for the 
simple fact tha t individuals wanted history to judge them  favorably.153 Second, and more 
important, whatever the details of who was responsible for what, both  Kissinger and Schlesinger, 
and the institutions they represented, had reason to be less than  enthusiastic about a major 
American airlift. They might have shifted blame between each other, bu t this does not mean 
that Kissinger’s grand schemes or Schlesinger’s bureaucratic logjams had to be mutually 
exclusive.
There is no doubt that Schlesinger had serious reservations about a resupply. W alter 
Isaacson paraphrased his comments during one strategy session early in the war: Schlesinger
warned that a major rearming o f  Israel, especially if it h elped  turn the war around, w ould poison
A m erica’s relations w ith  the Arabs. There was a d istinction , he argued, b etw een  defending
15 ̂ o n a r d  Garment, Crazy Rhythm (New York: Random House, 1997), 196.
See W alter Isaacson, Kissinger. 811, N ote 3, for a useful survey o f  the divergent accounts.
W hat is clear is that negative portrayals o f  Kissinger in general tend to focus on  the “M achiavellian” angle 
of which the airlift delay is cited as one o f many examples.
153Edward N . Luttwack and Walter Laqueur, “Kissinger & the Yom Kippur W ar,” Commentary, 
(September 1974), 33.
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Israel’s survival and defending its right to keep control o f  the occu p ied  territories it had taken  
during the S ix  D ay W ar o f  196 7 .154
The Kalbs’ account (written in cooperation with Kissinger) portrayed Schlesinger as being
excessively concerned tha t an airlift might cause an Arab oil embargo. It is a plausible assertion
in that one of the Defense Secretary’s many responsibilities is to ensure that United States forces
have adequate supplies of fuel. In fact, the ensuing Arab oil embargo did have a detrimental
impact on the military’s global maneuverability. Additionally, Schlesinger may have felt
compelled to be especially cautious with oil politics to compensate for Kissinger’s lack of concern
on that subject.155
Schlesinger’s own account of the airlift (which Nixon himself finally ordered for October
13) lacks any regard for Israel’s own fortunes. His discussion of the airlift in the Defense
Department annual report of 1975 focused on the airlift as a symbol of American capabilities to
project force elsewhere:
A  dependable U .S . capability to deliver large scale reinforcem ents to Europe quickly in an 
em ergency cou ld  n ot on ly be decisive in  preventing a N A T O  defeat, it cou ld  also be decisive in  
deterring the attack in  the first place. Indeed, I can  think o f  no m ore im pressive a deterrent to  
a W arsaw  Pact attack  o n  N A T O  than a clearly dem onstrable U .S . capability to put down in 
Europe a fully-equipped com bat-ready division (including its supporting forces) every few days,156
Schlesinger repeated his reasoning twenty five years later in  a symposium on the 1973 war:
A m ong major equipm ent item s, we flew four M -60  tanks to Israel. G iven  the im m ense w eight 
o f the tank, that was all w e cou ld  put o n  a C -5 A  [transport p lan e]. It was logistically insane, but 
psychologically and sym bolically it was important. W e w anted  to dem onstrate that we cou ld  fly 
tanks to  Israel. 157
154Walter Issacson, Kissinger, 518.
I55Kissinger once remarked to his aides, "Don't talk to me about barrels o f oil. They might as well 
be bottles o f Coca-Cola. I don't understand!” Henry Kissinger, as cited in Yergin, The Prize. 613.
156James Schlesinger, as cited in United States, Department o f  Defense, Annual Defense 
Department Report. FY 1975 (W ashington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), 157-158.
157James Schlesinger, as cited in Richard B. Parker, ed., The October War: A  Retrospective 
(Gainesville: University Press o f Florida, 2001), 158.
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Given his stated concern for an oil embargo, it is not improbable to deduce from these 
statements tha t had Schlesinger failed to see the benefits of the airlift which had nothing to do 
with Israel, he would have remained opposed to it by employing whatever stalling tactics were 
available to him.
A lthough Israeli Ambassador Dinitz placed a majority of the blame for the airlift delay 
on Schlesinger, his recounting of Kissinger’s strategy makes clear that Kissinger saw weapons 
transfers as a tool to calibrate the outcome of the war in a way favorable to him. Dinitz quoted 
Kissinger:
Egypt should  suffer the consequences o f  its attack en ou gh  to realize that war does n ot pay, and  
that alliance w ith  the S ov iet U n ion  does n ot assure security; but Egypt should  n ot be destroyed  
and Sadat should  n ot be hum iliated so that h e cou ld  be a party to  the negotiations that w ould  
follow the war under A m erican  gu idan ce.158
W alter Isaacson quoted a more explicit statem ent by Kissinger at the beginning of the conflict:
“The best result would be if Israel came out a little ahead but got bloodied in the process, and
if the U.S. stayed clean.”159 This unseemly statem ent supports Admiral Elmo Zumwalt’s charge
that Kissinger deliberately ordered Schlesinger to stall in the name of the president. Zumwalt,
no great fan of Kissinger, wrote: “He did not scruple to deceive his allies or besmirch the
reputation of his colleagues.”160 James Reston, the venerable New York Times columnist, based
his famous “Hidden Compromise” editorial on the notion tha t because the Arabs have the
manpower for an attritional war and Israel does not, then  a selective airlift could be used to
effectively intensify Israeli dependence on the wishes of Kissinger and Nixon.161
158Simcha Dinitz, as cited in P.R. Kumaraswamy, Revisiting the Yom Kippur War (London: Frank 
Cass Publishing, 2000), 113-114.
159Issacson, Kissinger. 514.
160Elmo Zumwalt, as cited in Ambrose, N ixon, Volume Three, 234-
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In sum, the significance of the airlift delay lies not in who was responsible for it, but in 
the fact that there was a general consensus that Israel should be denied the means to defeat and 
demoralize the Arabs again -  which the Israelis surely would have done if given the opportunity. 
Such widespread agreement on this policy was a rarity in  W ashington in those days. While the 
airlift delay may have placed an excessive burden on Israel, no American policymakers were 
prepared to see it destroyed, either. T hat would have been as m uch a disaster for American 
policy as another smashing Israeli victory. The airlift provided an example of basic Cold W ar 
strategy: Soviet arms must no t defeat American arms in battle. T h a t is the reason that 
W ashington quickly assembled one of the largest airlifts in history when it believed the time was 
right.162
The first issue impeding the airlift did not even involve the problems tha t would result 
in a direct airlift of American planes to Israel. Golda Meir’s O ctober 10 letter to Nixon did not 
hide her panic: “I know that in this hour of dire need to Israel I could turn  to you and count on 
your deep sympathy and understanding.”163 Schlesinger apparently wanted to do anything he 
could not to offend the Arabs. He opposed the idea of El A1 planes loading supplies at American 
military bases. He finally agreed after Kissinger absurdly suggested tha t the tail markings could 
be painted over, obscuring the Star of David that makes El A1 the unmistakable airline of the 
Jewish state.
Kissinger’s spray paint solution hardly made him a hero of the Israeli war effort. By 
October 12 Israel had contemplated two unthinkable scenarios: a military defeat at Arab hands;
162Quandt, Peace Process. 163.
163Golda Meir, as cited in N ixon, RN, 924.
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and the threat, or even use of nuclear weapons (if indeed Israel had a deliverable capability).164 
Schlesinger later recalled, “As Israel began to fall apart Henry began to fall apart.”165 If the 
charge was true, Kissinger had not yet lost his sense of geopolicy. Even though the El A1 
passenger fleet could not possibly handle Israel’s resupply needs, Kissinger remained opposed to 
American planes flying directly to Israel. In essence, Schlesinger’s own hesitation centering on 
an Arab oil embargo, dovetailed conveniently with Kissinger’s own concern of a Soviet response 
and erosion of detente.
Kissinger suggested that the United States charter commercial transports to Israel -  that 
way, he assumed, Israel could be saved while the United Stats could stay “clean.” The problem 
with this plan was tha t no sane charter executive had any inclination to fly into a war zone. 
Kissinger deviously told Ambassador Dinitz that the charter plan was being held up by Pentagon 
foot dragging -  in actuality the foot dragging was his own.
The following day, O ctober 13, Nixon realized that the charter scheme -  even if it had 
worked -  would look no different to a hostile Arab world than a direct airlift. A t a strategy 
meeting, the president decided that the airlift delay could go on no longer. He yelled, “Do it 
now! ” And so, a week after the war had erupted, the airlift got underway in full force. American 
C-130s and the even larger C '5  A transport planes began landing in Israel that evening, loaded 
with materiel including the crucial F-4 Phantoms.
Nixon recalled the sheer immensity of the mission: it was “an operation bigger than  the 
Berlin airlift of 1948-49.”166 Although the Soviet airlift to the Arabs had to cover a much shorter
164Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally. 483.
165Issacson, Kissinger. 521.
,66N ixon, RN, 927-928.
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distance, and, of course, was not hindered by fears of an Arab oil embargo, the American airlift 
dwarfed Moscow’s, in  the category of efficiency. The Soviets flew a total 15,000 tons of materiel 
in 934 missions; the Americans boasted 22,395 tons in 566 missions.167 United States Air Force 
pilots often flew 28-hour round trips without relief, and the Israelis did not overlook the sacrifice. 
Colonel Donald R. Strombaugh, Commander of the airlift mission, named “Operation Nickel 
Grass,” received hundreds of letters from Israeli schoolchildren, one of which promised: “Thank 
you for helping us in our war. W hen you have a war we will help you.”168 The sight of the 
behem oth American transport planes flying over Tel Aviv prompted drivers to get out of their 
cars, cheering “God bless America!” It was the first time in the war that Golda Meir cried.
Israel’s rejoicing, however did not exactly stem from as clear and present a danger as its 
leaders had indicated to W ashington. The real meaning of Israel’s doomsday fears was rooted 
in the fact that after the first week of fighting, its defense abilities were in an unprecedented 
position: Israel did not know how much longer it could hold out against an enemy with a 
seemingly unlimited am ount of soldiers and a steady resupply from the Soviets.169 The 
American airlift did not “save” Israel in any real sense; rather, it saved Israel from the potential 
that the Arab armies would advance into Israel proper. As of October 13, there was no evidence 
to support Israel’s fears. Its forces were clearly fighting to retain the occupied territories. The 
airlift, thus, allowed Israel to go on the offensive almost immediately. N o longer constrained by 
the possibility of running out of crucial weapons stocks, the Israelis in short order set out to
167Figures cited in David A. Brown, “Israel Airlift Flights Underscore C-5 Rapid Deployment 
Capability,” Aviation Space W eek &  Technology, 10 December 1973.
168Cited in Chris J. Krisinger, “Operation N ickel Grass: Airlift in Support of National Policy,” 
Aerospace Power Journal (Spring 1989),
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accomplish W ashington’s desire to see American weapons prevail on the battlefield. In the 
American strategy, if the airlift triggered an oil embargo (which in fact it did), it would be a 
relatively small price to pay in the context of Cold W ar considerations.
In demanding an airlift, Nixon told Kissinger, “I t’s got to be the works. W hat I mean is, 
we are going to get blamed just as much for three planes as three hundred.”170 It was an astute 
observation, predicated on the belief that an Arab victory would immeasurably heighten Soviet 
prestige in the area. In this scenario, an oil embargo in the short-run -  largely seen in 
W ashington as a tactical, no t strategic, penalty against American support to Israel was preferable 
to what Kissinger called a “concomitant radicalization of the area.”171 The international affairs 
specialist Bernard Reich offered the best summary of American strategy in  Congressional 
testimony:
Israel’s fall w ould very likely increase S ov iet prestige and power in the M iddle East since the 
Russians h ave contributed  the know -how  and m a te r ie l to ach ieve the Arab victory. It would  
further w eak en  those m oderate Arab states, such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, w hose overthrow  
has b een  a stated goal o f  various guerilla and opposition m ovem ents w ith in  the Arab world and  
w ho would n o  longer be diverted from their aim by preoccupation  w ith  Israel.
It w ould  probably facilitate Arab radical pressures w hich  have b een  destabilizing factors 
in  the Persian Gulf. T h ese achievem ents w ould, in  turn, negatively  im pact o n  the U .S . effort 
to m aintain  regional stability and peace, on  A m erican  econ om ic interests, and on  the flow o f  oil 
to  the W e s t.172
In other words, the United States was glad to endure an oil embargo by its moderate Arab 
friends. A n embargo dictated by Soviet whim was unacceptable. A nd so once more Israel 
benefitted from W ashington’s Cold W ar concerns.
The Israelis were making better use of the airlift than perhaps W  ashington had intended.
170Richard N ixon, as cited in Issacson, Kissinger. 522.
171Kissinger, Years o f Upheaval. 531.
Bernard Reich, as cited in United States, Congress, Subcommittee on  the Near East and South 
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Attempting to keep Israel strong enough to defeat Soviet weapons, but not so strong as to 
humiliate Soviet clients proved to be a difficult balancing act. By O ctober 19, the Soviets, who 
urged the Syrians and Egyptians to accept a cease'fire when it became apparent that Israel would 
prevail with fresh American arms, were now beginning to panic themselves. Like Washington, 
the Soviet Union had come to fear that its position in the Middle East was under threat. Soviet 
Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin delivered a message from General Secretary 
Leonid Brezhnev urgently requesting that Kissinger come to Moscow on October 20. Nixon and 
Kissinger assumed tha t the Soviets could be dissuaded from taking drastic action (like a 
unilateral military intervention) if Kissinger heeded their request.
Kissinger received a bombshell en route to Moscow. Nixon transmitted to Brezhnev a 
note through the Soviet Embassy in Washington, which called for “a firm com mitment from 
both of us to devote our personal efforts toward achieving tha t goal [a final peace] and to 
provide the strong leadership which our respective friends in the area will find persuasive.”173 
Kissinger, by his own account, was “horrified.” In effect, N ixon was proposing a joint superpower 
effort to impose peace on the region. Kissinger quickly decided to pretend as if the note did not 
exist; he made no gesture toward its contents during his visit to Moscow. In doing so, Stephen 
Ambrose charged: “The opportunity was lost. W e cannot know if Nixon and Brezhnev could 
have made peace between Israel on the one hand, Egypt and Syria on the other. W e do know 
that because of Kissinger, the attem pt was not made.”174
But Kissinger did not attem pt to scuttle a final peace. He tried to prevent Nixon, in his 
distressed state, from throwing away four years of American strategy. O ctober 20, the day Nixon
173Kissinger, Years o f Upheaval. 547.
174Ambrose, N ixon. Volume Three. 247-r
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sent the note, came to be known in W atergate lore as the “Saturday Night Massacre,” when 
Nixon fired Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox. It was arguably the most tense day of N ixon’s 
presidency. He was looking for something, anything, to halt the im peachment process which by 
that point was approaching full steam. Apparently he thought tha t an imposed peace -  
something both  the Arabs and Israelis had bitterly opposed for the past five years -  could be 
accomplished with a partner who had never budged from advocating the radical Arab demand 
of withdrawal w ithout recognition or security guarantees. O n  top of all of this, Soviet and 
American arms were still engaged in a brutal proxy war tha t had showed no signs of abating.
Kissinger fulfilled his objectives in Moscow; he stalled. The UN passed Security Council 
Resolution 338, jointly supported by the United States and Soviet Union, which called for both 
sides to “terminate all military activity immediately...in the positions they now occupy.”175 The 
resolution was basically a sop to the Soviets, who could use it to demonstrate to their Arab 
clients the effectiveness of Soviet diplomacy. As W alter Isaacson noted, Kissinger’s goal “was 
to have step-by-step negotiations between the Arabs and the Israelis, with the U.S. serving as 
the middleman while the Soviets were relegated to the sidelines.”176 Kissinger’s stopover in Israel 
after Moscow revealed to him just how m uch the Israelis feared an imposed peace. The 
Secretary of State assured them  tha t no such thing would happen. If the cease-fire held, 
Kissinger surmised, he would begin his shuttle diplomacy almost immediately.
But the cease-fire had almost no effect on the war in the Sinai. William Q uandt wisely 
observed,
175United Nations. 2004. U .N . Security Council Resolutions. 1973. 
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It did n o t m atter w hich  side was technically  responsible for firing the first sh ot after the cease-fire 
was to  have gone in to  effect. W h at was clear was that Israeli forces were advancing beyond the 
O ctober 22 cease-fire lin es .177
The IDF succeeded in surrounding Egypt’s Third Army Division, which was not only the jewel
of the Egyptian military, but the only force that stood between advancing Israeli forces and an
undefended Cairo. During the night of October 23, Egypt sent in commando and infantry units
in a failed attem pt to break open an escape corridor for the Third Army. Michael Brecher has
contended that Egypt’s refusal to surrender the Third Army was welcomed by the Israeli military,
which used Arab resistance as a pretext to strengthen its grip on the battlefield.178 Israel refused
to allow rescue teams to provide water and medical assistance. Basically, Israel wanted to starve
the Egyptians into submission, to demonstrate their power over Egypt in any future negotiations.
Furthermore, as Ambassador Dinitz argued, Israel would refuse to release the Third Army until
it had dropped its weapons: “W e will not open up a pocket,” he told Kissinger, “and release an
army that has come to destroy us. It has never happened in the history of war."179
The situation was quickly escalating into the most dangerous crisis of the war. If the
Americans and Soviets agreed on one thing, it was this: Israel must no t be permitted to destroy
Egypt. From Moscow’s perspective, this could be the final blow to its credibility in the region,
since millions of dollars of arms, Soviet advisers, and staunch backing of Arab demands at the
UN could end with an Israeli occupation of Cairo. In W ashington’s view, a humiliating defeat
delivered to the Arabs would essentially render post-war diplomacy useless. The radical Arab
states would continue to demonstrate no inclination to recognize Israel, and worse, the pro-
177Quandt, Peace Process. 172.
178Brecher, Decisions in Crisis. 223-224.
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W estern Persian Gulf States would likely become more shrill and daring in their objections to
America’s Middle East policy.
The United States made clear to Israel in its opposition to further aggression. In a
lecture delivered in late 1974, former Defense Minister Moshe Dayan said:
T h e A m ericans, in  order to sm ooth  the way w ith  the Arabs, confronted  us w ith  an  ultim atum  
to the effect that, if  we w ould n ot enable the Third A rm y to  receive food and water, we w ould  
find ourselves in a political con flict w ith  them  [the A m ericans] .180
According to Bernard Reich, the United States threatened Israel tha t it “would supply the Third
Army themselves if Israel did not allow other means of relief.181
The Israelis believed that the Soviet Union was prepared to do the same. Abba Eban
explained why this action would bring tensions to a dangerously new level: “The Soviet Union
would then be physically involved in the war against Israel, and it would become necessary for
the United States to think long and hard about its own commitment to regional stability and to
Israel’s security.”182 Eban, of course, was referring to the one question American policymakers
hoped they would never have to ask themselves during a proxy conflict: is the situation worth
a nuclear confrontation?
A t 9:35 p.m., W ednesday October 24, Brezhnev issued a note which increased tensions
still further. Moscow wanted the United States to know tha t it would not passively accept
Israel’s actions. Ambassador Dobrynin read the note slowly over the phone to Kissinger to make
sure there was no confusion. Brezhnev intoned:
180Moshe Dayan, as cited in Draper, “The United States &  Israel,” Commentary, 30.
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I will say it straight that if you find it impossible to act jointly w ith  us in  this m atter, we should  
be faced w ith  the necessity  urgently to consider the question  o f  taking appropriate steps 
unilaterally. W e can n ot allow arbitrariness on  the part o f  Israel.183
Nixon later commented on the note: “It was very firm and...left very little to the imagination as
to what he [Brezhnev] intended.”184 Nixon wanted to convey the myth that he was active in
making policy during this latest episode of the crisis. He was not; the W atergate affair was
incapacitating him, and he stayed upstairs in his living quarters while Kissinger took full control
of the situation.185
In those tense late night hours, Brezhnev’s note was not taken lightly. United States 
intelligence had detected radioactive emissions emanating from a Soviet ship at Port Said, Egypt. 
This alarming news was interpreted at the strategy session tha t night as adding credibility to 
Brezhnev’s implied threat. A lthough the source of those emissions was never determined, it is 
unlikely that Moscow would have allowed the United States to detect nuclear material so close 
to the crisis area if its presence was unrelated to the conflict.
Kissinger understood at the time that Sadat proposed that a joint superpower force be 
sent in to resolve the Third Army crisis or, if necessary, a unilateral American deployment to 
accomplish the same thing. W hat Sadat did not want -  for the same reasons as Kissinger -  was 
a unilateral Soviet move, which could quickly explode into an Israeli-Soviet confrontation. Put 
another way, Sadat did not want a nuclear superpower and a regional (and allegedly nuclear) 
power confronting each other on Egyptian soil. Kissinger reasoned:
m The note is cited in Quandt, Peace Process, 173.
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If the S oviets sent troops, it w ould be unilaterally, w ithout the sanction  o f  either the host country  
or the U nited  N ations. This w ould be m uch easier for us to resist, and w e were determ ined to  
do so. It show ed -  though we could  only guess this at the m om ent -  that Sadat was staking his 
future on  A m erican  diplom atic support rather than S ov iet military pressure.186
Kissinger chose to focus on W ashington’s concerns over Soviet intentions at his news
conference following the crisis: “It is inconceivable tha t we should transplant the Great Power
rivalry into the Middle East, or, alternatively, that we should impose a military condominium by
the United States and the Soviet Union.”187
The United States expressed its opposition to the unilateral Soviet move by heightening
its worldwide military alert status to Defense Condition (DEFCON) III. DEFCON I is
maximum force readiness, or the alert status just before war. Kissinger defined DEFCON III:
it “increases readiness without the determination that war is likely; it is in practice the highest
stage of readiness for essentially peaceful conditions.”188 In other words, DEFCON III is the
most nuanced of the alert statuses: its function is to convey a stern message without causing the
opponent to panic.189 Coral Bell provided a useful characterization of Brezhnev’s note and the
DEFCON III response:
as an exchan ge o f  rather loud signals -  excessively loud, on e m ight hold, and thus unnecessarily  
abrasive to the nerves o f  the world. But they probably n eed ed  to  be loud, in  order to carry over  
certain  background noises, and to reach other ears other than  those o f  the A m erican  and 
Russian policym akers concerned , w ho were, o f  course, perfectly w ell able to com m unicate in  
whispers unless it was useful that others should hear.190
Indeed, the American response could not have been much louder, if Kissinger’s only intention
was sabre-rattling. Every United States command post around the world heightened its alert
186Kissinger, Crisis. 355.
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status, including the Strategic Arms Command, which spearheaded nuclear missions. Between 
fifty and sixty B-52 strategic bombers were transferred from Guam to the United States, the 
aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy moved W est across the M editerranean from the Straits of 
Gibralter, and the 82nd Airborne Division received orders to prepare for deployment.
All of those actions fit with Kissinger’s attitude toward crisis management. As Barry M. 
Blechman and Douglas M. H art noted, “Rather than matching Soviet actions ‘tit for ta t,’ the 
Secretary believed, it was necessary to do something more dramatic, something which would get 
the attention of Soviet decision makers because it was several times more alarming than their 
own action.”191
Kissinger wanted the Israelis to be as alarmed as the Soviets. Lawrence W hetten  argued 
that Kissinger’s threats were “aimed against Israel as much as they were aimed against the Soviet 
Union.”192 N ot only did W  ashington want Israel to understand the gravity of its insubordination, 
but Kissinger wanted to freeze the situation before Israel pushed the Egyptians back from the 
sliver of land west of the Suez Canal. This was the land they had won in their short-lived glory 
days of the war, before the American airlift turned the tide against them .193 Raymond Gartoff 
took this line of reasoning one step further. He interpreted the public meaning of Kissinger’s 
DEFCON III alert as an opportunity to demonstrate that the U nited States would not bow down 
before the Soviet ultimatum. The real use of the alert, Garthoff argues, was “as leverage in 
pressing the Israelis into stopping their advance -  and not because the Soviets wanted them to
191Barry M. Blechman and Douglas M. Hart, “Nuclear W eapons and the 1973 Middle East Crisis,” 
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stop, but because the United States wanted them to.”194 Garthoff dismissed Nixon’s “farfetched” 
reference to the Cuban Missile Crisis as a lame attem pt to characterize himself as a strong 
president capable of making the right choices in times of crisis.195 G arthoff s argument is all the 
more damning in light of a telephone conversation between Kissinger and Chief of Staff General 
Alexander M. Haig an hour after they had received Brezhnev’s O ctober 24 note. Kissinger 
wondered, “I don’t think they would have taken on a functioning president.” Haig replied, 
“They couldn’t.”196
The DEFCON III episode was certainly bizarre. Israel had received its harshest rebuke 
in the history of its relations with the United States, and from an administration that was its 
staunchest supporter. The DEFCON III alert proved to the Egyptians tha t American diplomacy 
could guarantee their wishes where Soviet weapons could not -  in effect, the alert crisis became 
the first stage in a quick resumption of diplomatic relations between Egypt and the United 
States. President Anwar Sadat proved to be a flexible and enthusiastic participant in Kissinger’s 
post-war shuttle diplomacy.
Israel, over a series of painful steps, began to accept the fact that its bitter enemy, Egypt, 
would come to yield its own considerable influence in W ashington. Shortly after the DEFCON 
III alert, Israel yielded to UN Security Council Resolution 340,197 permitted resupply of the Third 
Army and begrudgingly recognized Egypt’s military presence west of the Suez Canal. The 
situation was such that Egypt and Israel could sit down in the next few days for direct
194Garthoff, D etente and Confrontation. 384 [emphasis Garthoff s].
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negotiations, a first with an Arab nation in the history of the Jewish state.
It is to Kissinger’s credit that events turned out they way they did. A lthough the crisis 
did not nearly approach the danger of the Cuban Missile Crisis eleven years earlier, the Secretary 
of State, National Security Adviser, and for all intents and purposes, executor of United States 
foreign policy, took a nuclear gamble. As John Lewis Gaddis observed: “O ne resorted to 
escalation to prevent escalation, and so ran the risk, if the other side did not back down, of 
bringing about precisely what one had sought to avoid.”198
W hat of the implications of American actions for detente? If detente sought nothing 
more than to institutionalize a fundamental agreement between the superpowers -  that nuclear 
war was an unacceptable response to an ongoing Cold W ar -  how did the DEFCON III alert 
affect the detente? The paradox of the alert itself was that Kissinger sought to avoid nuclear war 
by threatening it. A n answer to this question must reflect the ambivalence of the alert strategy. 
The lead editorial in the October 26 edition of the Washington Post observed of the DEFCON 
III alert:
T h e result was, in  our view , perhaps the single m ost significant v in d ication  o f  the word ‘d eten te ,’ 
that m uch  abused word, w hich  the world has seen  to date. It was a v in dication  all the more 
valuable for preventing an extrem ely serious disruption o f  G reat Power relations.199
The corresponding editorial in the New York Times weighed in on the other side: the DEFCON
III alert served as a reminder of how
tenuous d eten te really is....If it is surm ounted successfully, the M iddle East W ar o f  1973 will have  
b een  useful as a rem inder o f  the reality ‘partners and adversaries’ really implies. S ince it is 
ev id en t that such  a relationship can  still be carried to the brink o f  nuclear war, the U n ited  
States, the S ov iet U n ion  and the world n eed  som ething better and m ore secure.200
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D etente, it seemed, existed very much in the eye of the beholder. If the choices of interpretation 
have the alert either as proof that detente either prevented nuclear war, or was a smokescreen 
that could not prevent the superpowers from approaching the brink, then  the wisest conclusion 
must lie somewhere in the middle.
If one clear lesson emerges from this convoluted episode, it is tha t whatever ambiguous 
effect the Yom Kippur W ar exerted over Soviet-American relations, those between the United 
States and Israel underwent a drastic change. American policies toward Israel in its early years 
had always taken Arab concerns into primary consideration. This framework had not 
disappeared by the time of N ixon’s first term; instead it was necessarily m uted in order to grapple 
with an intractable situation that underscored the fascinating relationship between force and 
diplomacy.
The Yom Kippur W ar abruptly offered United States policy the chance to contain the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, and in doing so, enlist both Egypt and Israel as anti-Communist friends in 
a bipolar, Cold W ar world. W ith  the Egyptians back in the Sinai and a shaken Israel stripped 
of its interwar hegemony, the stage was thus set for an American-brokered peace, which, in the 
Middle East theater, proved to be the most potent weapon in America’s Cold W ar arsenal.
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Chapter V
American Diplomacy at the Expense of the Soviets:
Kissinger’s Step-by-Step Approach to Managing the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict,
October 1973-January 1974
The end of the Yom Kippur W ar of October, 1973, produced a revolution in the political order 
at both the regional and global level. In the Middle East, Israel could no longer equate 
occupation of Arab territories (most notably the Sinai and the Golan Heights) with national 
security, as it had since the end of the Six Day W ar of June, 1967. Likewise, the Arabs, led by 
Egypt, demonstrated military prowess and a new political unity based on a common anti-Zionist 
platform. Though the Yom Kippur W ar was concluded technically as an Israeli victory, Egyptian 
President Anwar Sadat successfully executed the political objectives of his war aims; that is, he 
forced the Israelis to the negotiating table after a major and largely balanced military 
confrontation stripped Israel of its supposed regional invincibility.
As one theater of the global Cold W ar system, the Yom Kippur W ar demonstrated to 
the United States that stability along the eastern rim of the M editerranean could no longer be 
guaranteed by American-supported Israeli hegemony. Effective crisis management in the final 
days of the conflict achieved the twin American goals of avoiding nuclear war and ending the 
war as a stalemate, which, in turn, effectively diminished the relevancy of any Soviet 
involvement in postwar negotiations. In this sense, American crisis management assumed a 
strategic, as well as diplomatic, posture. By refusing to allow Moscow to unilaterally deploy 
troops to the Sinai (in the form of the DEFCON III nuclear alert), the U nited States 
simultaneously reduced the potential for Great Power conflict, and proved to Egypt that 
American-brokered diplomacy could maintain Arab security far more effectively than Soviet-
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brokered violence.
W hen the war ended, the Nixon administration’s Middle East foreign policy, largely 
formulated by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, redefined the U nited States vision of stability 
as a negotiated peace between adversaries willing to make the necessary concessions. Massive 
Soviet arms shipments enabled Egypt and Syria to m ount a successful surprise attack on October 
6, which produced exactly the opposite of Moscow’s wishes. As Malcolm H. Kerr, a scholar 
observed,
Since 1970, Sadat has b een  at hom e and abroad. It seem s to m e that Sadat’s launching o f  the 
O ctober W ar, and his diplom acy since then, can  b est be exp lained  in this light. T h e war gave 
him  a ch an ce to n egotiate in a way that h e cou ld  n o t do before, w ith  the tw in objectives o f  
settling o n  respectable terms w ith  Israel and loosening his d ep en dence on  the S ov iet U n io n .1
In the three months that followed the war, Kissinger’s extraordinary diplomatic efforts set in
motion a policy long in the making, yet requiring innovative means. Through the revolutionary
use of “shuttle diplomacy,” the relatively new U.S. Secretary of State effectively managed an
unforseen political-strategic situation in which the Soviet position was increasingly irrelevant.
A t its most basic criterion, detente was successful in preventing a nuclear conflict between the
superpowers, but this fact did not signal a new confluence of Soviet-American interests. The
Yom Kippur W ar allowed the United States the opportunity to redefine its regional influence
to encompass both  Israel and its Arab adversaries. By the time of the Egyptian-Israeli
disengagement on January 18 1974, American Middle East diplomacy, as embodied by Henry
Kissinger, was at its apex.
'Malcolm H. Kerr, as cited in United States, Congress, House, Com m ittee on Foreign Affairs, 
Hearings: The Middle East. 1974: N ew  Hopes. N ew  Challenges (W ashington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1974), 39.
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The American goal of stability in the Middle East was not affected by the course and
consequences of the Yom Kippur War. The Nixon Administration’s objective of regional
stability had remained unchanged; what the war revolutionized was the means necessary to
maintain it. President N ixon’s Foreign Policy Report to Congress of May 3, 1973, outlined the
basic American position regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although the United States
supported U.N. Security Council 242, which called for Israeli withdrawal of occupied territory
in exchange for peace, a real settlement could not come from without. Nixon wrote,
a solution  can n ot be im posed by the outside powers o n  unw illing governm ents. If we tried the 
parties w ould  feel n o  stake in  observing its terms, and the outside powers w ould be engaged  
indefinitely in  enforcing them . A  solution  can  last on ly if  th e parties com m it them selves to it 
directly. Serious negotiation  will be possible, how ever, on ly  if a decision  is m ade o n  each  side 
that the issues m ust be finally resolved by a negotiated  settlem en t rather than by the w eight or 
threat o f  force.2
In fact, Arab force was what finally pushed Israel into serious negotiations under the 242 rubric, 
where the diplomatic efforts of the American-sponsored Rogers plan and the U.N.-directed 
Jarring mission had failed before. Nixon, of course, could not foresee the Yom Kippur W ar in 
May 1973, but he understood tha t the war produced the necessary conditions for a settlement. 
Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy rested on the mutual willingness of the Egyptians and Israelis to 
negotiate in the wake of the fighting. In the quest to m aintain Middle Eastern stability, 
Kissinger’s diplomatic method did not attem pt to impose American interests on either side. The 
particularities of the disengagement, though hotly contested between Egypt and Israel, were 
minor in the American view so long as its two major objectives were maintained: that the United 
States was doing the mediating, and thus denying the Soviet U nion its regional prestige.
2Richard N ixon, as cited in Report to Congress. “U.S Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Shaping a 
Durable Peace,” (W ashington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), 136.
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In Kissinger’s view, American ascendancy in the region was of vital importance. By the
1970s, he argued, the Cold W ar order had matured from a Europe-centered bipolarity to a global
multipolarity in which “equally grave risks are likely to arise in trouble spots outside Europe.”3
W hen Kissinger wrote, “the challenge of the seventies will be to  forge unity with political
measures,” he was referring to the strains in the trans-Atlantic relationship, although, as his
diplomatic efforts after the Yom Kippur W ar illustrated, his sentim ent was realized most
dramatically in the Middle East.4 Shuttle diplomacy represented a synthesis of Kissinger’s global
perspectives: he devoted his greatest diplomatic efforts outside of Europe by means of a basic
shared objective of all concerned parties. In the framework of detente, Kissinger was afforded
greater latitude to negotiate a settlem ent between Egypt and Israel. Because the superpowers
maintained reduced tensions at the global level, the Secretary of State took full advantage of the
fact that Moscow would not precipitate another crisis during the shuttle diplomacy.
Kissinger’s position was formulated as a response to the consequences of the war. After
the Six Day W ar through September 1973, Israel’s leadership regarded its occupation of the
Arab territories as a superior guarantor of security over tha t of political concessions. Yitzhak
Rabin’s overview of the new geographic barriers afforded by territorial occupation reflected
Israel’s policy during the interwar period:
T h e present borders run along natural barriers: Egypt -  the Canal; Jordan -  the Jordan 
R iver...and w ith  Syria, there will n o  longer be a n eed  to clim b up m ountains. T h e distance from 
the Egyptian border to T e l A v iv  was on ce 130 kilom etres and only 8 0  kilom etres from the Gaza 
Strip. But the distance from our border o n  the C anal today to Cairo is on ly 130 kilom etres. T he  
distance from our border to Cairo was on ce som ething over 4 0 0  kilom etres. T oday the distance
3Henry Kissinger, American Foreign Policy. Expanded Edition (New York: W .W . Norton &  Co., 
1974), 67.
4Ibid., 71.
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from the Egyptian border on the Canal to Tel Aviv is 400 kilometres.5 
In other words, the Israeli leadership held tha t while security through political agreements was 
fleeting, a buffer zone carved from natural barriers was not. The great irony of the interwar 
period is that because the Arabs were forced to recognize Israel’s military strength (but never its 
sovereignty), the aims of the Yom Kippur W ar were decidedly more limited than  the strategy of 
annihilation in 1967. Sadat in 1973 was fighting to regain the Sinai, no t to destroy Israel. The 
Egyptian president went to war for a territory, the occupation of which Israel, ironically, 
presumed made war less likely. Thus, the outcome of the Yom Kippur W ar finally betrayed the 
untenable character of the Israeli position, thereby ensuring the beginning steps to negotiation 
through the auspices of Henry Kissinger. The United States would no longer have only one 
client in the region, which meant that Moscow would have trouble maintaining influence with 
Sadat, whose need for Soviet weapons was now significantly reduced.
The “war of attrition,” led by Egyptian President Gamel Nasser in 1969, falsely 
demonstrated to W ashington that Israel was immune from war. Sadat took advantage of Israel’s 
security policy, which had become lax during the six years of Israeli dominance. As one observer 
has argued, Sadat demonstrated that W ashington’s special relationship with Israel was not an 
effective deterrent to war -  on the contrary, the political nature of the Yom Kippur W ar was 
partially a function of the influence U.S. policy could potentially exert over Israel after the 
fighting.6 A t the launch of Yom Kippur W ar, which commenced with a massive bombardment 
on Israeli positions, the United States maintained the policy it had developed in the preceding
5Yitzhak Rabin, as cited in Michael Brecher, Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1975), 447.
6Leon T. Hadar, Quagmire: America in the Middle East (W ashington, D.C.: Cato Institute,
1992), 79.
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years should another general war begin.
The initial attack was apparent to the Israelis and Americans only hours before the first 
launch, at which point W ashington quickly moved to ensure the stalemate for which they had 
generally planned. The fighting demonstrated to both Egypt and Israel tha t neither could get 
everything it wanted. For the former, total defeat of Israel was impossible; for the latter, 
territorial occupation failed to maintain a shield from attack. Finally, for both, negotiations 
would supplant force as the key to their diminished objectives.7 As one specialist observed, only 
after the Yom Kippur W ar and the beginning of Kissinger’s mediation did both sides stop viewing 
their relations as a zero-sum game bound for “rigidity, fatalism and despair.”8
Yet the policy of shuttle diplomacy was not a spontaneous reaction to a surprise war, 
rather, its principles were put in place long before October 1973, when war was only a 
hypothetical possibility. As one scholar paraphrased U.S. policy in the pre-war period, “when 
and if hostilities between the two sides should again occur, it was crucial tha t they be ended on 
terms and under conditions that allowed, so far as possible, successful negotiations afterward.”9 
As the war unfolded, it was obvious to Kissinger that meaningful negotiations could only occur 
if the United States maintained a military stalemate, which in turn  required a carefully restrained 
arms flow to Israel that would ensure both its safety, yet deny another crushing defeat of the 
Arab nations, after which negotiations would be impossible.10 There has been much debate 
around the reason for the arms delay to Israel during the war, w ith Kissinger and Secretary of
7Nitza Nachmias, Transfer of Arms. Leverage, and Peace in the Middle East (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1988), 57.
8Nadav Safran, “Engagement in the Middle East,” Foreign Affairs 53 (October, 1974), 48.
9William Bundy, A  Tangled Web: The Making o f Foreign Policy in the N ixon  Presidency (New  
York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 442.
,0Ibid.
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Defense James Schlesinger sharing various portions of the blame, but what is important is that 
the decision to hold back arms deliveries -  irrespective of the bureaucratic, political, and 
strategic difficulties a massive arms airlift would engender -  was a deliberate expression of U.S. 
policy designed to ensure a military balance throughout the fighting.11 The Yom Kippur W ar 
thereby reduced Israel’s standing; it became one among several roughly equal players in the 
larger framework of American objectives in the Middle East. Israel, to be sure, received a 
massive amount of materiel throughout the war. But the staggering quantity and value of the 
airlift (so great that U.S. forces were actually in a diminished capacity due to  depleted weapons 
stocks) must be understood in the context of the Arabs’ own arms shipments of roughly equal 
value.12 T hat is, the airlift itself did not underscore the special character of the AmericanTsraeli 
relationship.
W hat was especially striking about the American steps toward a negotiated peace was 
that Kissinger was able secure political influence in Egypt only shortly after the United States 
had supplied its adversary. As one expert argued in terms of military support to its client, toward 
the end of the Yom Kippur W ar, “the United States had gained in influence in the Arab world 
at the very time tha t it was most supportive of Israel.” In his memoirs, N ixon observed that “for 
the first time in an Arab-Israeli conflict the United States conducted itself in a m anner that not 
only preserved but greatly enhanced our relations with the Arabs— even while we were massively 
resupplying the Israelis.”13
nJohn P. Miglietta, American Alliance Policy in the Middle East. 1945-1992: Iran. Israel, and 
Saudi Arabia (New York: Lanham Books, 2002), 141.
12Dale R. Tahtinen, The Arab-Israeli Military Balance Since October 1973 (W ashington, D.C.: 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1974), 32.
13Richard M. N ixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard N ixon . 2d ed. (New  York, Simon &  Schuster, 
1990), 941.
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A lthough the cease fire to end the Yom Kippur W ar was implemented on O ctober 22,
Israel had encircled Egypt’s Third Army, beyond which lay an undefended Cairo. O n  October
24, Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev sent a note to  President N ixon urging for a joint
superpower task force to maintain the cease fire. (This crisis period is examined in detail at the
end of chapters 2 and 3.) The United States responded with a DEFCON III world-wide military
alert -  an unambiguous signal to the Soviets that direct superpower intervention in  the region
was unacceptable. T he DEFCON alert was supposedly a strategy primarily designed as a form
of nuclear deterrence, in  which nuclear war would be avoided, ironically, by threatening it, as
W ashington believed that direct contact between superpower forces could expand into a general
war. Kissinger offered another reason that fits within the U.S. policy toward a negotiated
settlem ent on which shuttle diplomacy depended. He outlined the “what if ’ had Nixon
accepted the terms of Brezhnev’s note:
Either we w ould  be the tail to the S oviet k ite in a jo int power play against Israel, or we w ould  
end  up clash ing  w ith  Soviet forces in a country that was bound  to share S ov iet objectives 
regarding the cease fire or cou ld  n ot afford to be perceived  as opposing them . B ut the im pact 
w ould go far beyond Egypt. If Soviet forces appeared dram atically in Cairo w ith  those o f  the 
U n ited  S tates -  and ev en  m ore if they appeared alone -  our traditional friends am ong Arab  
m oderates w ould be profoundly unnerved...Egypt w ould be drawn back into the S oviet orbit, 
[and] the S ov iet U n ion  and its radical allies w ould em erge as the dom inant factor in  the M iddle 
E ast.14
Kissinger’s reasoning -  in light of recent studies tha t argue that the Soviet Union was 
totally unprepared for a military intervention -  provides a credible story for explaining U.S. 
interests.15 A  basic stalemate between Egypt and Israel emerged as the war neared its end. Both 
sides had trapped forces tha t were vulnerable to destruction, and U.S. policy, put in place since
l4Henry Kissinger, Crisis: The Anatom y o f  Two Major Foreign Policy Crises (New  York: Simon &  
Schuster, 2003), 348.
15See, for example, Viktor Levonovich Israelyan, Inside the Kremlin During the Yom Kippur War 
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 190; and Anatoly Dobrynin, In 
Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to Six Cold War Presidents (New York: Random House, 1995), 296.
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the beginning of the war, could now proceed as sole arbitrator between adversaries more or less 
equally in ten t on disengagement. As Malcolm H. Kerr noted, “It was the October W ar which 
enabled Sadat to come out as a certified leader of his people. It therefore enabled him to begin 
to talk about peace in a way not possible prior to that time.”16
Sadat’s political success rested on the fact tha t he forced the Israelis to make a stark 
decision, as one writer outlined, “between contested frontiers some distance from the main 
centers of Jewish population, and negotiated frontiers close to Israel’s heartland, with some form 
of external guarantee.”17 The contested frontiers no longer afforded Israel security, and the 
Prime Minister, Golda Meir, begrudgingly had little choice bu t to retool Israeli policy around 
negotiations with the United States as external guarantor.18 As the international relations 
expert Coral Bell described it, the cost for Israel to m aintain a defense of the occupied territories 
against com petent and concerted Arab forces would have been “intolerable.”19 Additionally, as 
I. William Zartman, a scholar, noted, Israel’s “military successes [at the end of the Yom Kippur 
War] had not been sufficient to make its neighbors sue for peace, and the more it conquered of 
their territory, the more it would be burdened with an unassimiliable Arab population.”20
Egypt recognized tha t Israel had no other options but to defer to Kissinger’s 
reorientation, which they turned to their advantage for political leverage tha t Soviet arms had
16Malcolm H. Kerr, as cited in United States, Congress, The Middle East. 1974: N ew  Hopes. N ew  
Challenges, 1974, 42.
17Sydney D. Bailey, “The Prospects for Real Peace,” in From Wars Toward Peace in the Arab- 
Israeli Conflict. 1969-1993, vol. 4, Ian. S. Lustick, ed., (New York: Garland Publishing, 1994), 337.
18Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), 509.
19Coral Bell, “The October Middle East War: A  Case Study in Crisis Management During 
D etente,” International Affairs 50 (October 1974), 541.
20I. W illiam Zartman, “Explaining Disengagement,” in Dynamics o f Third Party Intervention: 
Kissinger in the Middle East. leffrev Z. Rubin ed., (New York: Praeger, 1981), 149.
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failed to provide. Kissinger believed that it was precisely America’s special power -  not a 
sentimental connection -  over Israel that would oblige Egypt to follow American mediation 
toward a negotiated peace.21
Thus the stage was set for an American-sponsored settlem ent between two willing 
adversaries. Kissinger summarized U.S. policy throughout the war at a news conference on 
October 25 :
T hroughout the crisis the president was con vin ced  that w e had two major problems: first, to end  
hostilities as quickly as possible— but secondly, to  en d  hostilities in  a m anner that w ould enable 
us to make a major contribution  to rem oving the con d ition s that have produced four wars 
b etw een  Arabs and  Israelis in  the last 25 years.22
His statem ent was not totally truthful; the arms delays were primarily intended to induce a
stalemate, which would have had the opposite effect of ending the hostilities immediately.
Admitting this, however, would have been impolitic. In any regard, U.S. policy after the war was
sincerely aimed at solving the conflict once and for all. All parties, save the Soviet Union, would
benefit from the results. Near the end of the war, Moscow denounced Israeli aggression, which
was little more than a reflection on their own perceived irrelevance in  the region.23 Indeed, what
would soon be called “shuttle diplomacy” could just as well have been termed “solo diplomacy”
as Kissinger equated direct negotiations with the Arabs as the most effective way of shutting the
Soviets out of the conflict resolution framework.”24
Perhaps the greatest beneficiary of the ensuing negotiations was Kissinger himself, whose
21William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
Since 1967 (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1993), 184-185.
22Henry Kissinger, as cited in United States, Department o f State, Bulletin N o. 1794 (1973), 585.
23Galia Golan, Yom Kippur and After: The Soviet U nion and the Middle East Crisis (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1977), 147.
24A nn M. Lesch and D an Tschirgi, Origins and Developm ent of the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
(London: Greenwood Press, 1998), 26.
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decisions were always a unique mixture of Cold W ar Realpolitik and concern for personal glory 
that would be gained as supreme peacemaker of the Middle East. The W atergate scandal had 
reached a fever pitch by the end of October, and Nixon hoped tha t a successful Middle East 
settlement could offset his domestic woes. Kissinger benefitted from W atergate in two ways. 
First, a domestically weakened Nixon gave his Secretary of State unparalleled authority to 
represent United States foreign policy abroad.25 Second, Kissinger’s time spent flying all over the 
world to shore up support for American peace initiatives allowed him to distance himself from 
an administration that was coming apart at the seams.26 Kissinger grasped the opportunity with 
astonishing vigor. Golda Meir characterized Kissinger’s efforts as “superhuman;” he conducted 
shuttle diplomacy “as though he had never heard of the word ‘fatigue.’”27 The word that 
Kissinger did keep in mind, of course, was detente. Unbridled by the fear of Soviet nuclear 
blackmail, Kissinger was able to pursue his objectives in full force as described by Golda Meir. 
The impact that Kissinger’s diplomatic initiatives had on detente will be discussed shortly.
Opening Moves Toward Disengagement
O n Saturday, O ctober 27, the cease'fire was holding, and the DEFCON imbroglio between the 
superpowers had ended. Moscow refrained from a unilateral troop deployment and the Israeli 
military allowed a resupply of the Third Army -  all w ithout either superpower resorting to 
anything more than  bluffs and threats. Kissinger was thus able wrote to the Egyptian President 
to inquire about a proposed trip to Cairo on November 6. Sadat agreed not only to Kissinger’s 
overture but also to direct talks with the Israelis at the rank of major general at Kilometer 101
25Quandt, Peace Process. 183.
26Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence. 306.
27Golda Meir, My Life (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1975), 443.
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(on the Suez road where the Israelis were entrenched), which, as Kissinger noted, constituted 
“the first direct talks between Israeli and Arab representatives since the independence of 
Israel.”28 O n the following day Israeli and Egyptian military representatives met at the Cairo-Suez 
road, which effectively ended the war in the Sinai. Shortly thereafter, Sadat announced that he 
planned to award the American Bechtel Corporation a $345 million contract to build an oil 
pipeline that from the Gulf of Suez to the Mediterranean. He seemed to intend to demonstrate 
to the Americans just how ready he was to do business.29 Kissinger reflected that the United 
States became “the pivotal factor in the diplomacy.”30 W alter Issacson, a largely sympathetic 
biographer of Kissinger, outlined the momentous American victory the direct talks had 
engendered:
H enceforth , negotiations w ould replace armed con flict in  the Arab-Israeli dispute. It was, for 
Kissinger, a major d iplom atic success. H is strategy, w hich  had seem ed  foolhardy during the war, 
had produced just w hat he had desired: a military sta lem ate that w ould require intricate 
n egotiations. T h e Soviets had lost their influence, and A m erica’s historic difficulty in  forging 
ties w ith  Arab nations had b een  overcom e.31
Formidable problems, nonetheless, lay before Kissinger. A  m utual willingness on the 
part of Egyptians and Israelis to negotiate did not mean that the ensuing shuttle diplomacy was 
going to be easy. Before Kissinger embarked on his historic Middle East trip, he recognized the 
fragile nature of the cease-fire. The Egyptian Third Army was still cut off, and their situation 
would likely become more dire so long as Israel did not get back its POWs.
The Arab oil embargo, commenced during the height of the fighting in protest of 
American support to Israel, was wreaking havoc on the industrial alliance of W est Europe, J apan
28Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1982), 610.
29Joseph Kraft, “Letter from Cairo," N ew  Yorker. 17 Decem ber 1973, 132.
30Kissinger, Years of Upheaval. 612.
W alter Issacson, Kissinger: A  Biography (New York: Simon &  Schuster, 1992), 537.
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and the United States. The former two -  entirely dependent on foreign oil sources -  were clearly 
shifting their policy to a more pro-Arab stance, thus demonstrating to the Persian Gulf states 
that oil could be an effective tool of coercive diplomacy. Israel, always conscious of its own 
survival, realized tha t its intransigence could dampen American support, as evidenced by 
W ashington’s refusal to allow the destruction of the Third Army. In fact, only after the United 
States linked further aid to Israel with cooperation in allowing a UN task force to monitor the 
Third Army did Meir relent.32 In the Israeli view, there was no other country in the world on 
which it could count. If American policy would not be formed in lockstep with Israeli wishes, 
they wondered where the concessions would end.33
To make matters worse, Kissinger had never conducted diplomacy with an Arab nation 
before. Until the Yom Kippur W ar, the Cold W ar had, in recent times, effectively sealed off the 
United States from the Arab world. Kissinger’s first significant contact came on October 29. 
The acting (soon to be permanent) Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy paid Kissinger a visit at the 
State Departm ent in preparation for Kissinger’s upcoming trip to Egypt. Fahmy’s mission, as 
Kissinger recalled, was removed “the tensions tha t had characterized Egyptian-American 
relations for nearly twenty years.”34 The Foreign Minister reported exactly what Kissinger 
wanted to hear. Sadat, he reported, was not interested in  destroying Israe. In Middle East 
politics, this was a small step toward official recognition of the Jewish state.
Detente and the New American Position
Between the time of the war’s close and his departure for the Middle East, Kissinger had
32Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally, 510.
33Kissinger, Years o f Upheaval. 620.
34Ibid., 617.
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successfully laid the groundwork that would ensure American leadership in, and Soviet expulsion
from, the peace process between the Arabs and Israelis. Soviet influence in the Middle East was
based not on socialist-fraternal ideology but on the special geo-strategic characteristics that the
dependent Arab states afforded Moscow. The diplomatic efficacy of Soviet weapons had run its
course during the war, and now Kissinger was prodigiously attem pting to deny the Russians a
meaningful role in the negotiation process -  a relatively easy task for the Egyptian-Israeli
disengagement, given tha t Sadat had little to no interest in Soviet involvement.
As W ashington understood the new system of relaxed superpower tensions that had
developed in recent years, it is worth asking: Did American diplomacy after the Yom Kippur W ar
run counter to detente principles? Melvin Laird, former Secretary of Defense under Richard
Nixon, described American-Soviet relations in the detente period with these words:
T h e true question  confronting us is n ot w hether it is possible to have instant revolution in our 
relations w ith  the S ov iet U nion . It is, rather, w hether we can  be peaceful adversaries w ithout 
becom ing belligerent antagonists, w hether we can  resolve w hat can  be resolved and control w hat 
can n ot. T h at is w hat the statem ent o f  Basic Principles o f  M utual R elations b etw een  the U nited  
States and the U .S .S .R . agreed to in  M oscow  on  M ay 29, 1972, is all about.35
As Laird’s characterization of the 1972 summit -  the pinnacle of detente politics -  makes clear,
detente was in no way an idealistic path toward superpower solidarity, but merely a recognition
that a continuing adversarial relationship ought never to devolve to the point of nuclear war.
A  contemporary State D epartm ent brochure quoted Kissinger’s conception of detente: “We will
react if a relaxation of tensions is used as a cover to exacerbate conflicts in international trouble
spots. The events in the Middle East during October 1973 dem onstrated tha t this...principle
cannot be disregarded without endangering the entire U.S.-Soviet relationship.”35
35M elvin R. Laird, The N ixon Doctrine (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for 
Public Policy Research, 1972), 6.
36United States, Department o f  State, The Meaning o f D eten te, Publication N o. 8766 (1974), 2.
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Kissinger embarked on the American-mediated Egyptian-Israeli disengagements on a 
basis that worked within the framework of detente in two ways. The Cold W ar system 
continued to be defined as a superpower competition for influence in the Third World, of which 
the Middle East was one vital region. The adversarial U.S.-Soviet relationship was based largely 
on this basic determinant, which, after the Yom Kippur W ar, tipped in favor of the United 
States. In W ashington’s view, it was actually Soviet actions before the war tha t violated the 
spirit of detente, when Moscow failed to alert the Americans of an im minent Arab attack. The 
Soviet Union’s longstanding opposition to an Arab attack was effectively neutralized when 
Moscow realized that its Arab clients had received sufficient arms to ignore the Soviets’ will. 
Rather than  risk another loss of influence on par with Sadat’s famous expulsion of Soviet 
advisors in the summer of 1972, Moscow decided to support its Arab clients’ determination to 
go to war. The Arab battle plan required a surprise attack, at which point the Soviets decided 
to sweep detente politics in favor of Moscow’s influence in the Middle East.
Because the Soviets had no political sway over Israeli foreign policy, arms supplies to 
their Arab clients constituted their only viable method of maintaining prestige in the region. 
Moscow’s lack of political influence in the Arab-Israeli conflict explained, as one expert noted, 
their “interest, not in peace in the Middle East, but in a low-burning, continuing conflict which 
[gave] them  leverage in the Arab world.”37 As Kissinger’s diplomatic efforts began the path to 
a true negotiated peace, Moscow denigrated American policy not because American influence 
in the region violated detente politics; quite the opposite. United States policy following the 
Yom Kippur W ar sought to supplant the faulty and newly excluded Soviet policy for
37United States, Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings: D etente (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), 145.
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W ashington’s own interests in peace and political regional influence. As one expert concluded 
of the new post-war situation, “[Moscow] understands tha t nothing could assure a diminution 
of its role or its attractiveness to prospective regional clients than the development of peace and 
stability in the area.”38
Kissinger’s efforts produced exactly the effect tha t Moscow feared, as exemplified by 
Sadat’s meeting with the Soviet ambassador to Egypt Sergei Vinogradov to inform him -  only 
in passing -  of the Six-Point process toward disengagement with the Israelis, as brokered by 
Kissinger.39 Indeed, Moscow was truly relegated to the periphery of the peace process. Perhaps 
most stunning of all U nited States diplomatic efforts came when Kissinger visited China on 
November 10, when Premier Zhou Enlai congratulated the Secretary of State for his role in 
reducing Soviet prestige in the Arab world.40 Zhou’s response was exactly the kind that 
Kissinger’s linkage policy had aimed to elicit. W ith Sino-American relations on the upswing, 
Moscow found itself further isolated on the international stage, and was thus sufficiently unable 
to protest meaningfully W ashington’s new position amid the Arab-Israeli conflict.41
N ot only was U.S. diplomacy bringing both sides of the protracted Middle East conflict 
within its sphere of influence, the recent loss of the Soviet U nion’s regional prestige was taking 
on global proportions. Moreover, all of this happened without any significant threat of nuclear 
war. Before Kissinger began his historic Middle East trip, he declared, “W e must prove to the
38U nited States, Congress, The Middle East. 1974: N ew  Hones. N ew  Challenges. 1974, 42. 76.
39Golan Yom Kippur and After, 137.
40Kissinger, Years of Upheaval. 683.
4lIt is telling that Pravda and Izvestia. the two major news organs o f  the Soviet Communist Party, 
gave almost no attention to the Arab-Israel conflict in the months following the Yom Kippur War. For a 
news summary that typically avoids any honest appraisal of M oscow’s diminished position, see “The War in 
the Middle East -  III,” reprinted in The Current Digest o f the Soviet Press 43 (Columbus, OH: American 
Association for the A dvancem ent o f Slavic Studies, 1973), 7.
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Arabs that they are better off dealing with us on a moderate program than  dealing with the 
Russians on a radical program.”42 Kissinger embarked on his Middle East trip with the intent to 
exploit the benefits of detente: the superpowers were to remain adversaries, bu t the unlikelihood 
of nuclear war helped to ensure the success of his diplomatic goals.
Dr. Kissinger Goes to the Middle East
Kissinger’s goals were relatively plausible, at least with Anwar Sadat. O ne scholar goes so far as 
to argue, “only the failure of the U.S. to respond to Sadat’s overtures prevented a policy 
transformation prior to the October War.... American mediation was what he wanted all along.”43 
Ironically, the Saudis, who were then engaged in coercive diplomacy, in the form of a major oil 
embargo that amounted to economic warfare in protest of pro-Zionist American policies, were 
instrum ental in guiding Sadat to seek a political solution under U.S. auspices.44 As the war 
ground to a halt, Sadat sought desperately for a political solution tha t would finalize a military 
disengagement between Israeli and Egyptian forces. T he Egyptian economy was in ruins, and 
Sadat was eager to reopen the Suez Canal to attract foreign capital to the region -  a feat that 
could only be accomplished with a durable peace in hand.45 Kissinger’s step-by-step approach, 
which demanded incremental concessions from both sides, offered the most promising delivery 
for a rapid disengagement. The Egyptian leader was all too eager for Kissinger’s arrival.
As one observer noted, when Kissinger landed in Cairo, he established “something the
42Ibid., 616.
43Raymond A . Hinnebusch, Jr., Egyptian Politics Under Sadat: The Post-Populist Developm ent of 
an Authoritarian-Modernizing State (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988), 55.
44Kirk J. Beattie, Egypt During the Sadat Years (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 148.
45A lvin  Z. Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile: The Soviet-Egyptian Influence Relationship Since the 
lune War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 290.
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United States had never really possessed before -  an Arab policy.”46 Kissinger’s simple formula
stated that the United States was committed to a new even-handed role in the Middle East
peace process tha t promised a balance of Arab territorial demands with Israeli security. Kissinger
was greeted at the Cairo airport warmly and met Sadat between a whirlwind tour of the Egyptian
Museum and the Great Pyramids. Perhaps these visits were m eant to overwhelm the American
with Egypt’s long history and power. As one scholar noted, the diplomatic objectives of Kissinger
and Sadat were so similar tha t at their meeting, “they rushed in to each other’s arms.”47
Kissinger, always the consummate diplomat, flattered Sadat by asking him how he managed to
pull off the brilliant surprise attack that made the Yom Kippur W ar possible. Afterwards,
Kissinger recalled his basic message to Sadat:
N asser’s policy o f  trying to extort con cession s by m obilizing the Third W orld against us w ith  
Soviet support had n ot worked in the past and w ould n o t be perm itted to work in the future. 
Peace in  the M iddle East could  n ot com e about by the defeat o f  A m erican  allies w ith  Soviet 
arms— as we had just show n. But an Egypt pursuing its ow n  national policy w ould find us ready 
to cooperate. W e sought n o  preem inence in  Egypt.48
Kissinger’s narrow definition of “preeminence” in the context of Arab politics attempted to
contrast U.S. aims with Soviet aims. W hereas Moscow had armed much of the Arab world as
a tradeoff for regional influence and prestige, the United States indeed sought “preeminence”
in the sense that American diplomacy would replace Soviet weaponry as the grand peacemaker.
Kissinger was not telling Sadat anything the Egyptian president did not know or believe, but he
wanted to make sure tha t Sadat was under no illusions about Kissinger’s goals and expectations:
Look, I am a serious person. I shall keep w hat I can  promise, but I sh an ’t promise w hat I can ’t
46Edward R.F. Sheehan, “How Kissinger Did It: Step by Step in the Middle East,” Foreign Policy 
22 (Spring, 1976), 17-
47John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy o f  Two Regimes 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 401.
48Kissinger, Years of Upheaval. 638.
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keep. If you exp ect from m e broad and sweeping declarations, th en  I’m  n o t your m an....W e m ust 
put aside irreconcilable differences for the m om ent. W e m ust build confidence; con ceive a 
negotiating dynam ic. W e  m ust set in m otion  small agreem ents. W e  m ust proceed step by step.49
The meeting ended with Sadat’s acceptance of what came to be known as the Six-Point 
Agreement, which mandated strict observance of the cease-fire, free transfer of nonmilitary 
supplies to be managed by UN checkpoints (especially im portant for the Third Army, which was 
facing certain ruin at this point), and an immediate transfer of all POW s.50 Egypt’s acceptance 
of the plan thus officially set in motion that country’s acceptance of the United States as post­
war mediator. As William Bundy, an expert on the foreign policy of the Nixon administration, 
characterized the meeting, Kissinger convinced Sadat to accept the American position “as an 
act of faith: if Egypt and other Arab nations could make Israel confident of its own security, he 
could persuade it to make territorial concessions.”51 The peace process was only in its infancy; 
at the end of the meeting with Sadat, he reminded the Secretary of State, “never forget, Dr. 
Kissinger. I am making this agreement with the United States, no t with Israel.”52
Nonetheless, both the Egyptians and Israelis were quickly moving toward a settlement. 
For the Israelis, the Yom Kippur W ar turned their entire defense strategy on its head and 
exposed a gravely flawed intelligence system. W ith Egypt’s crossing of the Suez, the Sinai had 
become a strategic liability -  not an ideal buffer zone. A  disengagement, in Israel’s view, would 
give the country sufficient “breathing space” to recover from the multiple traumas created by a 
bloody, unforseen war. Meanwhile, the Egyptian military was exhausted, and since both sides 
basically agreed that American diplomacy would pick up where the fighting left off, there was
49Sheehan, “How Kissinger Did It,” 16.
50See Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally. 511 for full text o f the agreement.
51Bundy, A  Tangled W eb. 447.
52Anwar Sadat, as cited in Kissinger, Years o f Upheaval, 643.
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little need for continued military engagement. Golda Meir accepted the proposal after some 
initial protests from the Israeli cabinet about the supposedly pro-Arab characteristics of the Six- 
Point Agreement. O n  November 11, Israel and Egypt signed the agreement at Kilometer 101, 
with General Mohamed Abdel Ghany el-Gamasy representing Egypt and General A haron Yariv 
representing Israel. As the political scientist Nitza Nachmias observed: “The direct negotiations 
signified a de facto recognition of Israel, and the representatives not only negotiated issues 
relevant to the implementation of the cease-fire, but they also exchanged ideas informally about 
broader and more far-reaching disengagement agreements.”53
By the end of Kissinger’s trip, he had visited many countries of the Arab world, 
effectively smoothed over U.S.-Arab tensions (although the oil embargo would remain in place 
for months to come), and stabilized the cease-fire. O n  November 15, Egypt and Israel 
exchanged POWs. The Egyptian-Israeli war was over, under tight American management with 
no meaningful Soviet contributions to the process, aside from Moscow’s noble refusal to escalate 
the crisis. The stage was thus set for a negotiated peace.
Toward Geneva
One of Kissinger’s aims for the Geneva Conference, to be held sometime in mid-December, was 
to slow down the bilateral talks at Kilometer 101, which threatened to  preempt W ashington’s 
interest in mediating the conflict. In Kissinger’s view, Geneva would formalize the pivotal 
United States role in the peace process, and luckily for him, Egypt withdrew from the Kilometer 
101 talks on November 29 after repeated frustrations in negotiating with the Israelis. The 
Egyptian Third Army was still cut off, Israel wanted a formal opportunity to demonstrate its
53Nachmias, Transfer of Arms. 64.
2 1 5
willingness to negotiate with Arabs, and Kissinger wanted remain centrally associated with all
negotiations -  in part because of his vanity, a determ inant never too far from his decisions.54 A t
a news conference on December 6, Kissinger outlined his expectations for Geneva:
W e believe that on ce  the [G eneva] conference starts, a negotiating process will be underway, 
w hich, dealing first w ith  issues o f  a military nature and then  turning to the overall settlem ent, 
will bring about a settlem ent in accordance w ith  R esolution  2 4 2 . A n d  the U n ited  States, as I 
have stated repeatedly, will use its influence to bring about su ch  a se ttlem en t.53
O n  December 7 Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan visited W ashington, D.C., to
discuss the plan for Geneva. Dayan stated that the full disengagement need not wait until after
the Israeli national elections scheduled for December 31. Kissinger, tellingly, warned against
excessively swift actions, lest the Arab world assume an exaggerated American leverage over
Israeli foreign policy. Dayan proposed a disengagement tha t would ultimately be based on a
return to the Israeli borders prior to the Six-Day W ar, which would be commenced by a
withdrawal approximately 30 miles east of the Suez Canal in return for Egyptian demilitarization
and a pledge to reopen the Canal.56 Sadat, with some minor haggling, agreed to Dayan’s
proposals, which formed the basis of the full disengagement on January 18. So as not to appear
as if he were conceding to Israeli plans for force limitations on Arab soil, Sadat stipulated that
he would make agreements only through Kissinger, to which the Secretary of State happily
agreed.57
W arm relations between the Egyptians and Israelis were far from being realized, and in early 
December, full participation at Geneva remained highly uncertain. Military skirmishes had not
54Issacson, Kissinger. 542.
55Henry Kissinger, as cited in United States, Department o f State, Bulletin N o. 1800 (1973), 755.
56Safran Israel: The Embattled Ally. 515.
57Tad Szulc, T he Illusion o f Peace: Foreign Policy in the N ixon Years (New York: Viking 
Press, 1978), 758.
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yet completely subsided between the Egyptian and Israeli forces. U.S. policy was determined to
halt Egypt from destroying the Deservoir pocket, where an Israeli division was vulnerable to
destruction. Kissinger arrived in Cairo on December 11, partly to warn tha t an Egyptian attack
on Deservoir might bring a direct attack with U.S. forces. Referring to the heavy military losses
sustained by Israel at the beginning of the war, Kissinger threatened Sadat: “The Pentagon will
strike at you. The Pentagon will strike you for one reason: Soviet weapons have once before
defeated U.S. weapons and, in accordance with our global strategy, we can’t allow it to happen
again.”58 Meanwhile, Israel threatened to boycott the Geneva Conference if the thorny
Palestinian issue were to be raised there. Nixon’s subsequent direct threat to Golda Meir, which
was a textbook utilization of coercive diplomacy, underscored the determ ination of U.S. policy
to keep the peace process on track under its own management:
I w ant to say to you in all solem nity that if Israel now  fails to take a favorable decision  to  
participate in  the conference on  the basis o f  the letter that we have worked out, this will n ot be 
understood either in the U n ited  States or in the world and I will n o t be able to  justify the support 
w hich  I have consistently  rendered in our m utual interests to  your governm ent.59
In other words, the Israelis would not be able to count on future American support if
they did not come to Geneva. The main reason for U.S. insistence for attendance at Geneva
under a stable military situation was because W ashington was poised to take full advantage of
the diminished Soviet position in Egypt. As Kissinger recounted, Sadat was planning to
“gradually eliminate the last vestiges of the Soviet presence....He would let the Soviet-Egyptian
Friendship Treaty slide into desuetude or cancel it.”60 Sadat could not carry out his plans until
negotiations were settled. O n  December 14, Kissinger expounded on the since-ended Kilometer
58Henry Kissinger, as cited in Anwar el-Sadat, In Search o f Identity: A n  Autobiography (New  
York: Harper &  Row, 1977), 268-269.
59Richard N ixon, as cited in Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 759.
60Ibid., 768.
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101 talks, which, along with the Dayan plan, would form the basis for the January 18 
disengagement: thinned-out Egyptian and Israeli forces with the former firmly planted on the 
Sinai, and a UN buffer force placed in the middle.
The following day, the UN released Security Council Resolution 344, titled “Peace 
Conference in the Middle East.” Article 2 read: “[The Security Council] expresses its 
confidence that the Secretary-General will play a full and effective role at the [Geneva] 
Conference, in accordance with the relevant resolutions fo the Security Council, and that he will 
preside over its proceedings if the parties so desire.”61 The hopes expressed in the UN resolution 
may as well have been intended for Kissinger, not the Secretary-General. The Secretary of State 
arrived in Damascus that same day to attem pt to convince the Syrians to join the conference. 
Kissinger’s objective ultimately failed, although Syria’s boycott was not necessarily a protest 
against the entire peace process per se, but reflective of their negative attitude to Geneva in 
particular. In  any event, U.S.-Syrian relations did not blossom after the war -  Syrian leader 
Hafez al-Asad was not nearly so interested as Sadat in reorienting his foreign policy toward the 
West. Moscow responded by redirecting much of its efforts to exert influence on Damascus once 
Sadat made the Soviets unwelcome in Egypt.62 Kissinger’s trip to Israel on December 16 and 17 
proved more fruitful; Israel accepted the invitation to Geneva on the condition that there would 
be no mention of the Palestinians.63
Despite significant problems, Israel and Egypt agreed to attend the conference. O n 
December 20, in Geneva, one day before the start of the conference, Kissinger dined with Soviet
61United Nations. 2003. U .N . Security Council Resolutions. 1973. 
< http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1973/scres73.htm>  (9 Novem ber 2003).
62Richard C. Thornton, The Nixon-Kissinger Years: Reshaping America's Foreign Policy (New  
York: Paragon House, 1989), 253.
63Quandt, Peace Process. 196.
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Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who expressed frustration at the growing Soviet irrelevance 
during the peace process.64 Moscow’s participation at Geneva would satisfy (if only 
symbolically) the Brezhnev-Nixon agreement of October 21, which guaranteed the Soviets a role 
in the post-war negotiating process.65 The Soviet Union’s rather perfunctory presence at the 
conference was basically a necessary function of detente policy, (in this formal setting, 
W ashington deferred to the Basic Principles Agreement of May, 1972, a docum ent that opposed 
unilateralism) and was in no way a reflection of Moscow’s position in post-Yom Kippur W ar 
period.
The Calculation of Geneva
The Israeli leaders were skeptical of the Geneva Conference from the m om ent it was put forth
as a negotiating forum. As Golda Meir recounted,
N eith er I nor m ost other Israelis really believed , in our heart o f  hearts, that w e w ould Q a n ev a  
w ith peace treaties in  our hands, and we d idn’t go there w ith  m any illusions or in a state o f  
euphoria. Still, the Egyptians and Jordanians had agreed to sit in  the sam e room  w ith us, and  
that, in itself, was som ething that they had never con sen ted  to do before.66
The Israeli position was reasonable enough; as one scholar noted, Kissinger’s real in tent was to
finally eliminate Moscow from the negotiations during a conference tha t would only perpetuate
the failure of solving the Arab-Israeli dispute under formal circumstances.67 The real peace
process would be conducted during Kissinger’s famous shuttle diplomacy, characterized by
informal one -on-one contacts with all sides.
64Kissinger, Years o f  Upheaval. 794.
65Ishaq I. Ghanayem and Alden H. Voth, The Kissinger Legacy: American-M iddle East Policy 
(New York: Praeger, 1984), 126.
66Meir, Mv Life. 454.
67Bundy, A  Tangled W eb. 448.
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After a minor problem concerning seating arrangements, the conference began on 
December 21.68 Kissinger’s opening speech managed to erase any remaining political credibility 
the Soviets may have retained with Sadat, who had found in the Secretary of State a new ally 
in delivering exactly what he hoped the Yom Kippur W ar would force. Kissinger declared: “Our 
final objective is the implementation in all its parts of Resolution 242. This goal has the full 
support of the United States.”69 The American goal of realizing Resolution 242 was not new, of 
course, bu t after six years of failed UN attempts to secure its own policies, Kissinger effectively 
assumed the central mediating position under UN auspices. A t Geneva, the Secretary of State 
managed to solve the self-defeating Arab and Israeli positions that had made negotiation before 
the war impossible.70 Israel had always sought direct negotiations with Arab leaders before 
considering any territorial concessions, and the Arabs refused direct negotiations as long as Israel 
was occupying Arab territory. Kissinger appealed to both sides, no t by scolding their positions, 
but through flattery. He was a natural mediator, which is exactly how the United States wanted 
to contrast its position with that of the Soviets. Kissinger declared: “The great tragedies of 
history occur not when right confronts wrong, but when two rights face each other.”71
Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban told the Arab delegations what would amount to the 
first major Israeli pledge to trade land for security -  the very bargain Jerusalem shunned because 
of the security they assumed that the occupied land would guarantee: “W e are ready for a 
territorial compromise which would serve the legitimate interests of all signatory states. In this
68The final position had the United States between Egypt and Jordan. The Soviet U nion sat 
between Israel on one side and an empty table for the Syrians, in case they decided to attend later on.
69Henry Kissinger, as cited in United States, Department o f  State, Special Report: U.S. Policy in 
the Middle East December 1973-November 1974, Bureau o f  Public Affairs Publication N o. 8799 (1975), 12.
70United States Institute of Peace, Making Peace Am ong Arabs and Israelis: Lessons from Fifty 
Years of Negotiating Experience (1991), 8.
71Henry Kissinger, as cited in U nited States, Department o f  State, Special Report. 13.
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matter, as in others, there must be a basic readiness on all sides to make such concessions as do 
not threaten vital security interests.”72 Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmy, for his part, advocated 
sovereignty for all nations of the Middle East -  of which Israel, by implication, was one. Fahmy’s 
subtle delivery was yet another hint from Egypt that his country was ready to move toward 
normalized relations with a nemesis of 25 years that had never before enjoyed political 
recognition from the Arabs.
The Geneva Conference ended after two days, despite the impressive political 
exchanges. As one observer characterized the conference, “the only result was tha t Egypt and 
Israel were urged to begin discussing the disengagement of their forces on both  sides of the Suez 
Canal.”73 Geneva ended exactly as Kissinger had hoped: promising rhetoric between Egypt and 
Israel without any immediate substance that could be linked to Moscow’s presence.
Toward the Shuttle
A  December, 1973, article in Egypt’s semi-official Al-Ahram  newspaper outlined the connection 
between the war and the ability to negotiate: “Before the war the Arabs had no cards to play in 
negotiation...it had become fixed in the world’s mind that they would never fight...after the war 
all that had changed.”74 The Arab “cards" were crucial for the successful execution of Kissinger’s 
diplomacy, which required both  sides to be in a position of relative strength so tha t concessions 
would be tolerable. Israel, after enjoying six years of unchallenged hegemony, was now amenable 
-  at least in principle -  to negotiations that could eventually lead to full realization of Arab
72Abba Eban, A n  Autobiography. (New York: Random House, 1977), 550.
73Szulc, The Illusion of Peace, 749.
74Raymond W illiam Baker, Egypt’s Uncertain Revolution Under Nasser and Sadat (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1978), 138.
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demands in exchange for the regional recognition tha t had always eluded the young country
since its creation in 1948. Most important, all mediating rested in  the hands of the United
States. As Alvin Rubinstein, a scholar, colorfully noted,
W ith  stunning alacrity, Sadat proceeded to  plum p all it-s eggs ostentatiously in  Kissinger’s 
basket, leaving the S oviets em pty handed and furious. T h ey  had provisioned Egypt, shielded it 
from certain  defeat, and im periled their d eten te w ith  the U n ited  States, on ly to  find their 
relations w ith  Sadat worse than ever and the Soviet governm ent relegated to the sidelines in  the 
negotiations that were under way for a M iddle East se ttlem en t.75
The term “shuttle diplomacy” was coined by Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco, as a
Boeing 747 more or less became an airborne United States D epartm ent of State that flew back
and forth between Egypt and Israel during much of January 1974- W hereas the formal setting
of the Geneva Conference mirrored the bureaucratic style of the failed Rogers and Jarring
missions, under United States and UN auspices, respectively, the face to face nature of shuttle
diplomacy would deny Moscow any meaningful influence and allow both Israel and Egypt to offer
incremental concessions to each other through the personal mediation of Kissinger.
As Israeli Foreign Minister Eban noted, there was no precedent for shuttle diplomacy,
which was truly a one m an show, whose leader “showed a candid lack of reverence for the
professional skills at the disposal of the State Departm ent.”76 W hen Kissinger wrote in a 1974
essay that “a scientific revolution has, for all practical purposes, removed technical limits from
the exercise of power in foreign policy,” he may very well have had his Boeing in mind.77
Kissinger’s plane was fully equipped for all incoming and outgoing communication, and rather
than delegate other diplomatic assignments to subordinates back at Foggy Bottom, (concern with
the rest of the world quickly took a back seat to Middle East affairs, which monopolized
75Rubinstein, Red Star on  the N ile. 288.
76Eban, A n  Autobiography. 558.
77Kissinger, American Foreign Policy. 54.
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Kissinger’s attention for the next several months) the State Departm ent and its responsibilities 
followed Kissinger around the Middle East.
Kissinger defined the objectives of shuttle diplomacy at a State Departm ent news 
conference on December 27: “W e are not approaching the problem of negotiations by drawing 
up a list of concessions that either side should make. W hat we have attem pted to do is discover, 
as honestly as we could, in these trips through the Middle East, what the minimum requirements 
of each side were and then attem pt to bring these into some relation to each other.”78 Kissinger 
believed the Rogers Plan of 1969 failed precisely because it was based on a sweeping and final 
agreement -  something neither side was willing to accept then or in  late 1973.79 As I. William 
Zartman put it, the idea of the step-by-step process is “eating bit by bit what cannot be swallowed 
all at once, and it is the idea of building both m utual concessions and m utual trust upon the 
previous partial agreement.”80 Kissinger believed that the commitment to peace in both Egypt 
and Israel was fragile -  the path  must be forged incrementally. W hile Moscow’s radical policy 
of maximum demands for Israeli evacuation of the occupied territories had failed, sweeping 
diplomatic gestures could shatter the balance and bring the Arab-Israeli conflict back to its pre­
war deadlock.
Additionally, Kissinger’s method carefully abstained from pressing American wishes on 
either side. As Nadav Safran, a Middle East specialist put it, “Such a role would have brought 
about the end of negotiations the moment one of the parties refused to go along with a position 
of his, and would have put the United States under the obligation to side actively with the party
78Henry Kissinger, as cited in United States, Department o f State, Bulletin N o.1804  (1974), 55.
79W illiam B. Quandt, Decade o f Decisions (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1977), 209.
80Zartman, “Explaining Disengagement,” in Rubin, ed., Dynamics o f Third Party Intervention,
158.
2 2 3
that had agreed with it or to risk losing credibility and usefulness.”81 W here Egypt and Israel 
haggled over kilometers and force strengths as the major foreign policy issues, the American 
interest was far broader and implicit throughout.82 So long as Kissinger was doing the mediating 
at the exclusion of the Soviets (and keeping the peace process moving forward), the centrality 
of the American position was W ashington’s interest. The United States was happy to see real 
progress made in the Arab-Israeli conflict, which had been at a standstill during the entire 
interwar period. Kissinger’s opposition to the Rogers proposals (and for tha t matter, all forms of 
sweeping diplomacy) was finally vindicated, as his claim made throughout N ixon’s first term -  
that peace was impossible so long as the Soviets advocated all Arab demands -  came to fruition, 
when Egyptian and Israeli officials negotiated directly for the first time in history, without any 
input from Moscow.
In sum, Kissinger’s step-by-step method in the Middle East was in keeping with his larger 
conception of international relations. As Kissinger biographers Bernard Kalb and Marvin Kalb 
noted, Kissinger based his foreign policy on the concept of linkage, which ‘‘was an up-to-date 
application of Kissinger’s theories about the balance of power.”83 The post-war situation in the 
Middle East offered the Secretary of State a microscopic application of his grand theory: after the 
Yom Kippur W ar Israel and the Arabs mutually recognized their rough balance of power. As 
Kissinger’s conception of linkage held, a balance of power was required for the basis of 
negotiations, which in turn would provide lasting stability. As G. W arren N utter, a former 
Assistant Secretary of Defense, noted, Kissinger’s application of shuttle diplomacy could not
81Safran, “Engagement in the Middle East,” 59.
82United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings: Priorities for Peace 
in the Middle East (W ashington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), 144-145.
83Bernard Kalb and Marvin Kalb, Kissinger (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), 102.
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succeed, “unless a stable order is achievable, the quest for peace is bound to be self-defeating. 
Hence the statem ent has the paramount duty of creating and preserving stability.”84 Kissinger 
saw himself as the crucial link in a series of Middle East events tha t was on a clear progression 
toward peace -  all of which was happening at the exclusion of Moscow. It was not an 
opportunity to be missed.
From the Shuttle to the Disengagement
Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan visited W ashington on January 4 to  present Jerusalem’s 
plan for disengagement. He proposed that Egypt would keep the land it had won, while Israel 
would move back approximately 20 kilometers from the Canal and a UN force would separate 
the two forces. O n  a map, the Israeli government was offering a few kilometers -  quantitatively 
a barely significant amount. In symbolic terms the offer was momentous. Egypt was about to 
receive a firm hold in the Sinai and all of the Suez Canal area, thus fulfilling a small portion of 
Sadat’s major war objective. The offer, however, was more a reflection on Israel’s internal 
turmoil than anything else. Jerusalem needed a quick disengagement as badly as Cairo. 
Whereas Sadat was eager to reopen the Suez Canal, as mentioned above, the reservists currently 
serving in the Israeli military had cut the domestic work force by a quarter, thus ensuring severe 
decline in the gross domestic product which was further harmed by Israel’s increased defense 
expenditures.85 Like Egypt’s own position, Israel’s eagerness to disengage boded well for 
Kissinger’s plan.
Kissinger began his famous shuttle on J anuary 11. His first stop was Aswan, the town
84G. Warren Nutter, Kissinger’s Grand Design (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute 
for Public Policy Research, 1975), 2.
85Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally, 522.
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where Sadat was currently residing. The Egyptian leader was so keen on disengagement that 
he offered Kissinger a self-imposed deadline to travel around the region to convince other Arab 
leaders of America’s good intentions, which, he hoped, would end the oil embargo and 
strengthen Nixon’s precarious position in Washington. Remarkably, Sadat assured Kissinger that 
Egypt’s desire for disengagement stood irrespective of the Syrians’ intransigence. As Kissinger 
recounted, “Sadat was convinced that unless Egypt proceeded alone, President Hafez al-Asad 
would always find some pretext for delay or put forward impossible demands. A  Sinai agreement 
would thus, in Sadat’s view, help Syria face its realities.”86
Kissinger’s most difficult task for the disengagement centered on force reduction levels. 
By the middle of January, Israel and Egypt agreed to positioning, acceptable weaponry, and the 
presence of a UN buffer zone. Kissinger managed to convince Sadat, against the advice of his 
senior military officers, to reduce Egypt’s manpower on the front from 70,000 to 7,500. As Abba 
Eban recalled, “It was this decision by Sadat that led me, for the first time, to reflect that a 
substantive change of direction might have taken place in Egyptian territory.”87 O n January 13, 
Kissinger sensed that the disengagement was close to completion. He proposed that three letters 
should be drafted to formalize the process -  one each for Egypt, Israel, and the United States. 
The lack of any Soviet involvement was striking, especially since there was no attem pt on 
Kissinger’s part to maintain a low-level atmosphere about the negotiations.88 After some 
relatively minor quibbling about force positioning, both Israel and Egypt agreed to the essence 
of what Moshe Dayan had proposed in W ashington earlier in the month. Each side pledged to
86Kissinger, Years o f Upheaval. 815.
87Eban, A n  Autobiography. 561.
88Sheehan, “How Kissinger Did It," 32-33.
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reduce its strength to an identical level: 7,000 troops, 36 artillery pieces, and 30 tanks.89 In four 
days of shutttling between Aswan and Jerusalem, Kissinger managed to secure an agreement 
between two hostile but willing adversaries. Upon Sadat’s January 14 commitment to proceed 
with the disengagement, Kissinger summarized (and not w ithout a tinge of gloating): “The 
disengagement, above all, would mark Egypt’s passage from reliance on the Soviet Union to 
partnership (in Sadat’s phrase) with the United States; and it would give us a major stake in the 
peace process that would be further magnified by having it be seen to emerge from an American 
proposal.”90
During a W hite House speech announcing the disengagement, Nixon declared:
In the past generation  there have been , as w e know , four wars in  the M ideast, follow ed by uneasy  
truces. [T he d isen gagem en t], I w ould  say, is the first significant step  toward a perm anent peace 
in  the M ideast...[o]u r role has b een  on e o f  being o f  assistance to b oth  parties to bring them  
together, to help narrow differences...I think that we cou ld  probably say that the area o f  the 
world that potentially  is the on e in w hich  the great powers can  be brought into confrontation  
is the M ideast, that area m ore than  any other is in  that category, as recent events have 
in dicated .91
It is perhaps too cynical to interpret N ixon’s triumphal tone merely in terms of his need to seek 
respite from W atergate. The significance of the disengagement, and for that m atter the concept 
of “perm anent peace,” is open to debate. But the Yom Kippur W ar would be the last between 
Egypt and Israel.
O n  January 19, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko predictably declared that the 
disengagement was the result of the Geneva conference. He gave no m ention of Kissinger’s
89United States Institute o f Peace, Making Peace Am ong Arabs, xxii. For the full text o f  the Sinai 
Disengagement see U nited States Congress, House, The Search for Peace in the Middle East: Documents 
and Statements. 1967-1979, report prepared for a subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. 1979, 1.
90Kissinger, Years o f  Upheaval. 825.
9lRichard N ixon, as cited in United States, Department of State, Office of the Historian, The 
Quest for Peace: Principal United States Public Statements and Related Docum ents on the Arab-Israeli 
Peace Process. 1967-1983 (Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1984), 51
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efforts in the Middle East. 92 The messages between Anwar Sadat and Golda Meir, as relayed 
by Kissinger on the day of the disengagement, belie a much more honest assessment. Meir’s note 
to Sadat read, “I, for my part, will do my best to establish trust and understanding between us.” 
Sadat’s response bordered on the sublime: “I am today taking off my military uniform - 1 never 
expect to wear it again except for ceremonial occasions. Tell her [Golda] tha t is the answer to 
her letter.”93
Even if leaders found little reason to trust one another, it was in the interest of both to 
commit fully to a disengagement. Sadat was now in  the vitally im portant position to rebuild the 
cities along the Suez Canal, which would virtually guarantee th a t Egypt would not launch 
another war.94 Israel was on track to reformulate its security policy, which would now rest on 
something other than  military force. A  reporter for the New York Times observed on Januaray 
18: “It is the first time tha t Israel has placed her faith in something other that her own 
strength.”95 As opposed to the American weapons airlift to Israel during the war, and the Six 
Point Agreement shortly thereafter, the January 18 disengagement, as one scholar argues 
“represented the first real attem pt on the part of the two [countries] since the beginning of the 
Yom Kippur W ar to accommodate mutually their interests and aims”96 The disengagement thus 
boosted the level of trust the Israeli leadership placed in Kissinger, which would be crucial for 
the upcoming (and far more difficult) Syrian disengagement.
Throughout the peace process, Kissinger displayed his famous realpolitik, which was best
92Golan, Yom Kippur and After. 170-171.
93Kissinger, Years o f Upheaval. 844.
94Szculc, The Illusion o f Peace. 759.
95“Israel Approves Agreem ent to Separate Israeli and Egyptian Armies," N ew York Times, 18 
January 1974.
96Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally. 527.
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exemplified at the Geneva Conference on December 21: “Today there is hope for the future, for 
the conflict is no longer looked upon entirely in terms of irreconcilable absolutes. The passionate 
ideologies of the past have, in part at least, been replaced by a recognition that all the peoples 
concerned have earned, by their sacrifice, a long period of peace.”97 The Secretary of State was 
speaking explicitly of the mutual hatred and fear that had characterized Arab-Israel relations 
since 1948. But he was also implicitly declaring that Soviet influence in Egypt -  which could not 
exist without perpetual tension -  would begin its decline as Moscow had no natural presence in 
the peace process. As one scholar observed, the Middle East events of late 1973 and early 1974 
demonstrated a profound shift from Professor Kissinger of the 1950s to Secretary Kissinger of the 
1970s. In A World Restored, Kissinger argued “diplomacy, the art of restraining the exercise of 
powers, cannot function in [a revolutionary] environm ent.”98 W ith the Egyptian-Israeli 
disengagement of January 1974 -  the first step on a long and shaky path from revolution to peace 
-  Kissinger proved himself wrong. His was a remarkable performance in a region that measured 
success incrementally.99 Comprehensive and lasting Middle East peace remained elusive, and 
Kissinger understood that as well as anyone.
As far as American policy was concerned, Moscow’s exclusion from the peace process 
was at once a victory for United States interests, and a requirement for peace itself. If detente 
is to be judged by its fundamental criterion, the avoidance of nuclear war proved to be a final
97Henry Kissinger, as cited in U nited States, Department o f State, Special Report. 12.
98Cited in Am os Perlmutter, “Crisis Management: Kissinger’s Middle East Negotiations 
(October 1973-June 1974),” International Studies Quarterly 19 (September 1975), 340.
" E ven  John Lewis Gaddis, a prominent critic o f  Henry Kissinger, singled out his impressive record 
in Middle East diplomacy amid an otherwise questionable -  even morally reprehensible -  tenure as de facto 
head o f American foreign policy in the N ixon and Ford administrations. See John Lewis Gaddis, “Rescuing 
Choice from Circumstance: The Statecraft of Henry Kissinger,” in Gordon A . Craig and Francis L. 
Loewenheim, eds., The Diplomats: 1939-1979 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 584.
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vindication of the viability of relaxed superpower tensions. Yet, beyond this determinant, 
Kissinger made clear tha t detente was not tantam ount to political cooperation. W hen Anwar 
Sadat reestablished diplomatic relations with Washington, Kissinger grasped the opportunity 
finally to diminish Soviet prestige in the Middle East. It had been his strategy long before the 
detente summits of 1972 and 1973.
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Chapter VI 
Conclusion
As the first superpower proxy conflict to follow the Soviet-American summits of 1972 and 1973 
(which collectively constitute the high point of the Cold W ar detente), the Yom Kippur W ar 
inevitably put, as the title of this thesis suggests, detente to “the test.” The criteria used in this 
thesis to judge superpower behavior in the Middle East were a construct of detente summitry.
As the historical record clearly indicates, neither the U nited States nor the Soviet Union 
held fast to the guarantees each country made to the other. A n objective reading of the 
agreements to emerge from the Soviet-American detente, studied against the backdrop of the 
policies of each nation toward their Middle East clients in late 1973, revealed, to the author, an 
astonishing lack of regard of the value of an international promise. This yields important lessons 
for understanding international relations.
Diplomatic agreements do not always enjoy the backing of a third party guarantor. 
Those signed by the superpower rivals depended upon an unreliable mixture of incentive and 
fear. Each superpower took every available opportunity to improve its own standing at the 
expense of the o ther when incentive of advantage appeared to outweigh the fear of 
confrontation. Although leaders of both countries declared detente to  be something greater 
than it actually was, the shared impetus to relax tensions and to avoid possible catastrophe 
clearly succeeded in downgrading the threat of nuclear war. Consequently, both the Soviet 
Union and the United States perceived an increased latitude in continuing the political conflict 
that remained at the heart of the Cold War.
For the many reasons discussed throughout this thesis, the Middle East offered an
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unparalleled strategic advantage to the superpower tha t enjoyed the most influence there. It 
was, in the Cold W ar system, the jewel of the non-aligned world. The Arab-Israeli conflict -  
though mostly indigenous in nature -  conveniently served the superpowers’ interests as a vehicle 
to win friends in the region. As Henry Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy demonstrated, there was 
nothing inevitable about the evolution of the client-patron relationships that had added a global 
character to a regional conflict. American-Israeli and Soviet-Arab relations were far rockier than 
the positive, problem-free appearance of public diplomacy. Americans spoke of an “unbreakable 
bond” and a “moral commitment” to protect Israel; Soviets declared that “socialist fraternity” 
impelled Moscow’s support of the Arabs. All were ideological window dressing designed as a 
veneer for strategic self-interest.
The Arabs and Israelis, likewise, proved to be unwilling participants in the superpowers’ 
designs, when doing so did not immediately satisfy their own particular goals. Each resented, and 
resisted, being treated as pawns in the Cold War. The cycle of violence between Israel and 
Egypt, crudely abetted by the arms/influence policies of their superpower patrons, was finally 
broken in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War. As a result, the stalemate between Israel and 
Egypt caused both to emerge as winners -  a rarity in the history of conflict.
Moscow ultimately lost much of its investment in building Soviet prestige in the region. 
The United States, in fulfilling the Cold W ar objective of reducing Soviet influence, would feel 
the aftershocks of its expanded and largely unwelcome Middle Eastern presence in later years. 
Yet the superpowers, too, emerged from the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflagration as winners, and for 
this they had detente to thank. If the policy of relaxed tensions had failed to stave off the Yom 
Kippur W ar, the sincere, and shared aversion to nuclear confrontation -  as codified by the 
fundamental purpose of detente -  prevailed. Even strategic self-interest had its limits.
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